

# FINAL REPORT

## CYPRUS BI-COMMUNAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM EVALUATION

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*Under:*


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## PREFACE

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This evaluation began shortly before negotiations began between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders on the United Nations formula for reconciliation and unification. There was great hope that a “historical moment” was at hand, by which the United Nations, using the “Annan Plan” developed under the leadership of the Secretary-General, could assist both sides to find a path to peace. The UN, supported by the international community, hoped that a settlement would be reached prior to the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the European Union on May 1, 2004. The final corrections on this report were completed the day after the Greek Cypriot citizens decisively rejected the UN plan by their vote in the UN sponsored referendum of April 24, 2004. This rejection was in sharp contrast to the substantial majority of Turkish Cypriot citizens who voted in favor of the UN settlement.

It is perhaps too easy to link the Bi-Communal Development Program’s expenditure of \$60.5 million since 1998 with the outcome by concluding that the programs and projects financed by BDP with the specific purpose of promoting bi-communal collaboration and reconciliation failed to achieve their purpose. Put in the context of the approximately \$450 million invested by the US Government through the United Nations since 1974, mostly for humanitarian relief and reconstruction in the Greek Cypriot sector (under the original 80-20 formula), it may be argued that a BDP type program should have begun much earlier to develop an active constituency for peace in the Greek Cypriot community, much as it was able to do among the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot NGOs, many of them supported by BDP, were active proponents of the settlement, and helped to convince others that this was their best hope to enter into the modern world. Here too, other, more powerful motives also were in play.

The US effort, along with the UN and others, has accomplished much since the inception of the program and, as we report here, since the establishment of the US-UNDP BDP. We also identify where we believe improvements could be made in the program, mainly in the context of our hope that the UN Plan would be accepted. With the Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan, it is not clear whether there will be, or should be a continuation of the BDP, or any other foreign grant program dedicated to convincing Greek Cypriots to “vote for peace”. The factors which caused these citizens to reject a settlement may well be too powerful for any such program to succeed.

There was no time to revise the report to reflect this rather sad outcome. We offer our analysis, judgments and recommendations as they stood in early April when there was still hope that something might reverse what many already predicted would be a negative outcome.

We have nothing but the greatest admiration for those Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot citizens in government and in the civil society who believe in a different future and have worked to achieve it. Also, we applaud the unswerving commitment of the many people in the UN agencies and in the US Government who worked very hard over many years under difficult circumstances. We thank them all for sharing their knowledge, their concerns, and their hospitality. Where we have disagreed, we do so with respect and the awareness that we may be wrong. As the UN Special Envoy, Alvaro De Soto, said, we will know “in the fullness of time.”

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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## I. INTRODUCTION

USAID contracted with Development Associates, Inc. to assess the strategy, attainment of objectives, and implementation of the Bi-Communal Development Program (BDP). The evaluation's findings, conclusions and recommendations will inform the design of a follow-on "BDP-like" project, expected to begin sometime in FY 2004.

The Bi-Communal Development Program (BDP) is one of three programs of the U.S. government to implement the Congressional directive (contained in a \$15 million annual ESF earmark) to support bi-communal projects and measures aimed at reunification of the island and designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on Cyprus.<sup>1</sup> The other two are the Cyprus America Scholarship Program implemented by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission and managed by the Department of State; and the Bi-communal Support Program, implemented by Amideast and managed by the Department of State.

Prior to 1998, USAID-funded bi-communal development programs were carried out by the UNHCR, but over time the need for relief programs declined and program emphasis shifted to large infrastructure efforts. When UNHCR decided to close all but its asylum office in Nicosia, USAID signed a grant agreement for a \$30.5 million program with UNDP<sup>2</sup>. Since UNDP does not have offices in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), the UNDP asked the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to execute the program. The BDP grant between USAID and UNDP was signed in March 1998 and UNOPS set up a Project Management Unit (PMU) in the UN Protected Area (UNPA) at Nicosia in April, 1998. The grant was later increased for a total USAID grant contribution through 2004 of \$60 million.

## II. METHODOLOGY

An evaluation team made up of 4 experienced US citizens, one Greek Cypriot citizen and one Turkish Cypriot citizen conducted the evaluation in February and March 2004. Standard USAID Rapid Appraisal methods were used, including interviews with stakeholders, extensive documentation review, assessment of policy and program management standards and procedures, small sample surveys of program grantees, and interviews with Opinion Leaders from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Ratings by policy and program managers of the bi-communal achievements of the various projects under the BDP were provided at the request of the evaluation team. Although not rigorously scientific, these ratings do reflect the views of those who know the program best, and showed a surprising ability to discriminate between what worked and what did not.

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<sup>1</sup> Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 2004

<sup>2</sup> USAID contributed \$30 million and UNDP \$500,000 for the period 1998 through 2001.

Finally, working draft findings, conclusions and recommendations were presented to most stakeholders, resulting in a number of comments and corrections that improved substantially the team's understanding and analysis of the program.

The team made every effort to substantiate conclusions with facts and interview findings. Inevitably, our conclusions are formed in the part by judgments based on the experience and expertise of the team members. The team takes responsibility for the conclusions and recommendations made in this report.

We wish to thank sincerely the many people who gave us their time, views, and expertise during the conduct of this evaluation. We are especially grateful to USAID and US Embassy staff officers, to UNOPS staff current and former, and to the UNDP leaders who took an interest in our efforts.

### **III. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS**

#### **A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS**

##### ***1. Accomplishments***

- a. The BDP is generally well known among opinion leaders on both sides, often as UNOPS, and is perceived by most to have had an impact on promoting appropriate contacts, cooperation and the possibility of support for a peaceful settlement, especially among government officials and younger Cypriots.
- b. Those activities that involved substantive contacts between Turkish and Greek Cypriots about subjects important to both sides did succeed in fostering effective working relations among people from a broad range of professions and interests.
- c. Those activities that encouraged common infrastructure and common systems for addressing infrastructure and economic issues, even though they involved collaboration of relatively small numbers of technicians and laborers, have improved the ability of TC and GC officials to cooperate on their own should a settlement occur. This is true as well of a more limited number of NGOs sponsored by the BDP.
- d. BDP projects have been a material and possibly symbolic manifestation of the commitment of the United States and the international community, through the UN, to the search for a peaceful settlement. They have created venues for visibility and positive public relations for the US Embassy and for the UN. .
- e. BDP Civil Society programs encouraged and facilitated contacts and possibilities for interaction between Greek and Turkish Cypriot citizens that would not otherwise have been possible given the prohibitions imposed by authorities on both sides.
- f. Making substantial funds available to civil society organizations supported increased NGO activity in a wide variety of areas, as well as providing the material support for

improved capacity by many of these organizations. The establishment of the Management Center on the Turkish Cypriot side is an outstanding example.

- g. The UNOPS PMU, faced with a restrictive political environment hostile to bi-communal interaction, demonstrated extraordinary creativity and energy in implementing the large public works, environment and animal health programs inherited from the UNHCR period. The compelling need to assume much of the responsibility for procurement, technical support, and financial control of these projects substantially defined the PMU's character and operational procedures during the first two years of the program and, to some degree, through the six year life of the grant agreement.

## **2. Challenges**

- a. The political purpose of the program was well understood by all stakeholders, but there were varying interpretations of how to define 'bi-communal' and particularly what the best means were to that end. Following several efforts to develop more directive strategies for grant making, the broad categories developed in the Flexible Framework Fostering Rapprochement were adopted. FFFR may have been useful for categorizing bi-communal activities at a time when the political restrictions were so harsh that a narrow definition would have cut off all activities. FFFR did not serve the purpose of a strategy, however, and in today's environment, with a settlement at hand, a more focused set of objectives and indicators is needed.
- b. The NGO side of the program, in part because of the restrictive political environment, never gained the level of visibility and focus achieved by the public works side. Attempts by outside consultants to develop for the BDP a more coherent civil society strategy that would support the political objective did not become fully internalized as part of the decision-making or operational criteria of the NGO program.
- c. The size of the grants made to many of the NGOs, especially in the first three years of the program, appears excessive by most standards used by USAID and other donors in the East European and NIS region, including in institutionally well-developed countries such as Poland. Whether driven by the high costs of the Cyprus economy, or by other factors, the dollar value of the grants (upwards of \$100 000) may have strained the absorptive capacity of many smaller NGOs, as well as producing a bias towards non-profit organizations already well established. (The ceiling for maximum grant size was reduced in the latter years of the project from \$100,000 to \$50,000.)
- d. In the smaller IA projects and in NGO projects, development impact identifiable to the team has been very limited, because of the scattering of funds over many organizations and the emphasis on one-off activities rather than on strengthening the organizations that offer them. While development was not the objective of the program, seeking good development outcomes was not inconsistent with bi-communalism, and indeed may have helped to contribute to this objective, as was the case in several of the public works and animal health projects. While the NGO sector appears to be flourishing, it is not sustainable at the current cost level without significant foreign funding.



- e. The desire to avoid negative publicity or the appearance of political interference may also explain the predominance of grants to health (30%) and environment (19%) NGOs, particularly in the first three years of the project. As BDP became more established and the political constraints relaxed, funding shifted to peace/Mediation NGOs (11%), the latter made mostly in 2002/3.
- f. A political program in a highly volatile environment can be expected to experience a high failure rate in terms of activities that do not improve bi-communal tolerance and cooperation, and do not result in a significant level of enhanced capacity of value to the challenges of making a peaceful settlement work. However, absent valid indicators of program performance and even a modest effort to evaluate at the project level the extent of bi-communal results achieved, it is not possible to objectively assess whether the failure rate was either lower or higher than an acceptable level.
- g. The ‘strategy’ for implementation of the NGO and for much of the IA parts of the agreement was largely reactive rather than proactive. Little effort was made to direct grantees toward specific program areas or objectives through the various BDP call for proposal mechanisms. This contributed to the diverse and seemingly disconnected character of the NGO grant portfolio and to a repetitive “proposal bombardment” to the PSC by Implementing Agencies. As the possibilities of a settlement improved in 2002, the Special Initiative grant was established permitting the beginnings of a more directive program that remained within control of the Embassy-PMU decision makers. If the settlement does occur, expanded use of this facility may permit a more proactive and focused strategy of support in areas of NGO Sector development.

## **B. PERFORMANCE OF BDP DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION**

### ***1. Accomplishments***

- a. The PMU did meet the basic allocation terms of the USAID – UNDP agreement, with roughly 60% of contracts allocated to Implementing Agencies and 20% to NGOs over the life of the program. Efforts to expand the NGO program after 2001 did not significantly change the overall financial allocation program, although it did result in an increase in the number of NGOs receiving grants. .
- b. Interviews with IAs, NGOs and opinion leaders indicate that the PMU enjoyed a positive reputation in both communities for being evenhanded and efficient. The word “trust” surfaced in a number of interviews relating to the PMU’s role. Another term used was the “UNOPS Umbrella” suggesting the PMU role was that of a neutral but committed third party facilitator, broker, and, for larger projects, effective implementing agency. The circumstances led to the PMU becoming something akin to a “proto-governmental agency” backed by the political will and good offices of both the UN and the US Embassy.

### ***2. Challenges***

- a. The UNDP grant’s provision about political guidance from the Embassy provided entre’ for the USG’s representatives in the Embassy to be substantially involved in decisions

throughout the project approval and implementation process. This made it difficult to establish policy, strategic objectives and implementation guidelines that could be monitored from “a distance.” The need to make quick and ad hoc decisions required the input of someone who could assess the problem from the standpoint of the Embassy on a daily basis. Policy managers became deeply involved in day-to-day implementation management. Thus there developed a potential for confusion about roles and the potential for divided loyalties. It is difficult to be a “team member” and still perform the function of policy and strategic oversight for USAID and the Embassy. Hopefully the post settlement future will permit a sharper division of labor and clarity of roles.

- b. The ‘strategy’ for implementation of the NGO and for much of the IA parts of the agreement was largely reactive rather than proactive. Little effort was made to direct grantees toward specific program areas or objectives through the various BDP call for proposal mechanisms. Achieving a controversial objective such as bi-communalism in a non-controversial manner is very difficult. Large infrastructure programs on common problems such as water and sewage compelled the authorities to collaborate to the degree necessary, and generally involved relatively few persons in the actual implementation process. On the civil society side, the overall record of NGO grant making suggests an understandable desire to avoid funding organizations that might arouse the opposition of one side or the other. This and the unusually large size of many of the grants may have promoted a tendency toward making grants to established NGOs that were acceptable to authorities, especially in the period before 2003.
- c. Frequent reorganizations and employee turnover are not unusual in international projects similar to BDP. It is of some concern that the current staff on the program side is relatively new, and there are several vacancies. On the other hand, this may be an opportunity to fashion a program that is better suited to the potential of a post settlement political environment.
- d. The ratio of project officers to staff and management seems disproportionate to the workload put on the line PO s, especially in 2003 – 2004. Moreover, the UNOPS policy of not training project officers on the grounds that anyone hired is already an expert presumes too much. Project Officers, especially on the NGO side could have benefited from more experienced leadership and from training for their responsibilities.
- e. The BDP PMU faced two very different implementation problems. The first came from the need to implement in a timely, cost effective manner infrastructure and environmental public works that produced visible and high quality solutions. The second problem was to implement an NGO grant program working with many, relatively inexperienced and fragile citizen groups on both sides. The staffing and procedural requirements for the two programs arguably were quite different. It appears that the systems put in place for managing the NGO program were largely adapted from those developed for the public works programs. This led to a documentation system focused on “contracts”, rather than a system more appropriate to a politically-oriented NGO program based on achieving bi-communal impact. The NGO program seemed to be something of a “stepchild” to the larger “flagship” projects for much of the life of the BDP program. If civil society development in support of reconciliation is to be a theme for a successor program, it will

need the flexibility to adopt decision making, management and results monitoring and reporting procedures relevant to its strategic objectives.

- f. Perhaps because the nature of the two programs (large IA vs. civil society) was different, there was not as much effort as there could have been to expand the scope of interaction of the large IA projects by adding a civil society component. For example, the veterinary health component could have worked with farmer organizations. This would have required a more proactive grant-making process
- g. The program never was able to develop consistent, well understood and documented criteria for grant making. Neither grantees nor PMU project officers can understand the reasons why projects are approved or disapproved. The perception of inconsistency undermines the credibility of the BDP, and the resulting belief that grants are given to favorites or ‘bogus’ NGOs prevents some organizations from applying. In addition, it reduces the credibility of the project officers with the grantees whose programs they monitor, and it contributes to project staff alienation from PMU management. It is possible to establish a reasonable set of approval criteria, even for a political program. This should have been done.
- h. Program and project monitoring and reporting focused on the “grant/contract”, rather than the recipient organization’s advancement of bi-communal goals. 77 NGOs received BDP grants (under the NGO component), 23 receiving more than one. There is no overall assessment of each of these organization’s progress toward greater interaction, collaboration or joint planning and implementation. Project files do not yield much information about bi-communal accomplishment.<sup>3</sup> No effort was made to assess effectiveness and impact other than completion of agreed work. U.S. Embassy and PMU officers know much more about grantee effectiveness than is represented in the project reports or closeout documents. For a \$6.4 million dollar investment, a better effort should have been made to evaluate and track progress on Turkish and Greek Cypriot NGOs bi-communal performance.
- i. The post settlement conditions should permit the introduction of strategic focus, more clearly defined grant making objectives and decision criteria, and greater transparency in announcing awards and explaining rejections. This will require a serious overhaul of grant proposal review procedures emphasizing objective rating procedures, and, possibly, participation by Cypriot experts and “wise people” in some part of the process. It is important that Cypriot government representatives in any future program steering committee understand and agree with the program’s objectives.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The US Embassy in reviewing this conclusion stated “The project files may not yield much information, but no decision was made to re-engage with an already funded NGO without an assessment of their progress to date.” The Team is pleased to learn this, but we still wonder how objective or consistent such a review process could be without some kind of evaluative documentation prepared either by the grantee or the PMU project officer as to the bi-communal achievements of the grantee.

<sup>4</sup> We are fully aware that there are risks to greater transparency and increased Cypriot participation. On the other hand, as has been demonstrated by USAID programs in other difficult environments, US programs should “model” desirable values and behaviors in the way they are implemented.

#### **IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: MAKING THE SETTLEMENT WORK**

Even if a solution is achieved to the Cyprus problem, experience shows that there will continue to be political bumps over the next several years. Regardless, contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is dramatically different than it was when the BDP began, and further freedom of movement is likely. Therefore major changes in the direction of future programs are possible that will increase their effectiveness.

1. **It is no longer useful to think in terms of bi-communality.** That term tends to polarize the two sides. It also fails to take into consideration the multicultural nature of Cypriot society. There is still a need to support the peace process, foster reconciliation and cooperation among the diverse Cypriot groups. This is dependent to some extent on reducing the income disparity between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.
2. **The post settlement conditions should permit the introduction of strategic focus, more clearly defined grant making objectives and decision criteria, and greater transparency in announcing awards and explaining rejections.** This will require a serious overhaul of grant proposal review procedures emphasizing objective rating procedures, and, possibly, participation by Cypriot experts and “wise people” in some part of the process. It is important that Cypriot government representatives in any future program steering committee understand and agree with the program’s objectives.
3. **Building on work already done, several assessments should be undertaken to set the stage for the next phase of assistance.** There have already been discussions about undertaking sectoral assessments and developing sectoral strategies. Any strategy work should be based on research to determine the level of need and available resources in each sector. Program baselines should be established against which to measure results. Local social science capacity exists to conduct this work.
4. **Mounting a program with four major objectives, as proposed in the contingency plan, would require a much larger commitment of funding and a more diversely expert staff than the program is likely to have in the future.** The analyses described above, along with further information about the EU’s plans, should factor into decision making about appropriate directions for future US assistance.
5. **USAID should collaborate with local partners in performing analyses, developing strategies and implementing new initiative.** The US, through the BDP and CASP, has helped to develop the capacity of many organizations and individuals. They can now participate in shaping the program of the future.
6. **A future program should include a civil society component, but one more focused and strategic than the BDP, including training in effective advocacy work by NGOs.**

It is likely that the EU will finance many of the needed infrastructure and economic development activities. The US holds a comparative advantage in working with civil society. The BDP has fostered an active civil society with interest in maintaining their

links with people on the other side. A strong civil society will be an important part of an effective, united society. In addition, there will be many issues affecting people that result from both the Annan plan and the EU accession. Civil society organizations can spur debate and increase the level of public discourse about these changes. They can also contribute greatly to the healing process of reconciliation and search for common purpose.

At the same time, the large dollar size of grants made to Greek and Turkish Cypriot NGOs, even taking into account higher costs on the island, should be re-examined. The assumptions underlying the cost structure of NGO proposals needs to be carefully assessed, and efforts made to more rigorously distinguish between administrative overhead costs and cost directly related to implementing projects.

7. **A second program focus should be “good governance”.**

Local and “state” level governments, especially on the TC side, are not sufficiently mature and developed to exercise the normal functions of government in an accountable, transparent and efficient fashion. Corruption, favoritism, cronyism is endemic in government on both sides according to most observers. Better systems for public finance management, procurement, and public participation in decision making are needed. If the Annan plan goes forward, there will also be a demand for technical knowledge about the workings of a Federal system. Although the Cypriot federal institutions will be quite limited at the beginning, substantial growth is anticipated.

The United States has a comparative advantage in providing technical assistance in both of these areas. Moreover, most USAID programs throughout the Balkans and the NIS have developed strong “good governance” programs. There is now a body of knowledge, expertise and experience that can be brought to bear quickly on the problems Cyprus will encounter. Making government work has to be a critical component of the larger “making the settlement work” program.

8. **Program financial and monitoring documentation should be reoriented for Results Management.**

From a Results Management perspective, the system for reporting on contracts and expenditures now in place is not very helpful. Expertise should be brought in to upgrade the financial and project data management system so that the implementing organizations can more effectively manage funds for results accountability, in addition to financial accountability. A Results documentation system based on systematic monitoring and evaluation will provide the necessary knowledge input for good policy as well as implementation management.

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# CYPRUS BI-COMMUNAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM EVALUATION

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## I. INTRODUCTION

USAID contracted with Development Associates, Inc. to assess the strategy, attainment of objectives, and implementation of the Bi-Communal Development Program (BDP). The evaluation's findings, conclusions and recommendations will inform the design of a follow-on "BDP-like" project, expected to begin sometime in FY 2004.

The Bi-Communal Development Program (BDP) is one of three programs of the U.S. government to implement the Congressional directive (contained in a \$15 million annual ESF earmark) to support bi-communal projects and measures aimed at reunification of the island and designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on Cyprus.<sup>5</sup> The other two are the Cyprus America Scholarship Program implemented by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission and managed by the Department of State; and the Bi-communal Support Program, implemented by Amideast and managed by the Department of State.

Prior to 1998, USAID-funded bi-communal development programs were carried out by the UNHCR, but over time the need for relief programs declined and program emphasis shifted to large infrastructure efforts. When UNHCR decided to close all but its asylum office in Nicosia, USAID signed a grant agreement for a \$30.5 million program with UNDP<sup>6</sup>. Since the UNDP does not have offices in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), the UNDP asked the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to execute the program. The BDP grant between USAID and UNDP was signed in March 1998 and UNOPS set up a Project Management Unit (PMU) in the UN Protected Area (UNPA) at Nicosia in April, 1998. The grant was later amended to increase the total USAID contribution through 2004 to \$60 million.

## II. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team assembled by Development Associates for this task included two former USAID Senior Foreign Service officers, with experience in civil society evaluation and program management, a senior economist with in depth experience with Cyprus and the Annan Plan, an experienced environmental engineer, a Greek Cypriot historian and a Turkish Cypriot NGO activist and social scientist. Four days after the team's arrival in Cyprus, the senior economist was drafted by the US Embassy and the UN for a major role in the Annan Plan negotiation process. An expatriate US citizen with suitable social science skills and in depth Cyprus experience was recruited to fill the gap.

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<sup>5</sup> Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 2004

<sup>6</sup> USAID contributed \$30 million and UNDP \$500,000 for the period 1998 through 2001.

The team followed data collection and analysis methods common to most USAID sponsored rapid appraisals. Program and project documentation was carefully reviewed<sup>7</sup>, grant and contract recipients were interviewed, sites visited. The TOR (found at Annex 1) directed the team to interview all relevant stakeholders, and to conduct interviews with “opinion leaders”. In addition, the team developed several innovative approaches to organizing data and the knowledge that was in the heads of the principal players in the US Embassy and the PMU.

For each of the major programs, the team addressed three questions; first, was the project sufficiently well **managed** to insure the desired outcome at a reasonable standard; second, did the project make sense in terms of a **strategy** for bi-communal objectives; third, was it **effective** in achieving those objectives. **Effectiveness** was further assessed in terms of three dimensions: **material, institutional, and symbolic**. **Material** effectiveness relates to the physical outcome, i.e., a functioning waste water treatment plant. **Institutional** effectiveness relates to whether those responsible for the project improved their skills, motivation, and capacity to maintain the project, or to take on new but related tasks. **Symbolic** effectiveness had to do with visible and emotional resonance of the project. Did people involved or affected have positive feelings about bi-communal cooperation, for example.

To assess the “public works” side of the program representing 60 percent of program expenditures, 15 public works projects were selected for detailed examination based on the size, longevity, and reputed significance of the project for advancing bi-communal relations. Project files for these projects were thoroughly examined by the team’s experienced environmental engineer, in addition to conducting interviews with all relevant players in project implementation. Considered a success story, the public and animal health set of projects was selected for assessment based on advice of the PMU.

On the NGO side of the program, a sample of 50 NGO grants was initially selected at random, augmented by grants suggested as “representative” by local US Embassy staff. From this list, 20 NGO interviews were conducted along with site visits. In addition, the team examined partial project files for 9 NGO grants on an intensive longitudinal basis. A list of Opinion Leaders was compiled with advice from the US Embassy staff and from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of the evaluation team. 23 Opinion Leaders were interviewed. The list of all stakeholders, opinion leaders and grantees interviewed is found in Annex 2.

Data from open ended questionnaires for grantees and OLs was coded and analyzed using simple descriptive statistics. Using program reports and files, an analysis of resource allocation patterns was conducted. Sample questionnaires and the coded responses to both opinion leaders and grantee questionnaires are found in Annex 5.

An unusual feature of the team’s methodology was the use of two project ranking systems. After discussions with US Embassy and PMU staff, it was possible to develop a self anchoring rating system for all grants, using criteria generated from published program objectives and the Flexible

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<sup>7</sup> Based on an interpretation of the USAID agreement with UNDP, the team’s access to UNOPS files was limited to an “on request” basis. This made the documentation review somewhat difficult for two reasons; one, the team did not know what was in the files so could not make specific requests; two, the need to use broad categories for formulating requests put a heavy burden on UNOPS staff to photocopy large amounts of material, much of which was not directly relevant.

Framework Fostering Rapprochement (FFFR) ‘strategy’ developed midway through the BDP. The team asked the USAID and Embassy Representatives to classify all grants using a FFFR schema, locating grants on a continuum from “no bi-communal feature” to those that were considered Collaborative and Joint activities, the latter the highest level of bi-communal achievement. A second rating was applied by PMU staff at the request of the evaluation team. This used an A,B,C rating on two dimensions: first, level of success in achieving the bi-communal objective of the grant, and, second, assessment of the future utility of the grantee for purposes of making the settlement work. A score of C was either not successful or of little utility. The data from these ranking systems was analyzed and used by the evaluation team to give a kind of “Delphi” assessment of the overall effectiveness of the program based on percentage of grants receiving A, or highest scores, through percentages receiving scores of B and C.

Shortly after beginning the field research, the team found that BDP reporting tables were focused mainly on financial data organized by each “grant or contract”, with no corresponding system of recording progress by the grantee organization. With assistance from the PMU, the team was able to organize the grant data by name of the recipient organization, primarily on the NGO side. Grants to implementing agencies were more clearly apparent in the reporting tables. This effort led to an assessment of the degree of concentration and dispersion of NGO grant allocations, as well as a better understanding of the performance of actual organizations receiving BDP funds.

The time allocated for the field work part of the evaluation was limited to the usual three weeks customary for USAID evaluations. The team used the first week for stakeholder meetings, organization of the field research and the documentation review process. During the next two weeks, 9 days were allocated to conduct interviews, site visits and documentation review, and 3 days to the preparation of a preliminary draft of main findings, conclusions and recommendations. These were presented to the US Ambassador and Embassy team, to USAID Washington CTOs via a video link, and to the PMU Management and staff in two separate meetings.

Following a tight schedule on return from the field, a working draft was submitted to USAID Washington on March 19 for review by USAID staff, followed by additional briefings with UNDP, UNOPS in New York and USAID Washington. Comments were received, the final complete draft prepared and submitted to Development Associates for review and submission to USAID in April, 2004. After reviewing the final draft, UNDP/UNOPS provided the team with comments on the report and with a document updating and analyzing program indicators. The consolidated comments of UNDP and UNOPS and the evaluators' responses are found at Annex 6. The indicators paper was received too late for evaluators to review it.

### **III. PROGRAM PURPOSE**

The BDP’s purpose, as stated in the grant agreement, is “to support the peace-making process in Cyprus” through “bi-communal projects and measures aimed at reunification of the island and designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on Cyprus.” The program “inherited” several large projects from the UNHCR period: Nicosia Master Plan (rehabilitation of the historic Venetian Walls that surround the old city and of a



community within the walls on each side of the green line<sup>8</sup>), rehabilitation and expansion of the Nicosia Sewerage System that serves both communities, and restoration of Pyla Village (one of the only villages on the island where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots lived together in 1998). Funds were made available for additional bi-communal projects, including projects of non-governmental and community based organizations. In 2001, the grant was amended to increase life of program funding by \$30 million and extend the BDP through 2004.

During most of the grant life, fostering bi-communal relations has been exceedingly tough. The Turkish Cypriot (TC) authorities banned bi-communal meetings and activities in late 1997, a ban that remained in place until April 2003. Turkish Cypriots needed special permission to cross into the South or even into the buffer zone – and that permission was frequently not forthcoming. The fact that neither the ROC, the US nor the UN recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus meant that activities involving TC authorities had to be implemented through other, recognized, organizations. TC and Greek Cypriot (GC) authorities could have no official relations with each other. Procurement of material for projects on the Turkish Cypriot side sometimes posed some challenges. The political situation was volatile throughout – from S-300 missile crisis to multiple failed attempts at peace talks. (Annex 8 provides a detailed timeline of the political events that influenced program management; as well as a timeline of key events in the life of the BDP.)

The conditions under which the BDP operated required extreme political sensitivity; consequently the Grant Agreement specified that the UNDP would receive political guidance from the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia in selecting activities to be funded. These conditions also required innovation and dexterity from the PMU in finding ways of accomplishing the program’s objectives. Finally, it required the program to adopt a very broad definition of bi-communality.

## **IV. FINDINGS ON BDP MANAGEMENT**

### **A. PROGRAM STRUCTURE**

BDP’s program structure grew out of the unique features of the Cyprus political environment. Three elements are key: the large number of stakeholders involved in the decision-making process, the inheritance of large public works projects from the UNHCR era, and the need for adaptability in an uncertain political environment where bi-communal activity is a risky business.

#### ***1. Stakeholder Relationships***

##### **a. USAID**

USAID’s role is that of manager/monitor of the overall grant to the UNDP, rather than of decision-maker on individual projects. USAID performs its monitoring role through a PSC who reports to the US Embassy economics officer. As an Embassy employee, however, she tends to play a dual role as both project monitor – reporting on project activity to USAID headquarters - and advisor to the Embassy on project decisions. In addition, all project activities must be

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<sup>8</sup> The “green line” is the demarcation between the Greek Cypriot controlled side and the Turkish Cypriot controlled side.

reviewed by a USAID environmental officer through the Initial Environmental Review (IER) process. This process provides USAID with some ability to affect project decisions, when activities have a clear environmental consequence.

**b. US Embassy**

The task of providing political guidance to the BDP was taken on initially by the economic/commercial officer, but as the amount of project activity grew it became necessary to hire a PSC, reporting to the economic officer, to serve as the Embassy's representative and to provide political guidance on all proposed BDP projects. Like the USAID PSC, she plays a dual role, in that she assists in monitoring certain projects, especially the large infrastructure and environmental projects, as the portfolio has become too large for the USAID PSC to monitor alone. As a result, while they play different roles, the two PSCs (Embassy and USAID representatives) work very closely together. Their different responsibilities and authorities are not easily understood to those outside the Embassy.

Interviews with principal senior stakeholders, the US Ambassador and senior US Embassy officers, indicate substantial satisfaction with the achievements of the BDP program. The US Ambassador meets with grantees and, along with his predecessor, has helped to resolve implementation problems from time to time. Embassy officers reinforce the view that the BDP has been very instrumental in giving the US commitment a degree of tangible visibility, and, in their view, has contributed to the maintenance of the possibility of a peaceful settlement. UNDP senior management also values the program as an indirect expression of United Nations commitment to the cause of peace, and to a working relationship with the United States as a principal player in UN affairs.

**c. UNDP**

Since UNDP does not operate in Cyprus, it has delegated responsibility for BDP implementation to UNOPS. UNDP carries out program monitoring through visits two or three times a year to Cyprus and through electronic means. UNDP has not delegated its decision-making role on all projects, however. Although it did not do so in the early stages, UNDP now participates in the project steering committees that approve projects, and advises on other projects that do not go to the project steering committees but are valued at over \$12,000.

**d. UNOPS**

UNOPS has set up a Project Management Unit (PMU) to implement the BDP. The PMU is delegated to act on UNOPS' behalf in Cyprus, though any procurement action or grant agreement or amendment of \$30,000 or more must be reviewed by UNOPS/New York before the PMU can sign. UNOPS also participates in reviews of projects at the project steering committee. UNOPS/New York carries out its program oversight and decision-making role through electronic means and occasional visits to Cyprus.

**e. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Authorities**

Since the Greek Cypriot (GC) and Turkish Cypriot (TC) authorities cannot meet together because of the recognition issue, the PMU arranges separate Steering Committee meetings on

each side. While authorities of both sides are aware that parallel project approval processes and funding decisions are being made on the other side, they do not know the content of those decisions, and they need take no official knowledge of them.

#### **f. The Red Cross and the Humanitarian Relief Mission**

Since neither the US nor the UN recognizes the Turkish Cypriot authorities, it is not possible to sign contracts with them; nor, is there legal recourse for a grant signed with any organization affiliated with or registered with the TC authorities. As the organization designated by the President of the Republic to deal with all international humanitarian assistance matters (following the events of 1974), the Cyprus Red Cross, with its Turkish Cypriot Vice Presidency as specified in the Constitution of the Republic—became the BDP’s official partner, playing an intermediary role in signing documents on behalf of the GOC. The Turkish Cypriot authorities used UNHCR’s departure from the Bi-communal Program as an opportunity to disband the Office of the Vice President of the Cyprus Red Cross through which programs had been implemented. In its place, the Humanitarian Relief Mission (HRM) was established as an intermediary between the BDP and the Turkish Cypriot authorities. HRM is fully authorized by the Turkish Cypriot authorities to sign documents on their behalf, and because of its affiliation with the BDP, it is legitimized in the South. The HRM becomes the signatory for all projects with Turkish Cypriot organizations. The HRM then passes funding on to the recipient organization, and serves as the conduit for all official communications between the TC authorities and the project.

The legal issues were not a factor in the South; however, it is important for both sides to be treated in a parallel way. For this reason, the Red Cross serves as representative of the ROC and takes on a similar signatory role for activities of Greek Cypriot organizations (not NGOs) as the HRM takes for Turkish Cypriot organizations.

In turn, the BDP transfers funds to the Red Cross and HRM to assist in their humanitarian programs and cover administrative and other costs.

## **2. Policy-Strategy Management**

Alice: “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”  
The Cheshire Cat: “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to.”  
Alice: “I don’t much care where---“  
The Cat: “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go”  
Alice: “---as long as I get *somewhere*.”  
The Cat: “Oh, you’re sure to do that, if you only walk long enough.”<sup>9</sup>

Responsibility for policy and strategy management was divided between USAID Washington’s Europe Bureau, UNDP New York, the US Embassy in Nicosia, and the USAID local representative also in Nicosia.

BDP policy was, as stated by the US Embassy officer responsible for oversight was “to take every opportunity to support and cultivate bi-communal contact...” Or, in a somewhat more

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<sup>9</sup> Paraphrased from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll

inclusive formulation, as put by the USAID Representative, the strategy was to “develop as many activities as a basis for bi-communal cooperation (including meetings) in as many sectors as possible”.<sup>10</sup> This very broad policy, combined with the political constraints of the Cyprus environment, opened the door for a very wide range of grant funded activities, each of which could be justified on the general grounds of having the potential to be a “basis for bi-communal cooperation.”

Apparently this very broad and flexible strategy was a cause for some concern to policy managers on the USG side. At least three major efforts were made to develop more concise and directive strategies for the environment program, for the NGO program, and finally for the entire effort, which culminated in the Flexible Framework Fostering Rapprochement (FFFR).<sup>11</sup> This document did help to define some of the several dimensions of the basic contact theory of bi-communal development. Also, USG officers continued to urge UNDP and UNOPS to develop a communications strategy for the BDP, however this was delayed until early 2004, the last year of the current agreement. These efforts notwithstanding, the need to be flexible, opportunistic, and responsive to a variety of political and budgetary pressures made it difficult to apply more specific strategic guidelines as a means for determining what would, and would not be funded. For example, US Embassy and USAID Nicosia officers, using the bi-communal content classification scheme they developed at the request of the evaluation team, classified 39 percent of the NGO funded activities representing \$1.8 million as “Other (may be some bi-communal), Nothing bi-communal (political, NMP, island wide) or Mirror (no information sharing contact). As will be demonstrated below, some of the grants not included in this 39 percent which began as “Mirror” projects, did develop a dynamic that led to greater collaboration. The fact remains that a significant number of grants were made that had little or no bi-communal content. While many of these activities had independent value using other criterion, clearly other decision-making factors were operating in addition to “cultivating bi-communal contact.”<sup>12</sup>

### **3. *The roles of the PMU***

Over time, the PMU has assumed an increasing number of roles so the program could move faster and reach a broader range of organizations.

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<sup>10</sup> The quotations are extracted from more extensive comments made by the two US Embassy based officers responsible for policy and strategic oversight of the UNOPS implemented program. Both state that although the policies and criteria for decision making may not have been well documented, they did exist. Moreover, in the decision making process for making grants, issues of capacity building, effectiveness, and impact were considered.

<sup>11</sup> USAID observers comment that FFFR was not so much a strategy as it was an effort to put some conceptual respectability and explanation on what was happening on the ground with the BDP program. The team agrees.

<sup>12</sup> This classification was prepared by US staff using the UNOPS Bi-Communal Development Programme in Cyprus Report: Quarterly Report 1<sup>st</sup> October 2003 – 31<sup>st</sup> December 2003, Expenditure Report by Sector and by Project. These tables show all cumulative project Disbursements and Contracted amounts through 31 December 2003. Each funded activity was classified according to the following:

S – Spirit (or In spirit)

M- Mirror (no information sharing)

C-Collaborative Parallel

J- Joint

O-Other (consultants, some bi-communal contact)    N – nothing (Political)(NMP)(Island-wide)

**a. Project management**

The PMU's primary role is as manager of the wide range of grants funded by the BDP, and its internal organization reflects this. The PMU manages the project process from start to finish: soliciting proposals from implementing agencies (government agencies) and NGOs, making recommendations on project approvals, negotiating the final terms of the grants, monitoring them, disbursing funds and assessing performance. Once approvals have been made other stakeholders generally have no further role except during program reviews (unless an issue arises that merits interagency attention).

Over the years, the program has shifted from a focus primarily on infrastructure to one of maximizing the number of bi-communal contacts throughout society. This has meant an increased emphasis on many small activities from other implementing agencies and NGOs in both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The dramatic expansion in the number of activities, from 7 in 1998 to 169 in 2003, has led the PMU to increase its staff substantially in order to manage the expanding portfolio. From an initial staff of 14 in 1998, it has grown to a current staff size of five international officers, 15 Cypriots from both sides of the island, and a handful of international experts in specialized areas. Only six of these are project officers (including vacancies). The remainders are engaged in management and administrative/financial support.<sup>13</sup>

**b. Implementing agency**

Several factors have pushed the PMU into playing a much greater role in project implementation than one would expect from a project manager.

- (1) The BDP inherited large urban environment and infrastructure projects, valued at about 60 percent of total program resources, from UNHCR days. After the initial round of inherited projects was completed in 2001, BDP approved follow-on grants expanding on the initial work, so that the urban infrastructure and environment program continued to require the major share of program resources. These projects were multi-year in nature and involved large procurements and construction contracts.
- (2) The decision was made early on to fund implementing agency projects for one year at a time. If progress was sufficient, a second year's funding would be added to continue the activity. Government procurement procedures, however, are cumbersome. By procuring project commodities and construction/engineering contracts directly, the PMU cut several months off the process, so that project activity could proceed on a one-year schedule.
- (3) Where the same types of commodities were needed by the GC and the TC sides, PMU procurement on their behalf would assure compatibility and economies of bulk purchasing.
- (4) PMU direct procurement made some bi-communal activity possible by bypassing the recognition issue. Additionally, the PMU stepping in to do things like pay workers directly enhanced the day-to-day bi-communality of projects in that it allowed TC and

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<sup>13</sup> Figures are based on quarterly and annual reports.

GC workers to work together on crews in Pyla and on the Venetian Walls in Nicosia. Without the PMU in between, a host of payroll and administrative issues would have made this arrangement impossible. For the same reason, the PMU has established a veterinary training and testing laboratory at its offices in the buffer zone. This has enabled TC and GC veterinary technicians to join together for training and product testing.

**c. Matchmaker**

For most of the BDP grant life, the TC authorities' ban on bi-communal contact has made it extremely difficult for GC and TC organizations to meet, let alone collaborate. To foster bi-communalism in this incredibly restrictive setting, the PMU had to become the intermediary that linked organizations together. As the program increased its focus towards NGOs, the PMU's role as matchmaker has expanded. Many organizations funded by the BDP had health, youth, or environment as their primary focus. Some organizations proposed "in-spirit" or mono-communal projects that became bi-communal as a requirement of approval. These organizations needed help from the PMU in finding partners from the other side and then in establishing a comfortable and productive working relationship. (e.g., the Girl Guides HIV/AIDS training program).

**d. Facilitator**

Promoting bi-communalism in Cyprus is a political minefield on both sides of the green line. The PMU became adept at side-stepping the mines and gaining the trust of officials by being discrete and low-profile, by not placing either side in the position of having to make decisions that would cause them political problems, and by offering both funding and quick implementation for activities that had objectives that everyone could agree with. With these tools, the PMU was able to broker agreements and overcome bottlenecks to implementation; e.g. with Embassy support convincing the TC authorities to agree to NGO projects; or assisting grantees in getting permission for members to cross the line.

**4. Characteristics of program structure and management**

**a. Quick response, quick impact**

Despite the large number of stakeholders involved, the BDP has maintained flexibility and the capability for quick response to changing situations. This is largely due to the good will and commitment of the main parties: USAID, UNDP, UNOPS and the US Embassy.

**b. "Responsive and Helpful"**

Among the 30 grantees interviewed by the team, one theme came through loud and clear: grantees find the PMU project officers to be helpful, responsive, and professional. Some comments: "They show flexibility, respectful relations, commitment to treat the two sides equally." "They are efficient; they know what to do". "They are helpful, supportive and understanding". The only criticism was that project officers are overworked. If the activity manager is absent, no one else can fill in.

**c. Who's on first?**

Over the years, the BDP has experienced growing pains, as interrelationships among the US and UN agencies were not clearly spelled out or understood. Decision-making and reporting relationships have only developed over time; as the number of projects has grown it has become necessary to formalize what were once informal communications channels, such as the weekly PMU-US Embassy meeting to review progress and approve special initiatives. There are still gaps in communications that cause confusion and inconsistency in treatment of grantees. Some stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team identified the following issues:

- ▶ Absence of a formal approval process for project extensions, leading in some cases to extensions of projects that should be terminated because they no longer advance program priorities, for example.
- ▶ Inadequate reporting of the full results of steering committee meetings and weekly US Embassy-PMU meetings, so that the project officer tasked with preparing the grant or contract document does not always understand the conditions agreed to.
- ▶ Absence of guidance to all the project managers about items that will generally not be approved, except on an exception basis (e.g. payment of a project coordinator)
- ▶ Lack of clarity as to the type of issue that requires Embassy involvement, leading PMU staff to play it safe by obtaining guidance from the Embassy on many project implementation issues. Everybody agrees that the Embassy's political guidance was essential – on what activities to approve. Where there is disagreement is on the issue of whether their inputs on the nuts and bolts of project design and implementation, while often valuable, were worth it in terms of confusion to the grantee, over-visibility of US role, and reduction of empowerment of PMU staff. On this issue, different people had different views, but there was definitely a level of frustration with the extent of Embassy involvement on the PMU side, and an equal level of frustration on the part of responsible Embassy personnel with what they saw as persistent weaknesses in PMU management.

**d. “Need to know” management**

In the Cyprus political environment, the PMU could only operate effectively by NOT sharing full information. At times, it was better for the Greek Cypriot authorities not to know what projects the Turkish Cypriots were approving, and vice versa. Throughout, it was risky to share too much information and/or any documentation because of its potential use to either advance or discredit political positions within each community and/or between the two communities. (Examples: list of NGO projects funded on TC side provided to HRM ended up on front page of anti-settlement newspaper with names and dollar amounts; list of authorities projects on GC side led to “crack down” on GOC officials engaging in bi-communal projects.) As for the NGOs, it seemed more discrete and easier NOT to inform applicants of the list of who won awards and who did not.

This “need to know” style of operation has raised suspicions and generated an element of distrust among some opinion leaders, stakeholders and grantees (both those whose proposals were approved and those whose were not). The extent to which information of various types can and should be shared needs to be revisited in light of recent and expected political openings.

**e. Management decision-making and internal communications**

Project approvals are made by the management team and the steering committee, but the tasks of informing those whose grants were rejected, development of the grant agreement and project monitoring fall to the project officers. Absence of clear guidelines for decision-making, poor communications about project approval decisions, the “need to know” mentality and overwhelming workloads as the project portfolio has grown combine to create dissatisfaction of the primarily Cypriot project staff with the expatriate managers.

**f. Project management tracking systems**

The PMU, as its name implies, views itself as the implementer of a single project under normal circumstances<sup>14</sup>. Hence, its reporting systems take as their management units individual contracts. The prominence of large infrastructure and environment activities in the portfolio reinforces the emphasis on managing by individual contracts. In a program containing such disparate activities, however, this does not provide managers the information they need to track progress. For example, on the quarterly and annual reports, activities are identified by their contract number and activity names, but not by grantee organizations, yet for a program focused on bi-communal contacts, understanding which organizations are furthering this objective is very important, particularly since some organizations have received multiple grants. Even for the large public works activities, the tracking system is confusing, because several contracts within a single activity have the same coding number.

A review of selected project files finds that grantees submit progress reports and invoices against pre agreed dates or benchmarks for payment. If the grant includes procurement of material or services through a bidding process, the documentation is submitted to the PO for inclusion in the file. POs make every effort to visit grantees and especially to attend events organized by NGOs. On the IA side, the POs are very much involved in the implementation of the grant, including organizing technical assistance, managing procurement, and organizing meetings where necessary. POs prepare monitoring reports to the file. In its review of selected elements of files, the team noted scarcity of evaluative data on progress towards achieving bi-communal goals. This is discussed further in the following section (Program Strategy and Decision Making).

Up until mid 2003, the ratio of grantees to PO was about 1 to 15 active NGO projects. With the relaxation of restraints on bi-communal contacts, the number of projects in the NGO sector has doubled, straining the capacity of the existing staff to conduct frequent site visits, while the IA side continues to account for 60% of disbursements.

**g. Staffing/training needs**

With only six project officers managing upwards of 150 projects, PMU project officers, especially for the NGO program, reported that the workload is excessive using the existing procedures. They said that it is very difficult to break away from paper work requirements of grant processing, as these requirements are the same for both large and small grants. One officer said she uses her evenings and weekends to attend events and visit grantees. Asked whether they had been given training in NGO development or other substantive areas project officers reported

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<sup>14</sup> This point was made by a Senior PMU staff person during the Team’s evaluation debriefing in Nicosia.



that UNOPS policy was not to provide staff training, as UNOPS hired only persons already qualified. This was confirmed by one of the UNOPS management staff.

## **B. PROGRAM STRATEGY AND DECISION-MAKING**

### ***1. Decision making process: Operational Rules for the PMU***

The Cyprus environment's political constraints had a profound effect on the BDP decision making process. When the project began in 1998 the separation of the island into two distinct communities had substantially hardened. At the level of the authorities, there was no political commitment to bi-communalism on either side. As much as the various stakeholders wanted to develop a focused, strategically determined development project, the political environment made the development of pre-determined criteria for **grant making** very difficult to formalize. Moreover, the first two years of the new project were dominated by the need to demonstrate material progress with portfolio in hand, largely concentrated on the Nicosia Master Plan, Water and Sewerage system rehabilitation and expansion, and related "big ticket" projects. Even as the NGO program got off the ground by 2000, it was at first next to impossible to find many NGOs willing to run the risk of any cooperation between the two sides, according to PMU and Embassy staff.

In addition to these constraints, in 1974 the Congress of the United States had mandated through an Economic Support Fund earmark that \$15 million be obligated each year for the purpose of, among other things, supporting the development of bi-communal cooperation in Cyprus that would facilitate a peaceful solution to the island's conflict. In 1998 this \$15 million did not purchase as much as it did in 1974, but for a population of some 700 to 800 thousand people, it represented a significant amount, especially as a budgetary supplement to projects that might otherwise be difficult to fund through tax revenues. The 1998 program specified that at least 20 percent of the available program funds should be spent on Non-Governmental Organizations, in an environment where the NGO community was not well developed in the Greek Cypriot side, and almost non-existent and/or highly distrusted by authorities on the Turkish Cypriot side. The humanitarian crisis of mass movements of conflict-dislocated peoples was no longer an issue by 1997, and other than infrastructure, it was becoming increasingly difficult to find appropriate projects for funding. The hardening of positions resulting from the missile crisis of the 1990s made it even more difficult to find ways to fund a program with the objective of supporting bi-communal contacts and cooperation.

Faced with the need to spend the money in an environment with multiple constraints and risks, while at the same time demonstrating progress, the program leadership had to operate in a manner that did not directly confront the political constraints, or seem to break any of the restrictions on contact and potential 'recognition' imposed by the TCC and GCC. After some time, some informal rules did develop that, if carefully applied, would allow work to progress. These "rules", as developed by the PMU and US Embassy and USAID players, are as indicated in the next table.

**TABLE 1**

**Bi-communal Program Rules under Severe Constraints**

Avoid the following:

Political Terminology

1. Do not say bi-communal to the Turkish Cypriot
2. Do not mention TC authorities to GC authorities.

Fundamental political principles/issues

1. Avoid being trapped in recognition issue.
2. Avoid voting in the Project Steering Committees. – forge a consensus.

Providing too much process/grant budgetary information to PSC members and general publics on both sides.

Becoming the advocate for any particular project, while doing one's best to influence grant decisions.

Do the following

Be flexible and opportunistic in deciding which projects to fund as well as in implementation.

Make it easy for the sides to accept the project by assuming as much responsibility for program implementation as possible; for example, do procurement, manage funds directly, and hire outside expertise to work with both sides.

Act with discretion, keep a low profile.

Circumvent local authorities on behalf of IA.

Enhance the role of local partners without obliging them to take on responsibilities for project implementation.

Encourage and facilitate contacts between Turkish and Greek Cypriots without appearing to do so.

Stress economic and other benefits of the project to the TC side.

In Public Works programs, use the project to fill essential gaps in an overall structure, such as Venetian Wall restoration or in the Water and Sewage program.

Maintain the integrity and unity of the PMU Stakeholders, by ensuring a unified position among USAID, US Embassy, UNDP UNOPS.

These were the decision rules that emerged from the experience of the PMU and the USG in trying to mount a bi-communal program in an environment where both sides lacked the political will to advance bi-communalism, and where engagement of government agencies and NGOs in anything that looked like bi-communalism carried significant risks.

## **2. Grant Making Review and Decision Processes**

Most grant making programs have to have a process in place for advertising/informing potential grantees, reviewing and deciding on proposals, informing grant winners and losers, preparing and signing grant agreements, and monitoring and evaluating grantee performance. For each step in the process, the grant making organization is faced with a number of decisions about how to accomplish each step in the process.

If the grant program objectives are broadly stated and the selection criteria poorly defined, the funding organization may have difficulty using objective processes for deciding which proposals will be approved, grantees will have trouble producing and assessing impact, and the overall program will take on a diffuse and unfocused character.

The BDP is a political program with the purpose of promoting contact and cooperation between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot organizations, NGOs and citizens. Although the categories used to describe the program in Annual Reports sound like the familiar categories of a normal development program, e.g., public and animal health, environment, NGO development, all the stakeholders understand that sector objectives such as disease reduction or institutional capacity building have been secondary to the political objective of improving the possibilities of rapprochement.<sup>15</sup>

In a political program largely financed by the United States, it is not surprising that the foreign policy interests of USG should be given primary consideration in how the program is perceived and what kinds of benefits can be expected. As we stated above, the interests of the USG and the UN in this instance are substantially convergent, the main difference being the USG was on the ground, while the UNDP was in New York. Overall, the program decision-making process has evolved into a team effort involving all the major stakeholders. It is understood by all, however, that the US Embassy is *prima inter pares* among the stakeholders.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Some stakeholders insist that capacity building as a means toward achieving bi-communal results was an important criterion in the decision making process, pointing to the substantial support given by BDP to the NGO Support Centers. The team notes that the Turkish Cypriot Support Center has provided important training to the relatively newer and arguably more robust NGO community there, but found as well that the same effort on the Greek Cypriot side was not successful. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot Center continues to remain underutilized and not very productive even after being taken over by the PMU. From the perspective of the team's considerable experience with USAID funded Civil Society programs, it is very difficult to find much evidence in the BDP program of a serious effort to engage in NGO capacity building as an integral and consistent part of the implementation strategy. To have done so would have required the application of a strategy, much like that suggested in the Biddle Evans reports, that went well beyond the one applied by the program's implementers and policy managers.

<sup>16</sup> US Embassy based officers responsible for oversight of the project commented on this finding. They do not believe that their advice was listened to or taken seriously by the PMU. The evaluation team interviews with PMU staff as well as with US Embassy and USAID representatives support the finding that on matters of policy, as reflected in grant decisions, the US Embassy's views are controlling. As noted elsewhere, US Embassy's frustration with perceived PMU management weaknesses prompted a substantial engagement of the US staff in program implementation. This may have contributed to confusion and frustration on all sides.

**a. Bi-communal explained**

According to interviews with policy level staff, bi-communal can be defined as broadly as any activity that has the potential for promoting tolerance, and support for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

**TABLE 2**

<b>Operational Criteria for Grants</b>		
<b>Political, No Bi-communal Aspect and Other:</b> These criteria prevailed when there was sufficient pressure or need to use BDP funds for something worth doing that did not fit well using other criteria.		
<b>Island wide projects:</b> These are mono-communal projects that have island wide implications, therefore affecting both communities.		
<b>In Spirit:</b> These activities are done by a single organization (mono-communal), but undertaken in the interest of improved tolerance and cooperation.		
<b>Mirror Projects:</b> These activities would be “In Spirit” but would be the same or similar projects in both the TC and GC communities. These projects do not involve communication between the communities.		
<b>Collaborative Projects.</b> These are activities which require some degree of communication between the two communities. The information sharing contacts are often encouraged and facilitated by the PMU.		
<b>Joint activities:</b> Projects of this kind require regular activities done together by GC and TC agencies.		

In an attempt to understand the distribution of the BDP funded activities in terms of the classification/taxonomy set out above, the team asked US Embassy program staff to classify the entire portfolio using the categories.. Table 3 shows the summary results.

**TABLE 3**

<b>A rough classification of the Portfolio*</b>		
Type	Number	Class
In Spirit (IS)	20	NGO
Mirror (M)	9	IA-NGO
Collaborative C	37	IA-NGO
Joint (J)	15	IA-NGO
Not Bi-communal /Island Wide/Political (N)	11	IA (NMP)
*The projects enumerated above do not add up to the number of grants/contracts made by the PMU. Implementing Agencies had multiple contracts, as did a number of the NGOs.		

The table demonstrates that grants made for a relatively low level of bi-communal activity could develop an internal dynamic that moved the grantees into a more relevant position, and in more than half the cases, to a collaborative or joint effort.

As the table below indicates, if the classification system is applied, 27 percent of grantee organizations were able to move up the scale of bi-communality from mono-communal or mirror projects to collaborative or joint projects. This is indicative of a deepening of bi-communal relations by a small but noticeable percentage of the grantees.<sup>17</sup>

**TABLE 4**

<b>Project Movement toward Bi-communalism</b>	
<b>A rough classification</b>	
<b>TYPE OF MOVEMENT</b>	<b>NUMBER</b>
N to IS	21
IS to C	3
M to C	15
C to J	7
Total Moves	46

Grantee projects showing movement towards significant bi-communality: 25

\*Classifications and ratings suggested by USAID staff.

The criteria for decision making about grant program selections have shifted somewhat since the program began. The agreement between USAID and UNDP called for an NGO program from the beginning, but in the conditions of 1998, it was difficult to mount. NGO grant making gradually became possible, although the formal restrictions on contacts remained in place until 2003. Various efforts were made to establish criteria to guide the decision process toward a more developmental focus during the period 2000-2003. Outside consultants developed sector strategies for a NGO development program and an effort was made to establish a more focused Environmental grant program. Finally the PMU formalized what had been evident to all. The

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<sup>17</sup> The team is fully aware of the limitations of the findings presented in Table 3 and 4 above, and appreciates the effort made by the local USAID representative to provide the reported estimates. We recognize the potential for bias of any stakeholder in making conducting such a rating. It should also be noted that our 9 days of field research covering a wide variety of Task Order issues did not permit the application of any serious social science techniques for scientifically testing hypotheses. As we became aware that very little evaluative work had been done by the PMU in assessing bi-communal results other than a one shot effort to measure “contacts”, we requested the help of those who knew the program best, the local USAID Representative and the PMU project officers (as reported in subsequent sections of this report). By so doing, our hope was to illustrate that the best information about a program is often contained within the minds of those who know the program best. When challenged, these people can and should be able to participate in qualitative evaluation processes, especially if supported by other, more systematic efforts. If program leadership takes the job of results management seriously, it will find a variety of ways to improve the relevance and validity of the information needed.

Flexible Framework Fostering Rapprochement (FFFR) was adopted which emphasized “dimensions” of bi-communality projects irrespective of the particular sector.

The FFFR was UNDP/UNOPS/PMU’s attempt at an acceptable formulation for a program that was and had to be opportunistic, flexible, and politically driven. Efforts were made to develop a sector strategy for environment and for NGO development, but the team had difficulty in determining the extent to which this strategy was actually implemented, or its effects consistently monitored. The FFFR standards did help to clarify several dimensions of a strategic approach to the political goal of rapprochement.<sup>18</sup>

**b. Announcing the program**

For IA projects, the GOC Planning Bureau and the Turkish Cypriot authorities ‘advertise’ the BDP within their organizations via circular notes. Agencies/offices then submit proposals through the Cyprus Red Cross (Planning Bureau) or the Humanitarian Relief Mission (foreign affairs) to UNOPS for processing.

NGOs learn about the program through word of mouth, newspaper advertisements and more recently, from a BDP website which states purpose, broad eligibility criteria, and provides a link to an application form. Now that BDP is well known, individual NGO leaders may contact the BDP directly, and some approach US Embassy officers for consultation prior to submitting an application.

**c. The review process**

All proposals, IA and NGO, are compiled into binders by PMU staff. These are circulated to members of the Project Steering Committee(s)—UNDP; UNOPS; the US Embassy; and on the GC side, the Cyprus Red Cross/Planning Bureau and on the TC side, the HRM and the “economic director” of the “foreign affairs” office. PMU project officers conduct a preliminary evaluation of proposals and feed their recommendations into a review of proposals by the PMU senior staff and the Embassy. A recent practice is the inclusion of the project officers in this PMU-Embassy review meeting. From the Embassy’s side, proposals are reviewed by the Economic and Commercial Sections—more specifically, by the Embassy’s Advisor on Bi-communal Programs and the USAID Program Advisor. A summary table of proposals is submitted to UNDP and UNOPS headquarters followed by a telephone conference. A consensus is reached on the BDP’s position regarding projects to be funded prior to the formal quarterly

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<sup>18</sup> In commenting on this report, US Embassy staff made the following statement: “USAID/Embassy insisted that the UNDP/UNOPS/PMU could/should develop sectoral strategies within the FFFR. There was a lengthy discussion in Nicosia and at larger BDP management meetings about how strategies in specific sectors needed to focus on activities that were the intersection of three separate and often conflicting sets of criteria—namely, (1) the BDP’s program priorities (foster bicom contacts, cooperation, etc); (2) the on-the-ground realities and constraints (political situation, institutional realities, etc); and (3) the ideal developmental goals (if Cyprus were not divided) in each sector. While this approach is outlined in detail in the “Environment Sector Strategy” documents, it was a framework that was applied across the board.” The team notes that an environmental sector strategy was developed, but if this was the framework that was applied across the board, we did not find evidence that it was applied anywhere. Nor can we discern it from the types of activities that were funded. By far, the “sector” receiving the most financial support among NGO grants was related to health issues, for which no strategy was developed so far as we can discern. The explanation given for the heavy concentration on health oriented NGOs is that these were the only fundable proposals in the early years of the project.

Project Steering Committee meetings, which include representatives of the Greek Cypriot and, separately, Turkish Cypriot communities. These meetings also include New York offices via a video link.

The extent to which TCC and GCC stakeholders participate in the decision-making is limited, at least formally, to the penultimate PSC meeting. As one local participant described it, the PMU-US Embassy internal review and consensus process assures that US and UNDP interests are generally observed. The TCC and GCC participants can say “NO” to some projects, but lack the power to approve a project without the support from the UNDP and USG decision makers.

Once the grantee list has been formalized, a memorandum is sent to UNOPS Executive Director through the SPMO, who authorized the PMU to proceed with contract negotiations.

In the meantime, those organizations whose proposals were not accepted receive a letter stating the same. This letter does not go into any detailed assessment of the **strengths** and weaknesses of the rejected proposal, but does invite applicants to call the PMU for feedback and/or to request additional information on the Program.

**d. The Fast Track**

After the 2002 Annual Review a ‘fast track’ process was created for target of opportunity projects or for ad hoc projects that might not receive the approval of the authorities. A weekly meeting was established whereby the PMU and the US Embassy approved such projects without reference to the PSC. This was further formalized as a new grant category called the Special Initiative Grant with a limit in principle of \$12,000 per grant.

**e. Negotiating the contract**

After authorization is received, it is the task of the PMU Project officer to negotiate the contract with the grantee. The Project Steering Committee frequently approves proposals with conditions, which must then be negotiated and including in the actual grant documents and budgets. Once agreement is reached, the grantee may begin work according to a pre-agreed schedule of activities/deliverables which serve as a basis for payments.

**f. Evaluation of Program Impact**

Project and program files do not provide much information on the application of either rapid or more formal results monitoring procedures, whether by grantees, the PMU staff or outside experts. Although there was a mid term program evaluation, much of that effort was focused on program operations and establishment of improved management and decision making systems, rather than on program results. The team found little documentation, even at the project level, to draw conclusions as to whether discrete bi-communal targets had been established or met. Absence of evaluative information in the project files, combined with the way project data is aggregated, have made it difficult for program managers to judge how they are doing and to make changes in program policy and strategy to improve program effectiveness.

### **3. *The Contingency Plan***

The contingency plan for the BDP, originally prepared in mid-2002, identifies some critical areas to be addressed in the case of a settlement. Those areas remain as valid in mid-2004 as they were two years ago. Opinion leaders as well as officials from both GCC and TCC recommended many of these same areas for future donor support.

Briefly, the contingency plan recommends four strategic priorities for BDP assistance:

- (1) Facilitate communications through physical reconnection of the two parts of the island (roads, telecommunications, postal services, redevelopment of the Nicosia buffer zone) and through development of joint regulatory and management systems for use of common resources and facilities.
- (2) Support good governance through assisting in the establishment of the common state organization (the federal state), and promoting improved local government that interacts with civil society through participatory mechanisms.
- (3) Spur economic growth by raising competitiveness of small and medium scale industries and by developing economic linkages between the GCC and the TCC.
- (4) Strengthen social cohesion and mutual respect by strengthening civil society organizations, by undertaking activities that develop common values, non-discrimination, tolerance and reconciliation (e.g. through education, human rights activities, dispute resolution), and by supporting the media to promote peace and reconciliation.


The problem with the contingency plan in the team's view is that it represents a major expansion in areas of assistance, including expansion to new areas not in the BDP's proven areas of comparative advantage such as communications infrastructure and development of economic linkages. (These two areas in particular are likely to be addressed through EU assistance.) The current structure and management of the PMU is not adequate to handle major additional interventions such as these. Subsets within some of these priority areas are appropriate, however, and these are discussed in the recommendations section.

## **C. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS BY SECTOR**

### **1. *Changes in Spending over Time (Overview)***

The BDP developed out of the UNHCR program with a high level of involvement in infrastructure projects, so spending patterns illustrate a steady commitment for funding implementing agencies. The figure below illustrates that the spending over time changed somewhat due to the changing priorities of the program. As an offshoot of large infrastructure projects, the primary recipients of the funding were the implementing agencies. However, over a short period of time, the NGO program became a priority for the BDP and spending levels reflect this.





After an impressive increase in spending on NGOs between 1998 and 2000, the expenditure level stabilized. The spending on NGOs fluctuated between 1.3 and 2.3 million dollars a year from the year 2000 to 2003. Implementing agencies experienced much higher levels of fluctuation in funding from the BDP over the years. Spending under the category of PMU reflects both operational costs as well as some directed expenditures such as the cost of preparing meeting rooms for Settlement negotiating teams.

Although the program documentation suggests a shift in emphasis toward the NGO side of the program after 2001, the spending pattern that emerged by year 2000 remained fairly constant for IAs and NGOs for the balance of the program. The dollar value of NGO grants was reduced in 2002, while the number of NGO projects increased substantially after that. Only one year, 1999, is somewhat of an anomaly in the data. It appears in that year the PMU, itself, was the major monetary benefactor of the BDP funds in 1999. In the first year of the project, the PMU was “squatting” in UNHCR’s offices until 1999 when it refurbished the old airport premises.


## 2. Governance and Civil Society Grants—Patterns and Changes

Although NGOs have not been the primary financial beneficiary of BDP funds, NGOs have been able to benefit a great deal from the program, especially since the year 2000. The PMU does not keep records on NGO grant spending by “sub-sector”.<sup>19</sup> In an effort to understand better whether there were implicit sub-sector allocation preferences, the evaluation team organized all NGO grants into 8 sub-sectors, based on the titles of the grants supplemented by other descriptive data.

<sup>19</sup> US Embassy personnel state that they had urged the PMU to keep financial and reporting records organized by NGO, but to no avail.

The chart below illustrates how spending in governance and civil society was distributed among these subject matter sub-sectors and changed over time.

By May 2000, spending was concentrated in the categories of environment and public health. These two sectors remained the best funded until June 2001. By mid-2001, the data show that there was a considerable effort to fund culture, community development, peace/mediation, and education. In about one year, the allocation of funds shifted from over eighty percent allocated to the categories of environment and health to a more balanced situation in which grants were given to organizations for other activities.




Another major shift appears in the spending patterns in 2002. Funding became available for issues in gender and the economy for the first time. In addition, 2002 saw a greater stress on spending on culture and the arts. By December 2003, spending on governance/civil society became more diversified, allowing for a richer diversity in organizations funded and projects funded. In addition, the BDP showed its interest in supporting NGO development by investing in intermediaries to assist in NGO development.

Public health was the category in governance/civil society that received the most funding up until December 2003. There are many projects that received over \$100,000 and dealt with some health issues of importance island-wide. Only one project received more than \$150,000, a project on Dyslexia.


Over the entire period, there were large sums of money invested in environmental concerns. Many projects received over \$100,000 and dealt with some environmental concerns. One, Swelling Clays, cost nearly \$200,000.

It should be noted that while NGO funding remained fairly steady following the year 2000, the allocation by categories diversified greatly, especially since 2002. This raises administrative issues. A greater number of grants would suggest higher transaction costs and oversight costs.



### 3. Special Initiatives

The special initiatives were a device that appeared as a sub-sector of the grants to allow for flexibility in the program. Although the Special Initiatives appeared only in the past few months of the program, they have allowed a great number of projects that require relatively small amounts of capital but have a significant impact. The figure below illustrates the growth of the Special Initiatives over the past few years.



The projects range from the very inexpensive (\$215) to the moderately expensive (\$27,546). These Special Initiatives have led to bi-communal concerts, academic conferences, and other educational activities. It is hard to assess the impact of such a diverse array of “one off” initiatives. However, some seem to have potential for bringing the two communities together, even if only to discuss a common issue or problem. From the perspective of the donor, the Special Initiatives offer a great deal of flexibility and the ability to move funds quickly without the cumbersome project review and decision making process described in section 2 above.

## **V. ASSESSMENT OF OPINION LEADER PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROGRAM**

### **A. APPROACH**

An open ended questionnaire was followed to structure interviews with Opinion Leaders (OL) from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Community. The OL list was compiled from suggestions provided by the USAID Representatives and by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of the team. The respondents included members of the Project Steering Committee, senior government officials, municipal leaders from both sides, union and professional association leaders, business people, and representatives of print media organizations. On the Greek Cypriot side, one Bishop of the Greek Orthodox Church was interviewed.

In several cases, more than one person was in the room, but the only the answers of the principal respondent were recorded.

The total number of Opinion Leaders was 23, distributed as: TC: 10; GC: 12. One informed expatriate observer was also interviewed. 6 of the TC and 3 of the GC respondents had been beneficiaries of an early BDP program, the Harvard Study Group. This may have put a positive bias on their responses...on the other hand, the relatively small size of the island’s Cypriot population produces an even smaller pool of potential Opinion Leaders, making it difficult to find someone who was not familiar with the BDP.

### **B. FINDINGS**

The interview asked respondents whether they knew of the program and its objectives, their assessment of achievements, strengths and weaknesses, knowledge of other bi-communal initiatives, and their thoughts about post settlement priorities and the future role of BDP if any.

1. All respondents were knowledgeable about BDP, although 4 of the 23 had very little knowledge. These were for the most part newspaper and union leaders.
2. 7 of the 23 opinion leaders were unable to explain the purpose of the BDP,
3. Asked about the main accomplishments of the BDP, 6 cited infrastructure, 7 cited opening up contacts, and 3 cited development of civil society.
4. In reference to the main strength of the BDP, 4 respondents said making financing available; 4 GC and 1 TC respondent referred to PMU’s reputation for balance and being

- trusted; while 3 TC respondents cited contributions to cultural heritage as the important strength.
5. Asked about major weaknesses, only 12 of the respondents replied, with 4 GCs and 2 TCs saying “funding of bogus NGOs” was a problem, with the same number citing “involvement of authorities” as a problem.
  6. With respect to the important evaluative question of whether the BDP had made a contribution to Peace, 12 respondents said yes, while 5 said no...and the balance did not want to say. GC respondents tended to be somewhat more positive about BDP’s contribution than TC respondents.
  7. The contribution of other bi-communal efforts outside BDP, primarily the EU program, was mentioned by 13 respondents, 5 persons from both sides mentioned other bi-communal activities that had been initiated by groups without foreign funding. For example the teacher’s union leaders on the TC side described their activities with counterparts from the GC side with respect to revising textbooks.
  8. Not surprisingly, most opinion leaders did not have views about the PMU as the implementing agent for the BDP, but 9 did, of which 5 were negative and 4 were positive. Several who had been involved with infrastructure and UNHCR did not see value in the NGO programs.
  9. Asked about immediate future needs in a post settlement environment, 9 respondents said Reconciliation programs, 3 TCs mentioned history book revision and 2 mentioned providing legal advice and language training for the Turkish Cypriot side. The Greek Cypriot side also ranked Reconciliation, property settlement, economic and financial cost issues close behind.

Respondents who participated in the Harvard Group who volunteered their assessment of that program said it had not done much to change their minds, but it did improve their understanding of the other side’s arguments.<sup>20</sup>

Responses regarding the future role of BDP were varied and difficult to categorize. Some stated that the phrase “bi-communal”, should be dropped and a new “mantra” put in its place. Others stressed the linkage between civil society, education and reconciliation as appropriate areas for a successor program. One TC leader made the important point that after over the 40 years of separation, both sides had changed considerably, especially for the TC side. At the beginning, the TC population was largely agrarian with a tiny educated class. Today, the TC population is urban, well educated and knowledgeable about business and other professions. Also, the Turkish Cypriots are very different than the Anatolian Turks (and Kurds) who have been brought from the mainland as settlers. Now a majority in the north, the settlers are largely agriculturalists, poorly educated, traditional in belief and custom and poor, compared to Turkish Cypriots. Several of the Turkish Cypriot leaders noted that this social dualism is a source of potential serious conflict and needs to be addressed immediately if the settlement is to work.

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<sup>20</sup> The US Embassy observes that persons selected to participate in the Harvard Study Group were “hardliners”. The project was not intended to change people’s minds. The team agrees.

## **VI. FINDINGS BY SECTOR**

### **A. INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENT**

#### ***1. Background on Environment and Public Infrastructure***

Many activities are related to the Environment and Public Infrastructure sectors that were initiated as pre-approved projects carried over to the BDP. These were rather large municipal infrastructure and environmental related projects carried out during the period February 1999 - August 2003. The two larger environmental projects developed during this period were the Nicosia Trunk E and the Mia Milia wastewater treatment facility. Two closely related environment related projects involved the study of an integrated warning system and sewage connections in Turkish Cypriot Communities (TCC).

Infrastructure grants carried out as part of the pre-approved projects included several sizeable Nicosia Master Plan (NMP) related actions such as the Arab Ahmet and Chrysaliniotissa neighborhood restoration projects on both sides of the line. Pre-approved projects were discontinued in 2001 and the most recent environmental and infrastructure projects implemented under the BDP require review and approval by a Steering Committee.

PMU personnel supplied information for each project as direct access by the evaluation team to project files was not allowed. The information collected in the interviews and project files review serves as the foundation for the assessment of the BDP program.

In terms of dollar value, the PMU directly implemented a larger share of project resources (\$6,380,834) than did the implementing agencies (\$6,221,225). This enabled implementation to proceed rapidly and several grantees interviewed were impressed with the PMU's capabilities in managing the funds and expediting procurement. Thirteen percent of the projects were contracted with NGOs (two different Greek Cypriot NGOs and two different Turkish Cypriot NGOs). Half of the projects went to the Steering Committees for approval. Thirty-two percent were either pre-approved or ad hoc agreements. Over half of the projects were implemented on both sides of the green line.

#### ***2. Findings on Environment projects***

##### **a. Management**

Because most of the public works programs required cooperation from implementing agencies from both sides at a time when official contacts were banned, the projects could not proceed without the PMU playing a critical role as intermediary and, in many cases, as direct project implementer. To supplement its own staff skills, the PMU frequently brought in consultants to give advice in specialized areas. This worked well and was appreciated by the implementing agencies, though there were a few cases when the implementing agencies disagreed with approaches recommended by the consultants.

Several technical deficiencies observed during the field inspection of the wastewater facility preclude a positive rating of the PMU management operation. Unfortunately, some of the

problems seem to have resulted from the way the PMU divided responsibilities in the interest of promoting bi-communalism. The Mia Milia wastewater treatment facility represents a significant capital investment that was not completed in agreement with standard practice as the flow meter device was not properly installed. This apparently resulted from the decision to use a Greek Cypriot supplier. Because the supplier could not work on the Turkish Cypriot side, where the flow meter was to be installed, installation fell to the Turkish Cypriot contractor in charge of the civil works. The contractor was not able to install it properly. As a result, the flow of effluent cannot be measured. The PMU is aware of this problem, but so far no action has been taken to correct it.<sup>21</sup>

In addition, engineering oversight during the construction phase did not provided proper advice with regard to geotechnical aspects of the project and significant quantities of seepage originate from the facultative and maturation pond units. Both of these deficiencies have caused discomfort and complaints from the TC operator of the facility. Seepage from the ponds system creates conditions for environmental distress due to potential groundwater contamination.

The operator of the facility also indicated that the necessary operation and maintenance training was not provided prior to the start-up of the facility operation and as a result they are unable to efficiently operate the facility. The Embassy and PMU staff state, however, that repeated training was provided for operations and maintenance as part of the project.

The Embassy and the PMU emphasized to the municipality the importance of putting a decent management team in place if the program was to be continued, and that it was discontinued when the municipality would not approve it. There remains the question, however, of whether the BDP should have allowed a previous investment such as the flow-meter to fail.

## **b. Strategy**

The strategy for the Nicosia sewerage program was to address a long-standing issue that required cooperation from both sides to resolve, and in doing so, foster good relations and common systems and approaches, so that the two sides would be able to work together without PMU's presence in event of a solution. At the same time, it would produce a visible result of social and developmental consequence for residents on both sides of the city. The strategy was sound, in that it did result in common equipment, systems, and approaches. IA representatives surveyed said that the projects resulted in regular contact and good cooperation between the technical people involved in the sewerage system on both sides.

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<sup>21</sup> When we first informed the US Embassy staff of the flow meter problem, our understanding from their comments was that they were aware of the problem. However, subsequent communication informs us that they were not aware of the "details of the flow meter," but they were aware of general management problems at the sewerage plant. Whatever the case, the BDP should have taken action to correct this serious failure in a major investment.

**c. Effectiveness**

**i. Materiality**

The environmental projects surveyed represent an investment of \$6.6 million and have an impact on all the residents of Nicosia. They have promoted and achieved interaction between both communities and have opened the door for similar opportunities in the future. IA and NGO representatives surveyed noted that there were regular meetings, that relations had improved and they were better able to deal with their peers from the other side.

In another one of the projects evaluated, the full effectiveness of the wastewater facility investment has not been fully realized because not all the necessary equipment was properly installed. It appears that no efforts have been made to complete the pending action. In general, it will be necessary to make sure that projects are not halted or abandoned before all recommended or specified actions are completed.

**ii. Institution-building**

The projects provided training in operations and maintenance for those who needed to implement the system improvements. In addition, several of the IA representatives surveyed said that their abilities to implement large projects were enhanced. The need for the PMU to take on the lion's share of procurement and contracting itself has probably limited the capacity-building impact, and to a lesser extent has affected feelings of "ownership" of the projects and their problems by the IAs. In interviews, some IA representatives referred to the activities as being the PMU's rather than their own.

**iii. Symbolic**

The sizes of these investments alone are an important symbol of U.S. interest in tolerance and cooperation. Unlike the Nicosia Master Plan (NMP) activities, however, water and wastewater projects are not noticed unless something goes wrong. The deficiencies noted above could in time have a negative impact if they lead to water quality problems that attract public notice.

**3. Infrastructure projects**

**a. Management**

Unlike the sewerage projects, the Nicosia Master Plan-related projects were implemented primarily by the IAs, except for the Buffer Zone Survey, the New Vision, and other consultancies and workshops. The major NMP initiatives reviewed, Arab Ahmet and Chrysaliniotissa neighborhood renovations, could be undertaken by one side alone, without much discussion with colleagues from the other side. The PMU played an important role in this sector by promoting a common vision between municipal authorities on both sides through the New Vision program and through partnership meetings.

Information provided in the surveys of grantees contains several concerns with regard to the following aspects of the management function:



- ▶ Long delays in the approval of grants.
- ▶ Need for expert advice from the PMU for the preparation of proposals.
- ▶ Need for clarity of proposal submittal rules and proposal debriefings.
- ▶ High turnover of personnel at the PMU.
- ▶ Need for technical advisers to assist with the implementation of “sophisticated projects” such as ecological inventories.

Despite the concerns expressed by the implementing agencies, there is agreement with respect to PMU strengths including its role as a facilitator for the implementation of projects.

These concerns indicate that temporary technical expertise in specific fields is required to meet the intended objectives of the PMU management function. In addition, there is need for establishing a proposal review process that includes a debriefing period.

## **b. Strategy**

Survey results endorse the BDP’s strategy towards the NMP as a unifying program. According to implementing agencies surveyed, the bi-communal purpose of the BDP provides the foundation of the projects being implemented in the infrastructure sector. Most projects are considered highly relevant to the physical unification of Nicosia. The general perception of the implementing agencies is that the BDP aims at closing the communication gap between the two communities. One of the interviewees indicated that the links being created as a result of the BDP are developing long lasting working relationships.

## **c. Effectiveness**

### *i. Materiality*

The infrastructure projects reviewed by the team are valued at \$6,018,280. They have had a substantial impact in urban revitalization. Projects such as the Arab Ahmet in the Turkish side of Nicosia and Chrysaliniotissa in the Greek side have advanced the goal of maintaining the Walled City as a residential area in preparation for a settlement and reunification of the Cyprus community. The NMP Buffer Zone Survey is an important example of creating a bi-communal group to preserve the heritage of buildings in the Buffer Zone. In the words of a Greek Cypriot interviewed for this evaluation “*the purpose of the Buffer Zone Survey is to preserve the capacity of the area so it could have a role in the unification of the city.*”

Thus, the signal seems clear that these projects not only aid in stopping degradation of buildings in the area but also contribute to bi-communal objectives.

Bi-communal working relationships fostered by this program are primarily among the architects and planners in the municipal governments. Recently, the BDP has begun fostering public-private partnerships (e.g. the Jasmine Internet Café) to broaden the range of bi-communal contacts and to breathe life into the renovated areas. There is much scope to expand this type of activity.

*ii. Institution-building*

All agree that their capacity to implement complex projects and to prepare proposals has improved, and some also noted that their relationships with architects and other counterparts from the other side have become close.

*iii. Symbolic*

Though they result in only a limited amount of direct bi-communal contact, historic renovations like the two neighborhoods improved under the NMP and the Venetian Walls restoration are visible symbols of US and UN commitment to improved relationships. To ensure that the symbol remains positive, it is important that the renovated communities are also revitalized, through activities that will bring people back into these areas. The public-private partnerships begun under the NMP may hold some promise to achieve this.

**B. OTHER IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES**

The evaluation team selected two of the large veterinary health projects (echinococcus and brucellosis eradication projects) of the veterinary health departments of both sides, and the human health project (Elderly Care at Karpas) of the Ministry of Health on the Turkish Cypriot side. The two subsectors represent two very different approaches to bi-communalism.

**1. Description of the programs**

**a. Veterinary health**

The diseases addressed in the selected veterinary health projects, echinococcus and brucellosis, have important impacts on Cyprus economic development. Echinococcus had been recognized as an important problem prior to 1974 and the united veterinary service had an island-wide control program. With the separation, however, though the Republic of Cyprus maintained its echinococcus control program in the South, the Turkish Cypriot officials in the North did not. The Greek Cypriot side had also received funds from UNHCR for echinococcus, so by the time the BDP project was approved, the program was already past the initial “attack” phase and well into the “consolidation” phase. The infection rate was already under one percent. On the Turkish Cypriot side, however, after more than a twenty-year lapse in its echinococcus program, it had to begin at the “attack” phase. Prevalence was high – 25 to 30 percent in sheep, 14 percent in cattle. As for brucellosis, on both sides the eradication project was new. The major effort was to prepare a common database for all the animals through ear tagging, to allow for identification of diseased animals and to pave the way for trade – both between North and South parts of the island, and to Europe.

Both projects were approved by their steering committees in 1999. The BDP steering committee recognized that disease eradication is a long-term effort and was prepared to fund each activity for five years, though grants were approved annually with further assistance dependent upon sufficient progress. As of December 31, 2003, \$4,411,714 has been contracted for these projects. A large percentage of expenditure has been for direct procurement by the PMU of testing equipment and supplies and pharmaceuticals, as well as an ear tagging and data base system for the North compatible with that used by the South. The grants have also financed

training and conferences for veterinary staff of both sides, an outreach program to teach farmers how to prevent disease occurrences, and establishment of a bi-communal veterinary training and testing facility in the buffer zone.

**b. Human health**

Despite efforts of the PMU to promote bi-communal health activities, early interest by implementing agencies was limited to the Turkish Cypriot side.<sup>22</sup> The primary activity reviewed by the team, Elderly Care, funded medical and social work services to about 200 elderly residents of six villages in Karpaz, of whom about 40 percent were Greek Cypriots. Other human health projects approved for the Turkish Cypriot health authorities were a palliative care project for cancer sufferers in the Nicosia area, and a breast cancer detection project. The projects were approved in June, 2000, are now completed, and totaled \$289,043. Later proposals by the GOC Ministry of Health were rejected due to high costs and low bi-communal returns expected.

**2. Management**

**a. Success depended on commitment of the Cypriot program managers**

For the first year after the health program was approved it faltered, primarily due to the lack of interest in bi-communal programs of the Turkish Cypriot health leadership. When new leaders more predisposed to participate in BDP activities took over, project implementation took off.

As for the animal health program, the willingness of the directors of veterinary services from both sides to collaborate on data collection, training, testing and planning is due to their recognition that these economically important disease issues cannot be effectively addressed unless there is a single approach used island-wide.

**b. For activity that required cooperation from both sides, the PMU role as intermediary was – and is – essential**

The PMU provided means of communicating, sharing information, and ensuring that disease eradication programs were compatible that would not have been possible otherwise, because of the ban on direct communication between officials of the two sides.

**3. Strategy**

Successful bi-communal strategies need to be based on important issues that require cooperation to resolve.

The project strategy to promote bi-communalism among implementing agencies seemed to be: Get your foot in the door, and with luck, little by little you can wedge it open.

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<sup>22</sup> As noted earlier, public (or human) health projects organized by NGOs represent the largest single sub-sector funded by the NGO side of the BDP with more than 30 % of the total NGO allocations. Most of these projects appear to be more properly classified as public health support projects, dealing with information outreach, education, and social support to families whose relatives have a serious ailment, such as cancer or diabetes.

The elderly care and palliative care projects did help the BDP develop a relationship with the TC health authorities, but since no relationship was built on the Greek Cypriot side, the door didn't open any further. Though there were plans to develop a strategy to promote bi-communal relations in primary health care and emergency health, it never happened. Perhaps primary health and emergency health are areas where bi-communalism is not necessary.

In animal health, where there was a clearly discernible need for cooperation, the BDP strategy of wedging the door open a bit at a time worked. There was no written strategy for promoting bi-communalism in animal health. It was a matter of building on successes, and using each successive grant amendment as an opportunity to push the door a little further.

The first project consisted of mirror grants with most work done individually on each side, and a few face-to-face meetings at technical conferences. Over time, the success of the programs in reducing incidence of disease led the higher-level authorities to view them as important developmentally. Once they supported the projects, it became easier for the veterinary staff to collaborate more openly. The PMU was able to write collaborative meetings into the next round of grants. The next step was an outreach program on both sides, to train farmers throughout the island on safeguarding their animals' health. The PMU included in farmer-level training the message that these were island-wide problems and farmers on the other side were doing their part by taking similar actions. Finally, in May 2003 the PMU opened a veterinary testing and training center at UNOPS offices in the buffer zone, to enable technicians from both sides to work together on preparation of tapeworm bait (for echinococcus prevention) and bulk milk testing (for brucellosis identification).

#### **4. Effectiveness**

In its small size and limited scope, the human health program fits better among the NGO programs than it does those of the other implementing agencies reviewed by the team. Therefore program effectiveness findings on this program will be consolidated with findings on the NGO programs.

##### **a. Materiality**

The veterinary health program has provided significant developmental benefits to both communities – and these benefits have enabled the program to increase its collaborative nature. Echinococcus rates in the North have been cut in half for cattle and sheep, and have remained stable in the South. Similarly, brucellosis rates have declined greatly among cattle and goats. Aside from the messages of the outreach campaign, which have reached at least 8,000 farm families to date, substantive bi-communal exchanges have occurred among some 80 to 100 veterinary officials from both sides. The primary bi-communal benefit of this program, however, is not the exchanges that have occurred, but the fact that the common approaches, common data collection and analysis systems, and progress made in fighting these two diseases will pave the way for regular, direct cooperation between the two sides once a settlement has been achieved.

##### **b. Institution building**

Since the North had not had an echinococcus control program since 1974, the institution-building needs there were much greater than they were in the South, but TC veterinary officials

were eager to accept help. Through training, procurement of modern equipment and development of databases in both sides that can eventually be combined into one, the BDP has achieved substantial institution-building. The major factor affecting the Turkish Cypriot side's ability to continue activities once the project has ended is financial constraints rather than institutional capacity. PMU staff recognizes, however, that handling so much of the project procurement may have prevented both sides from gaining skills in this area that they will need in the future

**c. Symbolic importance**

The veterinary program probably has very little importance as a symbol of bi-communality. The data bases and common approaches are not showy or easily described. The direct beneficiaries are technicians who happily do their thing, working with farmers on their own side of the island, except for occasional training, data analysis and discussion of recent progress. The most important benefits – reduction of disease – at the field level depends on mono-communal work between the veterinarians and the farmers. The echinococcus and brucellosis projects could have been used to promote civil society involvement through farmer support groups that might have developed bi-communal relationships. We understand an effort to do this is being made in the ongoing dairy project.

**C. CIVIL SOCIETY**

***1. Description of BDP NGO Sector Support***

Based on NGO lists maintained by the BDP-funded NGO centers on both sides, there are about 141 active Turkish Cypriot NGOs and about 150 active Greek Cypriot NGOs.<sup>23</sup> The largest categories of NGOs are professional, scientific and social. On neither side is there a legal structure that offers incentives for individuals or corporations to support non-profit and charitable organizations. Except for a few large, well-established organizations, NGOs tend to be small, fragile, and dependent on volunteers and in-kind donations from members.

The initial grant agreement with UNDP allocated \$2 million for NGOs. This ceiling was later removed to allow the program to expand. The philosophy behind an NGO program was twofold: that a vibrant civil society would be an important component of a successful society once a settlement was reached, and that in the meantime civil society organizations could greatly expand the number of bi-communal contacts to foster peace and cooperation.

NGO projects were reviewed by the Steering Committees in the same manner as Implementing Agency projects; however, the Turkish Cypriot authorities would not initially agree to approve NGO proposals. While the steering committee on the GC side began approving NGO proposals by June 1999, the TC side did not give its approval until a year later, and then only on the stipulation that TC NGOs must have no contact with GC NGOs. Clearly, this was a major stumbling-block to bi-communal activity. As a result, the BDP funded many civil society

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<sup>23</sup> This is a somewhat lower estimate than that used in the Biddle/Evans UNDP/UNOPS NGO Strategy of July 2001. That document estimated that there are 150 NGOs on the TC side, but more like 400-500 entities on the GC side based on registration records. We believe our list is more accurate, since it comes from lists compiled by the NGO centers as a result of the Biddle/Evans mission.

projects that were bi-communal “in spirit”, or concerned island-wide issues, or had mirror projects with NGOs on the other side, but where little or no actual contact between the two sides was made. The PMU encouraged GC NGOs to make contacts with individuals or groups on the TC side to increase the contacts resulting from the activities. Gradually, as the TC authorities became more comfortable with approving NGO proposals, TC NGOs also began to initiate contacts with the South, though they did so at some risk. Until April 2003, however, all on-island contact between CG and TC NGOs was extremely difficult.

Overall, the BDP has funded projects of 51 GC NGOs and 26 TC NGOs, to the tune of \$6,416,800 (including assistance to NGO centers); with another \$330,000 for international organizations or contracts to fund activities involving both GC and TC NGOs.

On both sides, the largest number of grantees are organizations that address a medical problem such as cancer, Alzheimers, or diabetes (14 GC and 8 TC organizations); followed by professional associations and research groups. Other focus areas of NGOs were environment, advocacy, arts and culture, and youth. Only in the north were traditional community development NGOs funded. In the South, several bi-communal peace organizations received funding. Twenty-three organizations (28 percent) received multiple grants. Of these, 5 organizations, including the two NGO resource centers, received over \$1 million through 2003. This concentration of grant funding indicates the difficulty BDP had in finding qualified grantees in the early years of the program.

## **2. *Use of Technology to Foster Bi-Communal Relationships***

During the years of the TC bi-communal ban, the Internet was one of the few means for GC and TC organizations to communicate. Computer and Internet use is widespread throughout the South, and is common in the urban areas and some rural areas of the North. For that reason, it was potentially a very important tool to promote bi-communal relations. The BDP promoted use of communications technology by its grantees in several ways.

First, the BDP created its own website ([www.UNOPSPmu.org](http://www.UNOPSPmu.org)) from which potential grantees can learn about the program and other bi-communal activities, read about grant criteria and download application forms. The BDP website also contains links to other major websites funded through the BDP.

Second, the BDP supported the development of several web-based resources that people interested in bi-communal peace and cooperation can access. Among these are the following key sites:

- ▶ Technology for Peace ([Tech4Peace.org](http://Tech4Peace.org)) serves as a “portal” where organizations interested in peace and bi-communality can read or post the latest news, learn about or post upcoming events, access free e-mail and join chat-rooms on subjects of common interest, and even place their own websites, free of charge.
- ▶ MediaNet ([cyprusmedianet.com](http://cyprusmedianet.com)) offers daily translations of the key news events from major Cypriot newspapers in three languages: Greek, Turkish and English.
- ▶ Cyprus Decides ([cyprusdecides.org](http://cyprusdecides.org)) describes the contents of the Annan Plan in plain, non-legal language, in Greek, Turkish and English.

- ▶ The Management Center's site (mancentre.org) announces news, events and services that it can provide to support capacity-building of TC NGOs.
- ▶ The "Internet Quiz Game", a new project, asks questions that help school-aged youth from both sides understand each other.

Third, the BDP has included funds in several of its grants to enable organizations to purchase computers and software, obtain Internet access, and receive computer training. In some cases (e.g. the Neuronet project), this included specialized software to allow for professional and technical dialogue between the two sides.

Many of these interventions have undoubtedly promoted the sharing of information on important issues related to bi-communality and potential solutions to the Cyprus problem. Most websites noted above are professional in appearance, user friendly, and accessible to both Greek and Turkish readers.

When the Tech4Peace grant was approved, the UN and US stakeholders hoped that it could become the electronic partner to the NGO management centers, helping to encourage NGOs in a wide variety of sectors to engage with similar organizations on the other side. Tech4Peace's director, however, has a different vision. He views the site as a resource for peace organizations rather than for the broader NGO community. Consequently, Tech4Peace has never become the tool that the BDP hoped.

Except for Tech4Peace's chat rooms, the BDP-funded web sites are informational, but do not allow for dialogue between people and groups from both sides. The latter occurs through e-mail, not websites. The PMU in its matchmaking role could have been more aggressive in initiating e-mail dialogue among grantees and potential grantees in order to foster greater collaboration.

This is reflected in the BDP's website, which provides a good deal of general information, but few specifics about organizations whose proposals have or have not been approved or about upcoming bi-communal events and opportunities. The grantees interviewed by the team who were familiar with the BDP website had used it for one purpose – to download the application forms. A couple were confused by what they read about application deadlines. No one spoke of other parts of the site as being valuable to them.

The BDP did not develop a communications strategy that could provide some direction on how the program could best use information technology until the last year of the project.

### **3. Management**

*"We have no idea what's going on." - A grantee*

PMU staff is helpful and responsive and take their project monitoring responsibilities seriously. The project officers maintain excellent relations with their grantees and make frequent monitoring visits, despite the increasingly heavy workload they have taken on as the civil society program grew.

The project application requirements are sufficiently comprehensive without being overly burdensome to grantees. Application instructions require grantees to identify project objectives

and beneficiaries, to provide sufficient background on the organization's capabilities, to cover issues of sustainability, impact and bi-communality, to describe implementation arrangements, and to provide budget details. Grantees did not find the process burdensome and were comfortable requesting assistance from PMU staff when it was needed. Team review of a sample of grantee applications showed rather large differences in the amount of detail provided, particularly related to bi-communal activity.

Lack of transparency and difficulties in communications are major sources of frustration, both to grantees and to applicants who do not receive grants. Those whose applications are not approved cannot understand why and are given no good explanations except for "inadequate funds". Yet they see other NGOs with similar projects getting approvals.

Some grantees became suspicious that this seemingly whimsical grant approval process meant that approvals were given to favorites, or to bogus NGOs. Some said they would not apply again for this reason.

NGOs also perceive inconsistencies between the way different grantees are treated on eligible budget items (some grants have project coordinators, other grantees are told these expenses are not allowed), need for a partner organization from the other side, and project extensions.

From a project management standpoint, the PMU lacks depth. The project management burden has become so great that when one project officer is away, no one else in the organization is able to handle a grantee's issues. The institutional memory about project activities appears to reside with the project officer, not in the project files where others could access it in order to fill in for each other.

#### **4. Strategy**

According to the Contact Theory lack of knowledge and information about the "other" is the source of evil. In a state of isolation, groups exaggerate their differences and fall prey to propaganda against the "other" while unfortunate events of the past can be kept alive. Creating conditions for groups to meet and get to know and see each other as human beings, and start a dialogue, helps break down negative stereotyping, prejudices and hatreds. The BDP applied the contact theory to "bi-communality"... The partial lifting of the restrictions on the freedom of travel between the two sides on April 23, 2003 was a major break through in the relations between the two communities. This naturally resulted in what the BDP was aiming to achieve: bringing the two peoples together. Even after this date it is hard to find clear criteria on which projects get approved. The PMU team has commented that the type of grants funded since April has shifted from lower levels of bi-communality to joint projects but there still are no written criteria or strategy.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> The US Embassy comments on this report insist that a set of standards for promoting bi-communal activities through the BDP program did exist and were applied across the board. The team was unable to document this. Indeed, most interviews with PMU and Embassy stakeholders, including UNDP officials, USAID, US Embassy officers and Cypriot Representatives, indicated that the main decision rules were to maintain flexibility and be as opportunistic as possible. See Table 1 above for an excellent summary of these rules. Moreover, according to Embassy and PMU rankings, as high as 45% of the projects were rated as having little or no bi-communal results. A fully random process of grant making would produce similar results. The fact that some projects did succeed is not evidence for the application of criteria systematically applied.



## **5. Effectiveness**

### **a. Materiality**

Roughly 34 percent of active GC NGOs and 15 percent of active TC NGOs were direct grantees of the BDP. Available evidence indicates that the BDP has succeeded in promoting bi-communal contact in many cases.

PMU staff rated ALL their grants on their success in achieving bi-communal goals, using a scale of A, B, and C, (high, medium and low). They gave 45 percent of the projects a “C”, suggesting little or no bi-communal achievement. 35 percent were rated “B” and 20 percent an “A”. The team also asked PMU staff to rank the organizations, as opposed to grants, on their potential to contribute to bi-communal objectives in the future. Forty-three percent received a “C” grade, 31 percent got “B”, and 26 percent got “A”.<sup>25</sup>

The team then compared the two scores provided by the PMU staff for NGO grants with scores that the team gave to the 21 NGO projects surveyed (of which one was an international NGO and two were funded under special initiatives). In most cases, the team’s project ratings were in accord with those of PMU staff.<sup>26</sup>

Since a third of the NGO grantees received multiple grants, the team hypothesized that provision of more than one grant to an organization would be an indication that the PMU considered that organization to have high bi-communal potential. To test that hypothesis, the team prepared consolidated ratings for the 21 NGO projects that the team surveyed, consisting of the two ratings provided by the PMU (one for the project’s bi-communal impact and the other for the organization’s future potential to promote bi-communalism), the team’s rating, and the Embassy’s rating. The latter was derived by giving three points to any grant identified by the Embassy as Collaborative or Joint, two points to grants identified as mirror, and one point to grants identified as in-spirit, island-wide, or other. The four three-point rating schedules provided a maximum of 12 points for the most effective bi-communal projects and four for the lowest. The team then compared the ratings with the total funds received by that grantee organization (for all grants received).

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<sup>25</sup> This ranking includes only those grants and organizations that fall under projects listed as P07-01-XXX. Please see Annex 10 for PMU project and organizational ratings.

<sup>26</sup> See Annex 9.

The table below shows the spread between the 21 grants in terms of bi-communal scores and value of BDP funds provided.

**TABLE 5**

<b>Rating</b>	<b>\$ 0-50,000</b>	<b>\$50,001-75,000</b>	<b>\$75,001-100,000</b>	<b>\$100,001-200,000</b>	<b>\$200,000 and above</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>11-12</b>	2	1				3
<b>8-10</b>	4	2	1	2	4	13
<b>5-7</b>	1	1		1		3
<b>1-4</b>	1				1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	8	4	1	3	5	<b>21</b>

More than half of the NGO grant recipients (13 out of 21 we looked at) were in the 8-10 rating category. But lower rated organizations have received higher amounts of money while higher rated ones received very little. All 3 of the 10-12 group received less than \$ 75,000. This is because the BDP has been able to fund truly joint activity only since last April.

The team then looked at those grantees (among the 21 surveyed) which had received multiple grants, to see if there was a correlation between amount received and bi-communal scores.<sup>27</sup> Results are shown on the following table:

**TABLE 6**

<b>Name of NGO</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>Amount Received</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Cyprus Institute of Neurology Management Center	4	\$401,650	15.7
Has Der	10	389,001	15.26
Cyprus NeuroScience and Tech	8	257,042	10
NGO Resource Center	9	204,892	8.02
KAYAD	8	202,618	7.9
CYMEPA	8	196,989	7.7
	6	189,159	7.4

With two exceptions, the grantees with multiple grants did receive respectable scores from the raters.

Credible informants believe that the large number of contacts fostered between organizations on both sides have reduced the level of fear and uncertainty about bi-communal relations when the restrictions on movement between the two sides were reduced. Though this opinion cannot be

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<sup>27</sup> The US Embassy comments on this table criticize the team for failing to take into account the “time dimension” of the NGO grant program, particularly with reference to the large CING grants, all of which were made at the beginning of the program when it was thought, presumably, that the institute would be able to pursue bi-communal activities. The team recognizes that grant making for bi-communal activities became easier after 2002, and is happy to learn that no more consideration was given to CING proposals.

verified empirically, it comes from people with an in-depth understanding of the Cyprus problem.<sup>28</sup>

On the other hand, development impacts from the civil society program in any sector are not apparent. Although this was a secondary objective, the documentation clearly indicates that objectives such as capacity building and material results were important in grant decisions, but the PMU had no procedures in place for assessing capacity development or for providing systematic support for this objective. This is because the program was too scattered, even within a particular sector such as health or environment, for any obvious impact. Further, neither the PMU nor NGO grantees collected consistent monitoring and evaluation data on capacity building or the development impacts of their activities. Though development impact is not the primary purpose of the BDP, it is possible for activities to have both bi-communal and developmental impacts. In fact, the presence of developmental impacts can make bi-communal activity more acceptable to authorities and skeptics.

There was lack of clear agreement between stakeholders on the role of civil society capacity building in fostering bi-communal peace and understanding. The emphasis in documentation on the activity, rather than on the organization, is an indication of the secondary role attributed to capacity building. Nonetheless, some capacity building was achieved. This is described in further depth in the following section.

## **b. Institution Building**

Although institution-building was not a high priority for some BDP stakeholders, some institution building did take place and dependent NGOs were formed. CS organizations in the North depend mostly on membership fees and fund raising activities for survival. Thus organizations other than unions and chambers of commerce or industry (professional associations that receive high membership fees that correspond to a percentage of their members' incomes) were never able to establish a center or employ paid staff for their services. BDP funding provided an opportunity for this as well as creating a space for these organizations to expand their services. This did result in unintended capacity building of the grantees, but at the same time it created new expenses for the organizations while the organizations' income levels and opportunities remained the same. Thus these young and fragile professional organizations are now dependent on BDP funding for carrying out their "new" or "expanded" services. This is more relevant for TC NGOs than GC NGOS. Only three grantees, all GC, said they had taken the one-day course offered by the NGO center on proposal writing, and one left early because the course was "too basic".

Two parallel Management/NGO Resource Centers were created to provide services to NGOs. The Management center in the North has been very successful, serving an increasing number of NGOs, while the center in the South is inactive. Some reasons were given for this including: lack of demand for the services provided, lack of interest of the managing team (board) of the Resource Center, and lack of visibility of the services of the Center. PMU took over the

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<sup>28</sup> A Post Script after April 24, 2004. In any evaluation of a controversial issue, evaluators are often told what the respondent thinks the interviewer wants to hear. In this case, the credible observers may have been right in their assessment, but the level of fear reduction on the Greek Cypriot side was apparently far too little and not sufficiently wide spread to make a difference in the outcome of the referendum.

management of the Resource Center in the South and hired a consultant to carry out the services, but this has not been enough to reverse the down cycle. There is a need for a more proactive Center in the South. During our interviews, the Center in the North raised the issue of a small market in the North and the fact that they might be interested in serving as the only center after a possible settlement.

**c. Symbolic**

Did the NGO program create the space needed for contact between the two communities? The data gathered through interviews with grant recipients and opinion leaders show that grants did indeed result in “bi-communal” activities. Thirteen out of 23 Opinion leaders questioned answered yes when asked about whether the BDP has contributed to a settlement of the political division between the TCs and GCs. Thus clearly there is a perception among most, if not all, that the program succeeded symbolically.

Opinion leaders with direct experience in the public works side of the BDP expressed the view that these were by far the most important parts of the program, and did much to contribute to the establishment or renewal of working relationships among professional engineers and others. This view seems to be shared by PMU staff, who consistently gave an “A” rating to the bi-communal impact of the major public works programs, compared to a much more mixed review of NGO projects as indicated above.

During our interviews with Opinion Leaders it became apparent that many bi-communal initiatives that were already underway (especially those of the unions) were perceived as not fundable because of political affiliations that would raise objections. This issue emerged as one of the criticisms of the program. It is also evidence that groups not associated with BDP were making other efforts to advance greater contact and cooperation between the two sides.<sup>29</sup>

## **VII. CONCLUSIONS**

### **A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS**

#### ***1. Accomplishments***

- a. The BDP is generally well known among opinion leaders on both sides, often as UNOPS, and is perceived by most to have had an impact on promoting appropriate contacts, cooperation and the possibility of support for a peaceful settlement, especially among government officials and younger Cypriots.

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<sup>29</sup> US Embassy commentators expressed unhappiness with these findings. Opinion Leaders interviewed gave us their perceptions of the BDP. Our reporting of those views does not necessarily indicate our concurrence. However, interviews with Embassy and PMU staff support the finding that grants could not be made to organizations that the authorities on one side or the other might object to. The more important point which does not seem to be acknowledged by the US Embassy is that OL’s on both sides indicated that there was independent support for and efforts to develop bi-communal contacts and working relationships outside the BDP.

- b. Those activities that involved substantive contacts between Turkish and Greek Cypriots about subjects important to both sides did succeed in fostering effective working relations among people from a broad range of professions and interests.
- c. Those activities that encouraged common infrastructure and common systems for addressing infrastructure and economic issues, even though they involved collaboration of relatively small numbers of technicians and laborers, have improved the ability of TC and GC officials to cooperate on their own should a settlement occur. This is true as well of a more limited number of NGOs sponsored by the BDP.
- d. BDP projects have been a material and possibly symbolic manifestation of the commitment of the United States and the international community, through the UN, to the search for a peaceful settlement. They have created venues for visibility and positive public relations for the US Embassy and for the UN. .
- e. BDP Civil Society programs encouraged and facilitated contacts and possibilities for interaction between Greek and Turkish Cypriot citizens that would not otherwise have been possible given the prohibitions imposed by authorities on both sides.
- f. Making substantial funds available to civil society organizations supported increased NGO activity in a wide variety of areas, as well as providing the material support for improved capacity by many of these organizations. The establishment of the Management Center on the Turkish Cypriot side is an outstanding example.
- g. The UNOPS PMU, faced with a restrictive political environment hostile to bi-communal interaction, demonstrated extraordinary creativity and energy in implementing the large public works, environment and animal health programs inherited from the UNHCR period. The compelling need to assume much of the responsibility for procurement, technical support, and financial control of these projects substantially defined the PMU's character and operational procedures during the first two years of the program and, to some degree, through the six year life of the grant agreement.

## **2. Challenges**

- a. The political purpose of the program was well understood by all stakeholders, but there were varying interpretations of how to define 'bi-communal' and particularly what the best means were to that end. Following several efforts to develop more directive strategies for grant making, the broad categories developed in the Flexible Framework Fostering Rapprochement were adopted. FFFR may have been useful for categorizing bi-communal activities at a time when the political restrictions were so harsh that a narrow definition would have cut off all activities. FFFR did not serve the purpose of a strategy, however, and in today's environment, with a settlement at hand, a more focused set of objectives and indicators is needed.
- b. The NGO side of the program, in part because of the restrictive political environment, never gained the level of visibility and focus achieved by the public works side. Attempts by outside consultants to develop for the BDP a more coherent civil society strategy that

would support the political objective did not become fully internalized as part of the decision making or operational criteria of the NGO program.

- c. The size of the grants made to many of the NGOs, especially in the first three years of the program, appears excessive by most standards used by USAID and other donors in the East European and NIS region, including in institutionally well-developed countries such as Poland. Whether driven by the high costs of the Cyprus economy, or by other factors, the dollar value of the grants (upwards of \$100 000) may have strained the absorptive capacity of many smaller NGOs, as well as producing a bias towards non-profit organizations already well established. (The grant ceiling was reduced from \$100,000 to \$50,000 in the latter years.)
- d. In the smaller IA projects and in NGO projects, development impact identifiable to the team has been very limited, because of the scattering of funds over many organizations and the emphasis on one-off activities rather than on strengthening the organizations that offer them. While development was not the objective of the program, seeking good development outcomes was not inconsistent with bi-communalism, and indeed may have helped to contribute to this objective, as was the case in several of the public works and animal health projects. While the NGO sector appears to be flourishing, it is not sustainable at the current cost level without significant foreign funding.
- e. The desire to avoid negative publicity or the appearance of political interference may also explain the predominance of grants to health (30%) and environment (19%) NGOs, particularly in the first three years of the project. As BDP became more established and the political constraints relaxed, funding shifted to peace/Mediation NGOs (11%), the latter made mostly in 2002/3.
- f. A political program in a highly volatile environment can be expected to experience a high failure rate in terms of activities that do not improve bi-communal tolerance and cooperation, and do not result in a significant level of enhanced capacity of value to the challenges of making a peaceful settlement work. However, absent valid indicators of program performance and even a modest effort to evaluate at the project level the extent of bi-communal results achieved, it is not possible to objectively assess whether the failure rate was either lower or higher than an acceptable level.
- g. The ‘strategy’ for implementation of the NGO and for much of the IA parts of the agreement was largely reactive rather than proactive. Little effort was made to direct grantees toward specific program areas or objectives through the various BDP call for proposal mechanisms. This contributed to the diverse and seemingly disconnected character of the NGO grant portfolio and to a repetitive “proposal bombardment” to the PSC by Implementing Agencies. As the possibilities of a settlement improved in 2002, the Special Initiative grant was established permitting the beginnings of a more directive program that remained within control of the Embassy-PMU decision makers. If the settlement does occur, expanded use of this facility may permit a more proactive and focused strategy of support in areas of critical importance to making the settlement work.
- h. Overall, the “bi-communal achievement and potential” ratings and classifications of BDP activities prepared by the PMU and by US Embassy officers directly involved with the program support the conclusion that the program was substantially successful in areas

involving common problems that the authorities could collaborate on; projects with larger budgets and fewer people organized around specific tasks, such as a common sewage project or the animal health series of projects. Projects involving Non-Governmental Organizations overall were less successful, having little or no bi-communal achievement in roughly 35 to 45 percent of the activities, especially in the period 1999 to 2001/2. Efforts to “force” a certain level of NGO bi –communal contact and cooperation during the first three to four years of the BDP, while heroic and well meaning, may have been premature and largely wasted.

## **B. PERFORMANCE OF BDP DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION**

### ***1. Accomplishments***

- a. The complex decision-making structure including USAID Washington, UNDP and UNOPS New York, US Embassy Nicosia, and UNOPS/PMU Nicosia appeared on the surface to be a recipe for stalemate. This was overcome by frequent communications, a common interest in making the program work, and, in the main, the strong leadership of the US Embassy team. This resulted in an operational mode that featured timely decision- making on grant approvals and authorizations and maximum flexibility for solving implementation problems, especially with regard to the sensitivities of the GCC and TCC authorities.
- b. The absence of a UNDP office in Nicosia, coupled the with more macro-political interests of UNDP leadership in promoting an overall solution to the Cyprus program meant that UNDP exercise of BDP specific program management was left substantially to the UNOPS chain of command. Only in the later years of the program did UNDP New York become more substantively involved with guiding program implementation and in developing a sound professional dialogue with USAID.
- c. PMU staffs are highly motivated, professional in behavior, and to the extent permitted by staffing constraints and Cyprus circumstances, accessible to their Cypriot partners. Frequent use of outside experts for implementation jobs suggests recognition of the need for additional expertise in implementing complex projects. Whether motivated by internal or external demand, the use of outside reviewers and strategic planning experts provided a steady stream of recommendations for improving performance of the program, especially on the NGO side
- d. The PMU did meet the basic allocation terms of the USAID – UNDP agreement, with roughly 60% of contracts allocated to Implementing Agencies and 20% to NGOs over the life of the program. Efforts to expand the NGO program after 2001 did not significantly change the overall financial allocation program, although it did result in an increase in the number of NGOs receiving grants. .
- e. Interviews with IAs, NGOs and opinion leaders indicate that the PMU enjoyed a positive reputation in both communities for being evenhanded and efficient. The word “trust” surfaced in a number of interviews relating to the PMU’s role. Another term used was the “UNOPS Umbrella” suggesting the PMU role was that of a neutral but committed third party facilitator, broker, and, for larger projects, effective implementing agency. The circumstances led to the PMU becoming something akin to a “proto-governmental

agency” backed by the political will and good offices of both the UN and the US Embassy.

## **2. Challenges**

- a. The UNDP grant’s provision about political guidance from the Embassy provided entre’ for the USG’s representatives in the Embassy to be substantially involved in decisions throughout the project approval and implementation process. This made it difficult to establish policy, strategic objectives and implementation guidelines that could be monitored from “a distance.” The need to make quick and ad hoc decisions required the input of someone who could assess the problem from the standpoint of the Embassy on a daily basis. Policy managers became deeply involved in day to day implementation management. Thus there developed a potential for confusion about roles and the potential for divided loyalties. It is difficult to be a “team member” and still perform the function of policy and strategic oversight for USAID and the Embassy. Hopefully the post settlement future will permit a sharper division of labor and clarity of roles.
- b. The ‘strategy’ for implementation of the NGO and for much of the IA parts of the agreement was largely reactive rather than proactive. Little effort was made to direct grantees toward specific program areas or objectives through the various BDP call for proposal mechanisms. Achieving a controversial objective such as bi-communalism in a non-controversial manner is very difficult. Large infrastructure programs on common problems such as water and sewage compelled the authorities to collaborate to the degree necessary, and generally involved relatively few persons in the actual implementation process. On the civil society side, the overall record of NGO grant making suggests an understandable desire to avoid funding organizations that might arouse the opposition of one side or the other. This and the unusually large size of many of the grants may have promoted a tendency toward making grants to established NGOs that were acceptable to authorities, especially in the period before 2003
- c. Frequent reorganizations and employee turnover are not unusual in international projects similar to BDP. It is of some concern that the current staff on the program side is relatively new, and there are several vacancies. On the other hand, this may be an opportunity to fashion a program that is better suited to the potential of a post settlement political environment.
- d. The ratio of project officers to staff and management seems disproportionate to the workload put on the line PO s, especially in 2003 – 2004. Moreover, the UNOPS policy of not training project officers on the grounds that anyone hired is already an expert presumes too much. Project Officers, especially on the NGO side could have benefited from more experienced leadership and from training for their responsibilities.
- e. The BDP PMU faced two very different implementation problems. The first came from the need to implement in a timely, cost effective manner infrastructure and environmental public works that produced visible and high quality solutions. The second problem was to implement an NGO grant program working with many, relatively inexperienced and fragile citizen groups on both sides. The staffing and procedural requirements for the two programs arguably were quite different. It appears that the systems put in place for



managing the NGO program were largely adapted from those developed for the public works programs. This led to a documentation system focused on “contracts”, rather than a system more appropriate to a politically-oriented NGO program based on achieving bi-communal impact. The NGO program seemed to be something of a “stepchild” to the larger “flagship” projects for much of the life of the BDP program. If civil society development in support of reconciliation is to be a theme for a successor program, it will need the flexibility to adopt decision making, management and results monitoring and reporting procedures relevant to its strategic objectives.

- f. Perhaps because the nature of the two programs (large IA vs. civil society) was different, there was not as much effort as there could have been to expand the scope of interaction of the large IA projects by adding a civil society component. For example, the veterinary health component could have worked with farmer organizations. This would have required a more proactive grant-making process
- g. The program never was able to develop consistent, well understood and documented criteria for grant making. Neither grantees nor PMU project officers can understand the reasons why projects are approved or disapproved. The perception of inconsistency undermines the credibility of the BDP, and the resulting belief that grants are given to favorites or ‘bogus’ NGOs prevents some organizations from applying. . In addition, it reduces the credibility of the project officers with the grantees whose programs they monitor, and it contributes to project staff alienation from PMU management. It is possible to establish a reasonable set of approval criteria, even for a political program. This should have been done.
- h. Program and project monitoring and reporting focused on the “grant/contract”, rather than the recipient organization’s advancement of bi-communal goals. 77 NGOs received BDP grants (under the NGO component), 23 receiving more than one. There is no overall assessment of the organization’s progress toward greater interaction, collaboration or joint planning and implementation. Project files do not yield much information about bi-communal accomplishment.<sup>30</sup> No effort was made to assess effectiveness and impact other than completion of agreed work. PMU officers know much more about grantee effectiveness than is represented in the project reports or closeout documents. For a \$6.4 million dollar investment, a better effort should have been made to evaluate and track progress on Turkish and Greek Cypriot NGOs bi-communal performance.
- i. The post settlement conditions should permit the introduction of strategic focus, more clearly defined grant making objectives and decision criteria, and greater transparency in announcing awards and explaining rejections. This will require a serious overhaul of grant proposal review procedures emphasizing objective rating procedures, and, possibly, participation by Cypriot experts and “wise people” in some part of the process. It is

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<sup>30</sup> The US Embassy in reviewing this decision stated “The project files may not yield much information, but no decision was made to re-engage with an already funded NGO without an assessment of their progress to date.” The Team is pleased to learn this, but we still question how objective or consistent such a review process could be without some kind of evaluative documentation prepared either by the grantee or the PMU project officer as to the bi-communal achievements of the grantee.

important that Cypriot government representatives in any future program steering committee understand and agree with the program's objectives.<sup>31</sup>

## **VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS: MAKING THE SETTLEMENT WORK**

Even if a solution is achieved to the Cyprus problem, experience shows that there will continue to be political bumps over the next several years. Still, contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is dramatically different than it was when the BDP began, and further freedom of movement is likely. Therefore major changes in the direction of future programs are possible that will increase their effectiveness.

- 1. It is no longer useful to think in terms of bi-communality.** That term tends to polarize the two sides. It also fails to take into consideration the multicultural nature of Cypriot society. There is still a need to support the peace process, foster reconciliation and cooperation among the diverse Cypriot groups. This is dependent to some extent on reducing the income disparity between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.
- 2. The post settlement conditions should permit the introduction of strategic focus, more clearly defined grant making objectives and decision criteria, and greater transparency in announcing awards and explaining rejections.** This will require a serious overhaul of grant proposal review procedures emphasizing objective rating procedures, and, possibly, participation by Cypriot experts and "wise people" in some part of the process. It is important that Cypriot government representatives in any future program steering committee understand and agree with the program's objectives.
- 3. Building on work already done, several assessments should be undertaken to set the stage for the next phase of assistance.** There have already been discussions about undertaking sectoral assessments and developing sectoral strategies. Any strategy work should be based on research to determine the level of need and available resources in each sector. Program baselines should be established against which to measure results.
- 4. USAID should collaborate with local partners in performing analyses, developing strategies and implementing new initiatives.** The US, through the BDP and CASP, has helped to develop capacity of many organizations and individuals. They can now participate in shaping the program of the future.
- 5. Mounting a program with four major objectives, as proposed in the contingency plan, would require a much larger commitment of funding and a more diversely expert staff than the program is likely to have in the future.** The analyses described above, along with further information about the EU's plans, should factor into decision making about appropriate directions for future US assistance.

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<sup>31</sup> We are fully aware that there are risks to greater transparency and increased Cypriot participation. On the other hand, as has been demonstrated by USAID programs in other difficult environments, US programs "model" desirable values and behaviors in the way they are implemented.

**6. The Scope of Works calls for up to 6 indicators that would be used to measure progress towards results. Evaluation and monitoring of program and project progress towards observable results is essential for accountability and good strategic management. The team believes that one can't establish good performance indicators until one has established clear, well-defined, operationally useful objectives. Once that has been done, performance indicators serve three purposes:**

- ▶ They help you to measure how successful your interventions have been.
- ▶ Equally importantly, they help you to determine what activities to fund in the first place.
- ▶ Finally, they help determine whether the program strategy or 'theory' is working, or needs adjustment.

### **Getting ownership**

The team's experience with outside consultants preparing performance indicators has not been very successful. A better approach is to engage the person in the organization who is responsible for monitoring and evaluation progress toward results in a process of "discovery", in which what is feasible, relevant, and useful is arrived at with the consultant, if a consultant is necessary.

Both USAID and UNDP have gained considerable experience with results management, and have prepared guidance documents to help implementing organizations make the right choices.

**Possible ways of measuring increased tolerance and cooperation** between the GCC and the TCC - and other Cypriots. Priority for selection of activities should be based on criteria such as those that follow. The criteria have been introduced in the body of this report. The same criteria can be used to measure performance - at the activity-level.

### **Materiality**

- i - The activity is in an area where the gains from cooperation are such that there will be good reasons for close cooperation to continue even after the activity ends, and these gains can be specified at the time of start-up.
- ii - The activity includes substantive involvement and discussion of a large number of people, and has the potential to increase to larger numbers of people in the future.
- iii - The activity will achieve an economic or social objective that is important to participants of all involved communities, in which clear objectives are determined prior to activity start-up.

### **Institution-building**

- i - The implementing organizations have previous experience, either through BDP or through other demonstrated activity, that indicate they have the capacity and commitment to implement the planned program.
- ii - The planned activities enhance the ability of the implementing organizations to expand areas of cooperation or expand the populations involved in cooperation.

- iii - The planned activities involve public-private partnerships that engage civil society with government organizations in both GCC and TCC.

### **Symbolic importance**

- i - The planned activity and involved organizations show promise for publicity that demonstrates the value of the bi-communal or multi-cultural cooperation. This should be built into the activity plan.
- ii - The activity leaves a visible economic or social benefit that observers or the general public will be able to easily identify as resulting from the bi-communal or multi-cultural cooperation.
- iii - The activity addresses an issue that publicly highlights cultural, historical, or political diversity and demonstrates that this issue can be worked on cooperatively through mutual understanding.

The BDP attaches a weight to each of these criteria, and selects those activities that achieve a certain weight. Evaluation of individual programs should assess progress and final completion against the same criteria, using the same weights. A Delphi-type method, using four or five knowledgeable people to apply, at regular intervals, the criteria to all the individual activities and organizations, can be used to ensure consistency.

Program-level achievement of tolerance and cooperation is then based on the following indicators:

- Percent of activities that achieve a weighted score above \_\_\_ percent, indicating that these activities have met "tolerance and cooperation promotion" goals. (The percent selected, of course, needs to take into consideration the high-risk and consequent relatively high-failure rate expected in a political program.)
- Percent of organizations that have expanded areas of cooperation and multi-cultural populations involved in cooperation.
- Number of individuals from the various ethnic and cultural groups who have been substantively involved in multi-cultural cooperative activity. (Substantive involvement has to be defined, but goes well beyond attendance at a rock concert or a conference or seminar.)

### **Ways of measuring other program objectives**

Assuming the team's recommendations regarding future directions are adopted, other important objectives will include some variation on the following:

"Expansion of an informed, politically-active civil society"

"Establishment of an effective system of governance at the Federal level"

"Improved effectiveness of participatory local government."

and possibly

"Establishment of an active, sustainable Institute for Governance and Civil Society in Central Nicosia."

All four of the above are developmental objectives for which both USAID and the UNDP have established good performance indicators. The reader is referred to the UNDP's Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results, the SIDA – UNDP's Measuring and Managing Results, and USAID's Handbook of Democracy and Governance Performance Indicators (available in PDF form at USAID's website).

### **A word on the activity-selection process**

The above suggestions do NOT require that the BDP continue to select all activities based on a general solicitation for proposals, as it has done in the past. In fact, the team recommends that for civil society proposals, the solicitation should be more directive in terms of the sectors or subsectors from which proposals should come, and the levels of cooperation between multicultural groups that will be expected as a minimum. For activities implemented with government agencies, these should be the product of discussion between the BDP stakeholders, rather than through a solicitation process.

- 7. A future program should include a civil society component, but one more focused and strategic than the BDP, including advocacy.** It is likely that the EU will finance many of the needed infrastructure and economic development activities. The US holds a comparative advantage in working with civil society. The BDP has fostered an active civil society with interest in maintaining their links with people on the other side. A strong civil society will be an important part of an effective, united society. In addition, there will be many issues affecting people that result from both the Annan plan and the EU accession. Civil society organizations can spur debate and increase the level of public discourse about these changes. They can also contribute greatly to the healing process of reconciliation and search for common purpose.

The large dollar size of grants made to Greek and Turkish Cypriot NGOs, even taking into account higher cost on the island, should be re-examined. The assumptions underlying the cost structure of NGO proposals needs to be carefully examined, and efforts made to more rigorously distinguish between administrative overhead costs and cost directly related to implementing projects.

- 8. A second program focus should be "good governance".** Local and "state" level governments, especially in the TC side, are not sufficiently mature and developed to exercise the normal functions of government in an accountable, transparent and efficient fashion. Corruption, favoritism, cronyism is endemic in government on both sides according to most observers. Better systems for public finance management, procurement, and public participation in decision making are needed. If the Annan plan goes forward, there will also be a demand for technical knowledge about the workings of a Federal system. Although the Cypriot federal institutions will be quite limited at the beginning, substantial growth is anticipated.

The United States has a comparative advantage in providing technical assistance in both of these areas. Moreover, most USAID programs throughout the Balkans and the NIS have

developed strong “good governance” programs. There is now a body of knowledge, expertise and experience that can be brought to bear quickly on the problems Cyprus will encounter. Making government work has to be a critical component of the larger “making the settlement work” program.

- 9. Program financial and monitoring documentation should be reoriented for Results Management.** Based on the information available to the team, the documentation maintained by the PMU is not only inadequate to identify bi-communal impacts, but also inadequate for effective management of funds linked to expected program results. This is not to suggest that the financial reporting is faulty from an accounting or audit perspective. Such a conclusion would be well beyond our mandate and expertise. Our point is that from a Results Management perspective, the system for reporting on contracts and expenditures now in place is not very helpful. Expertise should be brought in to upgrade the financial and project data management system so that the PMU can more effectively manage funds for results accountability, in addition to financial accountability.

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# CYPRUS BI-COMMUNAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

## ANNEXES

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# ANNEX 1

## BDP EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE AND AMENDMENT

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TASK ORDER # \_\_\_\_\_

### Evaluation of USAID's "Bi-communal Development Program" in Cyprus

#### Scope of Work

#### I. BACKGROUND — The “Cyprus Problem” and the U.S. Congressional Earmark

Cyprus, an island roughly the size of the state of Connecticut and situated in the middle of the Mediterranean, is home to an ongoing conflict that is a source of tension between two important NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. Barbed wire, a buffer zone and 1200 United Nations peacekeeping forces now run the width of the island, cordoning off the island's two physically divided communities from one other. The division is a result of inter-communal violence that began in the 1960s and culminated in armed conflict in the summer of 1974. Approximately 200,000 Cypriots, nearly one-third of the 1974 total population, were displaced during the events. Today, despite several years of on-again-off-again negotiations between the leaders of the two communities, the political conflict persists. Nicosia remains Europe's last divided capital.

The U.S. seeks to increase stability in the eastern Mediterranean, by supporting a comprehensive, permanent solution to this long-standing dispute in the context of ongoing efforts by the United Nations. In December 2002, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan presented both sides with the text of a framework agreement. The “Annan Plan” is a sound basis on which the two sides can reach a permanent settlement based on a bizonal, bi-communal federation in which Cypriots from both communities can live in security and prosperity.

The international community, including the U.S., has been encouraging representatives of both communities (with support of the governments of both "mother countries," Greece and Turkey), to resume negotiations based on the Annan Plan. The aim is to arrive at a permanent solution before the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus formally joins the European Union on May 1, 2004. In the absence of settlement by that date, the area north of the buffer zone (currently host to approximately 30,000 Turkish troops) would remain in international 'limbo' at least until Turkey's European aspirations are addressed.

More details to be provided upon award of task order.

#### U.S. CONGRESSIONAL EARMARK FOR THE CYPRUS PROGRAM

Since 1975, the U.S. commitment to finding a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem has included a \$15 million annual Congressional earmark of economic support funds (ESF). This funding is intended to support "bi-communal projects and measures aimed at reunification of the island and designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation



between the two communities on Cyprus”<sup>1</sup>. It has proven a powerful tool in working towards a peaceful resolution to the island's longstanding ethnic conflict. While largely contained by the substantial presence of United Nations peacekeeping forces, the island's conflict nonetheless has the potential to increase tension between U.S. NATO allies Greece and Turkey, thus destabilizing an already fragile region. Over time, the emphasis of the U.S. assistance program has shifted from emergency relief to longer-term development. Overall, the program has sought to promote bi-communal cooperation between Cypriots on initiatives that benefit the island as a whole and support a broad political settlement, based on a bizonal, bi-communal federal framework. While a settlement must be reached at the political level, it will be largely up to Cypriots from both communities to implement that agreement and ensure it results in an enduring peace for the island. From the mid-1970's until 1998, the lion's share of the earmark (about \$10 million per year) financed activities that benefited both Cypriot communities through grants to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) whose central mandate was to ameliorate the plight of displaced persons and refugees. When UNHCR decided to close all but its asylum office in Nicosia, USAID transferred implementation responsibility to a new grant agreement with UNDP. Currently, the ESF for Cyprus is administered in Washington by USAID, in coordination with the Department of State. Funds are either programmed directly by USAID, or are transferred from USAID to the Department of State. There are three programs, either monitored or overseen by the Embassy's Bi-communal Working Group:

- ▶ The Bi-communal Development Program (BDP -- implemented by UNDP and UNOPS, under funding from USAID and UNDP) USAID manages the grant to UNDP
- ▶ The Cyprus America Scholarship Program (CASP) implemented by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, which funds scholarships, training programs and bi-communal activities (funded, managed by the Department of State).
- ▶ The Bi-communal Support Program (BSP), implemented by Amideast, which funds theme-based and target group-based bi-communal programs, focused on professional development, education and leadership. BSP is directly managed by the U.S. Embassy and implemented by Amideast. (funded, managed by the Department of State).

These three programs give the U.S. a varied, flexible, and comprehensive toolkit with which to approach the Cypriots who will influence a political settlement and then ensure that it leads to a lasting and durable peace on the island. Each program has strengths and competitive advantages that allow it to reach into particular areas of society and address unique needs and concerns.

## **II. THE BI-COMMUNAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (BDP)**

The Bi-communal Development Program (BDP) is the largest and most diverse assistance program on Cyprus. Its overarching objective is to promote the peace building process by encouraging Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to work together in the preparation and implementation of projects in areas of common concern. The BDP was established in 1998 with funds provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In developing the BDP, the UNDP utilized information

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<sup>1</sup> Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 2004

derived from the evaluation commissioned by the UNHCR concerning its bi-communal efforts in Cyprus.

The BDP was initiated as a multi-year \$30 million grant in 1998. UNDP made a \$500,000 contribution. The original life of the grant (for activities between 1998 and 2001) was extended until December 31, 2004 and the level of USAID funding increased through successive grant amendments to a life-of-grant level of \$60 million.

The BDP is executed in Cyprus by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). UNOPS' Nicosia Program Management Unit (PMU) includes four internationally recruited officers, fifteen Cypriots, and a handful of international consultants in specialized areas. From the beginning and until December 2003, Miran Rechter, Program Manager, managed the PMU. A replacement for Mr. Rechter, Mr. Andrew Russel, has been identified, and is to be deployed to Cyprus in early January 2004. From late 1999 until June 2003, Thore Hansen filled the PMU's Deputy Program Manager position. Since June 2003, that post has been vacant. Mr. Jan Meelker is scheduled to take up the position, also in January 2004.

## **PURPOSE AND RATIONALE FOR THE BDP**

The original BDP grant agreement outlined a broad overall purpose for the program, but explicitly, and rather narrowly, defined the activities to be funded. Over time, the purpose/objectives of the BDP were fleshed out, but continued to hue to the Congressional mandate. Joint annual review meetings by the BDP, USAID, UNDP, UNOPS, the U.S. Embassy and the PMU refined both objectives and directions based on expert input and on evolving political circumstances.

The original BDP grant agreement states that the program's purpose,

"... is to support the peace-making process in Cyprus. Activities under this Grant ... include bi-communal projects and measures aimed at reunification of the island and designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on Cyprus. The Program will encourage the participation of both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities in the planning and implementation of projects that benefit the island as a whole....It is anticipated that this Grant will facilitate the two communities on Cyprus working together on projects that benefit the island as a whole and that the bi-communal nature of the activities will create an environment more conducive to a peace settlement."

Beyond the specific "pre-approved" projects in the grant, the BDP's strategy early on was to initiate activities in other bi-communally productive sectors where politically possible. From there, attention was focused on opening a channel of communication, feedback and funding between the BDP and civil society organizations on both sides. Once the civil society program was underway on both sides, the BDP became more calculated in implementing its underlying strategic approach of expanding project-based bi-communal cooperation and interaction into as many sectors as possible. The effort sought to weave a broad, strong fabric of bi-communal contacts, relationships and cooperation, based on mutual understanding and tolerance, in virtually every aspect of economic, social and cultural life on the multiethnic island. Accordingly, over time the range of bi-communal activities expanded much beyond UNHCR's

initial dominant involvement in physical infrastructure and the activities outlined in the grant agreement. This strategic approach was described by UNDP as a “Flexible Framework for Rapprochement,” and was described in (see p. 13, Section X, Background and Reference Documents, item #8, below) The BDP today, reflects a diverse portfolio of initiatives in health, education, environment, communication, and other areas in both the public and civil society sectors.

Throughout the life of the BDP, the UN, with support from the U.S. and the U.K., pursued efforts to encourage the leaders of both communities to negotiate a permanent political peace settlement. This complex process, set in the broader dynamic of Cyprus' EU accession, justified the BDP's flexible strategic posture, intended to enable a prompt, appropriate program response to emergent needs and opportunities to support the peace process. In December 2002, a group of experts, commissioned by USAID and UNDP, met with USAID, UNDP, UNOPS, PMU and U.S. Embassy management staff to discuss and agree on a flexible "Contingency Plan" (see p. 14, Section X, #9) to prepare the BDP for rapid developments on the political front, especially during the initial (and likely volatile) period of transition.

Accordingly, the BDP, through its statement of purpose and broadly defined goals of "reunification... reducing tensions.promoting peace and cooperation" through bi-communal activities and projects, reflects a number of implicit objectives that have been internalized in BDP planning over time. These include:

- ▶ The promotion of mutual understanding and tolerance among and between Greek and Turkish Cypriot residents of an increasingly multi-ethnic island;
- ▶ The support and promotion of initiatives to effect permanent political solution and peace, including public discussion and the dissemination of information; and
- ▶ The need to support the viability of a permanent settlement through a critical transition period.

## **ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED BY THE BDP - ILLUSTRATIVE OVERVIEW**

The activities funded by the BDP were initially categorized into three "components":

- 1) Bi-communal Projects, initially in infrastructure, later expanding to other sectors;
- 2) NGO and Community-Based Organization (CBO) sub-grants; and
- 3) the Cyprus Red Cross Society and the Turkish Cypriot Humanitarian Relief Mission humanitarian assistance. Eventually, the grant budget was reorganized to clearly support eight program areas, incorporating the initial three categories:
  - ▶ economic development;
  - ▶ environment;
  - ▶ public infrastructure;
  - ▶ education and culture;
  - ▶ public and animal health;
  - ▶ information and communications;
  - ▶ governance and civil society; and

- ▶ humanitarian assistance.

Under the terms of the original grant, signed in March, 1998, UNDP was to institute certain “innovative measures,” including the utilization of new communications technology; introduction of greater bi-communality in projects; provision of capacity building assistance to NGOs; development of an proactive approach in the Project Management Unit; and the development of an Advisory Board.

At any point in time, the BDP supports over one hundred projects in three different categories: (1) those implemented by the authorities (at the central or municipal level); (2) those implemented by non-governmental organizations; and (3) those "special projects" implemented either by outside organizations or international consultants. All of these projects are designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities, create an environment more conducive to a peace settlement, and address issues of island-wide concern.

The list of authorities' projects includes the renovation of two historic Nicosia neighbourhoods; the restoration of Nicosia's Venetian Walls; the extension and maintenance of Nicosia's shared sewerage system; the development of a system to monitor ambient air quality; the restoration of Apostolos Andreas Monastery and Hala Sultan Tekke, two of the island's most important cultural sites; the improvement of road conditions in the mixed village of Pyla; the eradication of animal diseases on both sides; and the maintenance of the twenty telephone lines that connect the north with the south.

Supporting the work of civil society organizations, the BDP funds over sixty-five NGO projects in various fields. They include annual celebrations of World Environment Day; the establishment of a Folk Art Center and a Folk Arts Archive; the establishment of a community library by the Turkish Cypriot University Women's Association; the design and implementation of a lead screening program for children and several other medical/health studies; and youth and cultural activities in the areas of music, dance and literature. During program implementation, the BDP conducted a civil society needs assessment, as well as a specific strategy and implementation plan to define the NGO program in Cyprus. This BDP evaluation will, inter alia, review the strategy, achievements and recommendations for future development of the NGO sector in both communities (see Section III. 2.a, on p. 8, below).

Recognizing the wide disparity between the economies of the two Cypriot communities, and the potential for collaboration on joint, mutually beneficial economic initiatives, the BDP has also supported a modest number of activities that would come to full fruition when the broader political settlement takes place. Pending settlement, however, the complexities involving a European trade embargo directed against the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” due to the fact that this entity does not enjoy international recognition, make substantial progress in this sector difficult.

The BDP has supported several politically or otherwise sensitive projects that for different reasons had to be implemented by outside organizations. The list of these types of "special projects" is small, but includes important projects like ‘Gimme6’, an educational children's television program aimed at 8-12 year olds and designed to encourage tolerance and understanding. The show was produced by Common Ground Productions and used Cypriot actors, writers, producers, and directors. It was broadcast on both sides and in Greece and Turkey

in the fall/winter of 2001, reaching a respectable percentage of Cypriot youth in its first run. The broadcasts of the program were discontinued in 2001, but rebroadcasts of the eight part series in the Greek Cypriot community have resumed in October 2003. In the Turkish Cypriot community, the series remains blocked from broadcasting, but the recorded program is being used as training material for teacher training schools.

## **ROLE OF USAID AND OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN NICOSIA**

In USAID, the locus of grant management is in the Office of European Country Affairs of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia. Nicholas Studzinski administers the allocation of Congressional appropriations under this earmark and manages the BDP Grant on behalf of USAID. He maintains appropriate contact with UNDP Headquarters staff administering the BDP from UNDP headquarters in New York City, represented by Ms. Josyane Chapelier, and her staff, Mr. Parviz Fartash. N. Studzinski also supervises the Cyprus-based USAID, USPSC Senior Program Advisor, Ms. Elizabeth Kassinis, and maintains periodic contact with key members of the U.S. Embassy, including Ambassador Michael Klosson; DCM Ned Nolan; Public Affairs Officer Craig Kuehl; Economic, Commercial and AID Affairs Section Chief, David Renz; and Embassy ESF Program Advisor, Kim Foukaris.

Ms. Kassinis monitors the implementation of the BDP Grant and liaises on the entire range of BDP program, policy, strategy and project activities among the USAID/Washington grant management, the U.S. Embassy, and the UNOPS Project Management Unit. She is a member of the Embassy's Bi-communal Team , and also reports to the U.S. Embassy's Economic, Commercial, and AID Affairs Section Chief, Mr. David Renz.

Under the terms of the Grant Agreement, UNDP, through the UNOPS Project Management Unit (PMU) in Cyprus, consults with the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, to obtain from the Embassy's Bi-communal Team political guidance to determine whether specific proposed activities and projects will foster bi-communal peace and cooperation. Ms. Kassinis works with U. S. Ambassador Michael Klosson and members of the Bi-communal Team to provide the information necessary to obtain such a determination.

## **IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING AND REPORTING**

BDP progress monitoring is supported and informed through a number of regular, periodic reports and meetings, beginning with weekly implementation meetings of the UNOPS Project Management Unit (PMU) in Nicosia. These are chaired by the PMU Director and attended by other key members of the PMU, the Senior USAID Program Advisor (Elizabeth Kassinis); and the Embassy ESF Program Advisor (Kim Foukaris). Quarterly BDP Reports are circulated to all stakeholders and inform quarterly digital videoconferences which include the Manager of the USAID Bi-communal Cyprus Program (N. Studzinski), UNDP and UNOPS headquarter Program Management (Josyane Chapelier, Parviz Fartash, Franco Becchi) and the above Embassy and PMU local staff.

An Annual Program Review is scheduled in Cyprus every fall. It is preceded by the distribution of a BDP Annual Report and includes representatives of the PMU, Embassy, the resident USAID Senior Advisor, and headquarters program staff from USAID, UNDP and UNOPS. USAID and UNDP site visits, including those by senior agency officials have taken place this year (USAID

Administrator Andrew Natsios and Assistant Administrator Kent Hill, in May 2003; Kalman Mizsei, Assistant Administrator of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, in October 2003).

UNDP has conducted one Internal Mid-term Review of the BDP in May 2000, followed by a Review of Program Progress, Project Appraisal, and a report on measuring performance, in Jan. 2001 (see references in Section X.4-7, below). UNOPS has also developed draft indicators for purposes of tracking and reporting implementation effectiveness (see X.8, below).

## **PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE BDP**

Despite the ban placed on bi-communal meetings and activities by the Turkish Cypriot authorities between December 1997 and April 2003, the BDP has been able to consistently facilitate bi-communal collaboration, including in the form of meetings on island. In 2002, the number of BDP facilitated bi-communal meetings far exceeded the number that took place in 1996, previously considered the 'highpoint' of bi-communal activities.

Beyond the meetings themselves where projects in sectors such as sewerage and animal health are designed and coordinated, the tangible results of this cooperation include several publications (poetry, specialized academic articles, conference proceedings); a joint seismic risk survey of the greater Nicosia area; joint musical compositions, including several recorded CDs; a comprehensive survey of the infrastructure in the UN Buffer Zone; a comparative survey of political and national attitudes and perceptions; and several seminars and workshops where international experts facilitated bi-communal interaction in specific fields (dyslexia counseling; early years education; revitalizing historic cities; etc). That said, the BDP has consistently run up against resistance on the part of the Turkish Cypriot authorities to bi-communal contacts on NGO projects and, prior to 4/23/03, to Greek Cypriot staff of the PMU being allowed to travel freely to project sites in the north.

The BDP has established a strong reputation on both sides of the island as a source of international expertise, funding and support. It receives hundreds of project proposals every year. A Program Steering Committee (PSC) that includes representatives of the two communities, UNDP and the U.S. Embassy, reviews these proposals quarterly.

## **BDP AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE - THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Increasingly interested in Cyprus and in engaging the Turkish Cypriots, in 2002 the EU approached UNDP/UNOPS to implement specific EU-funded initiatives in the same manner that it implements U.S.-funded projects. Currently, UNDP/UNOPS is implementing several restoration activities in old Nicosia ("Partnership for the Future") and administering a small fund to support the development of small- and- medium sized enterprises on both sides. Given the Turkish Cypriot administration's views of the EU, the Embassy and USAID continue to work with UNDP to devise an arrangement that maximizes complementarity between the U.S. and EU programs, but limits the damage that an anti-EU stance (on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership) can have on the BDP's progress.

### **III. THE USAID EVALUATION OF THE BDP**

#### **PURPOSE AND USE OF THE EVALUATION**

The purpose of the USAID evaluation is to assess the strategy, attainment of stated objectives, and the implementation-management of the BDP.

The findings and recommendations from the evaluation will inform the design of a follow-on grant to UNDP, taking into account the strategic, operational and management lessons-learned and recommendations generated by the evaluation. While the current BDP grant expires in December 2004, it is expected that a follow-on "BDP-like" program will commence sometime in early-mid FY 2004.

The final report of the evaluation team will be used by USAID and the Department of State for purposes of future strategy and shared with UNDP to inform future program development.

#### **USAID'S EVALUATION OBJECTIVES**

In general, the evaluation will focus on the **strategy, effectiveness, and management** of the BDP.

Accordingly, these three issues are reflected in **three fundamental questions** to be answered by this evaluation, along with a series of subsidiary questions for each:

1. **Strategy. *Is the actual BDP strategy appropriate and optimal with respect to the changing internal political and international peace process in Cyprus; and which strategic options are recommended for a follow-on program?***
  - a. Are the expected results and objectives underlying the strategy clear and coherent? Are key, corresponding indicators of progress in place? Suggest up to six practical, strategic indicators.
  - b. Does the UNDP strategic "Flexible Framework" (p. 14, Section X, #8) approach provide an adequate balance between flexibility and process on the one hand, and a strategic results orientation and concrete objectives on the other?
  - c. Would separate and distinct sub-strategies for the key sectors (e.g. education, governance, economic development, etc.) be useful, under an integrated program strategic framework?
  - d. Does the BDP complement other USG- and internationally funded programs on Cyprus and advance overall USG foreign policy goals in Cyprus?
  - e. Is the BDP "Contingency Plan," to be implemented in case of political settlement, an appropriate, sufficiently flexible response to this type of sudden potential change in the political environment in Cyprus?

2. **Effectiveness.** *Was the BDP effective in attaining its stated goals and objectives, as amended; and how can a potential BDP II optimize attainment of objectives and impact?*

- a. What are the BDP's principal accomplishments and impacts, and how are these documented? Is this documentation adequate and articulated through clear and appropriately monitored indicators? In particular, include a review of accomplishments in the different priority sectors identified in the grant: economic development, environment, public infrastructure, education and culture, public and animal health, governance and civil society, and information and communications. Humanitarian assistance will not be addressed by this evaluation.
- b. How effective was the BDP in instituting the "innovations" to have been adopted by UNDP and outlined in the original BDP grant ? These included utilizing new communications technology; introducing greater bi-communality in projects; providing capacity building assistance to NGOs; developing an activist PMU; and developing an Advisory Board (see last paragraph, p. 4, above)
- c. How can the BDP improve the documentation and monitoring of its impact in general and of projects in special interest areas?
- d. What is the perception of effectiveness and usefulness of the BDP's stated mission and purpose as perceived by the following stakeholders? How do these perceptions help or hinder the BDP in its mission? Which of these perceptions should BDP II strive to change?
  - i. USAID;
  - ii. Members of U.S. Embassy Bi-communal Team;
  - iii. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities as represented on the
  - iv. Program Steering Committee;
  - v. Random sample of five Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot grantees
  - vi. Select group of prominent Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot opinion leaders.

3. **Management.** *How did the management and operation of the BDP contribute to or detract from achievement of the program's goals and objectives; and how can the organization and management of the PMU be improved?*

a. **PMU Operational and Organizational Management**

- i. Are there staffing constraints at the PMU? If so, what are they, and how can they be ameliorated?
- ii. How effective and efficient is the PMU's process for soliciting proposals; reviewing submissions; and negotiating contracting arrangements?
- iii. Are the criteria for selection of projects clear and transparent? Using a random sample of both authorities and NGO projects, how closely do the selected activities adhere to established criteria?



- iv. Are there checks in place to assess the long-term technical, economic (including sustainability of maintenance and recurrent costs) and environmental soundness (i.e. environmental management and compliance) of future projects?

**b. UNDP, UNOPS Management**

How effective have UNDP and UNOPS HQ been in backstopping the PMU? What role have they played in the implementation and iterative improvement of the BDP?

**c. Stakeholder Relationships**

- i. How effective and efficient is the process of consultations with the U.S. Embassy Bi-communal Team to obtain political guidance concerning the bi-communal value of proposed activities?
- ii. What is the quality of UNDP, UNOPS, PMU, USAID and U.S. Embassy communication? Have these relationships improved the BDP's efficiency and effectiveness? If so, how?

**d. Audience and Stakeholder Perceptions**

What is the perception of the effectiveness and usefulness of UNDP, UNOPS, and the PMU in implementing the program from the point of view of the following audiences? How do these perceptions help or hinder the BDP in its mission? Which of these perceptions should BDP II strive to change?

- i. USAID;
- ii. Members of U.S. Embassy Bi-communal Team;
- iii. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities as represented on the Program Steering Committee;
- iv. Random sample of five Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot grantees;
- v. Select group of prominent Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot opinion leaders.

## **IV. METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation team will be responsible for developing an evaluation workplan and methodologies that include a mix of literature and documentation review, qualitative and quantitative data collection, analyses, interviews and site visits. Specific methods, and the appropriate instruments will be developed in concert with USAID staff in Washington and Cyprus.

BDP reports, implementation records, strategy documents, etc., should provide the evaluation team with adequate material necessary for the review and analysis. These will include the Grantee's quarterly and annual reports and special documentation concerning implementation plans, indicators, monitoring systems, press releases, consultancy reports and other project documentation.

Notionally, extensive interviews, including possible focus-group discussions should be conducted with USAID/Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, Washington; U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Europe; Ambassador Thomas Weston, Special Cyprus Coordinator; Ambassador Michael Klosson, U.S. Embassy/Nicosia; UNDP, UNOPS and PMU staff as well as Cypriot implementing partners in both communities, including the authorities, grantees and contractors. Consideration should also be given to special contact with "consultative bodies" consisting of informed observers and/or participants in bi-communal activities including opinion leaders, municipal leaders, businessmen, economists, academics, activists and informed members of the media. Indeed, an attempt should be made to contact the groups that are the object of some of the BDP's projects—i.e., educators, environmentalists, etc.

## **V. EVALUATION PROCESS, STRUCTURE AND DELIVERABLES**

1. USAID's selection of contractor; Contractor's deployment of evaluation team (est. 20 days – prior to commencement of services or accrual of bill-able expenses).
2. (10 work days - 9 days in Washington, DC; and one day in New York with UNDP and UNOPS)
  - Conduct literature review and desk study including of BDP grants data base
  - Draft work plan
  - Develop methodology and instruments
  - Interview key Washington, DC stakeholders (USAID Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia; USAID Bi-communal Cyprus Program Manager; and concerned Department of State staff mentioned above); and New York principals (UNDP and UNOPS grantee and implementer, respectively)
  - Finalize work plan and submit to the USAID Bi-communal Cyprus Program Manager for review and approval (include allowance of 2 work-days for the approval/modification, within the total 10 days allowed).
3. (18 work- days, Cyprus)
  - Present work plan and methodology to USAID Nicosia and U.S. Embassy and, after incorporating any feedback, to PMU
  - Collect evaluation information, data, and implementation records from program files and conduct interviews and focus group discussions with PMU officers, implementing partners, opinion leaders and other stakeholders
  - Conduct interviews, analyses and develop initial findings
  - Confer with field staff at a mid-evaluation point
  - Prepare/distribute a preliminary draft 7-10 pages with key findings and recommendations
  - De-brief with USAID Nicosia and U.S. Embassy using the preliminary report.
4. (8 work days - 7 in Washington with USAID and the Department of State; and 1 in New York with UNDP and UNOPS)
  - Produce final draft report

- Via DVC, debrief USAID/Washington, USAID/Nicosia, the Dept. of State and U.S. Embassy/Nicosia, and collect comments from Washington and the field
- Present findings to a joint meeting of USAID/Washington and UNDP and UNOPS /New York stakeholders
- Based on evaluation experience, organize discussion regarding the findings and the future directions for follow on activities, involving USAID and the U.S. Embassy team

The outline for the final report shall comprise, but not be limited to the following:

- Executive summary, not to exceed 5 pages;
- Table of contents;
- Introduction and background;
- Summary description of evaluation objectives;
- Description of methodology and data sources, and limitations of the study;
- Analysis and statement of findings;
- Recommendations for the follow-on BDP-like activities, with particular emphasis on strategy; impact; and management and operational efficiency.

20 bound copies of the final evaluation report and supporting documents will be provided to USAID, along with an electronic version of the report and an electronic copy of all data files used to conduct analyses, within 14 days after the final presentation and discussion of the final report. Provide hardcopy and electronic copy of final report and supporting documentation to PPC/DEI/DI. It will then be put in the USAID library and database so that other Missions can learn from the contractor's experiences.

## **VI. TIMEFRAME**

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Dates</b>
1. Selection of Contractor; Contractor's Deployment of Evaluation Team	USA	20 days	Dec. '03-January '04
2. Review BDP documents; discuss work plan and other needs with relevant USAID, U.S. Embassy, UNDP and UNOPS staff; begin interviews with USAID Washington based CTO E&E Bureau management, State Dept., and UNDP and UNOPS headquarters staff.	USA – Washington, DC and New York	10 work days	January–February '04
3. Review additional documents as needed/appropriate; adjust work plan as needed; interview PMU staff, USAID and Embassy representatives; GC and TC authorities/counterparts and grantees as appropriate; conduct focus groups, qualitative survey work ;analyze and debrief/report on preliminary findings.	Cyprus	18 work days	January-February '04
4. Write draft final report; circulate for review/comments; incorporate feedback; finalize report; debrief USAID/Washington staff and UNDP, UNOPS / New York.; and all UNOPS/Cyprus, USAID and U.S. Embassy staff. Submit bound report.	USA Washington and New York	8 work days	Final, bound report to be submitted 14 days after presentation, discussion of final draft report.

The evaluation team will be responsible for making its own arrangements for interpreters and translators, transportation, housing, and other logistics. The team is also responsible for its own workspace, computers, and printers.

## **VII. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE EVALUATION TEAM**

The evaluation team shall include four senior specialist contractors, two local, mid-level Evaluation Analysts, two local, administrative/logistical support staff, and one, part-time U.S.-based home office administrative staff as follows:

- ▶ A Senior Evaluation Specialist with extensive experience in designing and conducting evaluations, evaluation methods, rapid appraisal techniques, and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data, will also serve as the Team Leader;
- ▶ A Senior Civil Society Development and Grants Program Specialist, with experience in the design, management and evaluation of NGO development programs and management and/or evaluation of sectoral or specific NGO strengthening grants ;
- ▶ A Senior Conflict Transition Program Specialist with experience in the strategy development and design of programs in conflict settings, and with the design of strategies and programs involving information and communication interventions in such settings;
- ▶ One Light Infrastructure Program Specialist with an engineering and environmental background, familiarity with both USAID and EU environmental management and compliance, and hands-on experience in design, construction and rehabilitation, and assessment of infrastructure projects, particularly the maintenance and recurrent cost analyses of infrastructure projects (only for 10 days in the field);
- ▶ Part-Time home office support staff (U.S. –based)

Local hire, Cypriot staff:

- ▶ Greek-speaking Evaluation Analyst;
- ▶ Turkish-speaking Evaluation Analyst
- ▶ One local Greek-speaking administrative, logistical assistant
- ▶ One local Turkish-speaking administrative, logistical assistant

Accordingly, the overall skill set and experience required of this team includes the following:

### **Evaluation methods**

Academic and/or practical experience in evaluating multicultural programs, particularly with community participation, media and civil society organizations, in countries undergoing transitions;

### **Rapid appraisal techniques**

- ▶ Academic training and experience with rapid appraisal techniques (particularly direct observation, focus group interviews, community interviews and key informant interviews);
- ▶ Development of civil society and NGOs in international transition settings;
- ▶ Grant program design and implementation/management;

- ▶ Design and Management of infrastructure projects;

The use of media, marketing and communication methods in transition country programs;

### **Local knowledge**

General knowledge of Cyprus' unique political, social, economic, and cultural environment; and

### **Language abilities**

At minimum, local-hire, community specific members of the team must have a demonstrated knowledge of Greek and/or Turkish.

## **VIII. LEVEL OF EFFORT**

A total of 268 person-days are estimated for the team and support staff, with the work to be completed during approximately 42 calendar days distributed in Washington, Cyprus, and New York.

## **IX. BACKGROUND AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTS (TO BE PROVIDED TO AWARDED CONTRACTOR)**

1. ESF Briefing Book, September 2002
2. Original Grant Agreement and Amendment
3. Evaluation of the UNHCR Bi-communal Program, 1998
4. Mid-Term Review of the BDP by Agnes Dethrones, 5/2000
5. BDP Backstopping Mission-Report 1: Review of Program Progress by Agnes Deshormes, 1/01
6. BDP Backstopping Mission-Report 2: Project Appraisal by Agnes Deshormes, 1 /01
7. BDP Backstopping Mission-Report 3: Measuring Performance by Agnes Deshormes, 1/01 (includes "Flexible Framework" for fostering rapprochement)
8. Indicators developed by UNOPS - in draft?
9. BDP Contingency Plan, 2002
10. BDP Annual Reports
11. BDP Quarterly Reports
12. "UNOPS New Millennium Civil Society Program: Draft Implementation Plan" by Stark Biddle, 11/01
13. DP brochures and `corporate literature' (both general and project related)
14. List and brief description of all activities (sub grants and contracts)

**ANNEX 1. *Continued: Amendment to TOR***

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Bluemont, VA 20135  
[richardblue@earthlink.net](mailto:richardblue@earthlink.net)  
Tel: 540 554 4880/2246  
Fax: 540 554 2388

February 14, 2004

To: Nicholas Studzinski  
USAID

From: Richard N. Blue  
For Development Associates Cyprus BDP Team

Sub: Clarifications of USAID SOW for Evaluation

Based on our discussions at your office Feb 10 and subsequently, the following clarifications have been understood about the tasks and certain terms specified in the USAID Scope of Work for the Cyprus Bi-communal Development Program (BDP).

1. The overall USAID objective in this evaluation is to assess the BDP's effectiveness and impact with reference to how the program might be structured and organized to serve different/evolving political circumstances. Ongoing discussions at the UN in NY could lead to settlement of the longstanding dispute. But, even if negotiations do not succeed, USAID will remain committed to some form of programmatic support fostering bi-communalism and effective development cooperation among Cypriots, a point made by USAID Regional Director Marilyn Schmidt.
2. The evaluation should focus its attention on the BDP program from March 1998, the point at which a grant agreement was signed with UNDP, to the present..
3. The general methodological approach will be that common to USAID Rapid Appraisals. The terms "survey" and "random sample" are not meant to convey strict conformance to rigorous social science standards for statistically relevant scientifically selected sampling to a larger population.
4. The draft report submitted to USG prior to the team's departure will focus primarily on major findings, conclusions and recommendations. These will be shared first with USAID and US Embassy personnel and subsequently with PMU personnel at briefings to be arranged prior to the team's departure. It is intended that Nicholas Studzinski will participate through video conferencing facilities available to USAID. Additional confidential briefings between the expatriate members of the team and USG staff may be arranged as needed.
5. The relationship between the expatriate and local hire professional members of the team was discussed. It was agreed that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot professionals would be treated as full team members with the proviso that they understood and agreed to strict

confidentiality with respect to background documentation, the report's findings, conclusions and recommendations. This would apply both to the fact finding and writing period, as well as the period before the report became available, if then, to a larger public. These same standards apply to the expatriate members of the team. Substantive interviews about the work of the evaluation team with media representatives are prohibited.

6. The overall approach of the evaluation will be to conduct the work and present findings, conclusions and recommendations in a manner that enhances the likelihood of the report's utilization; by USAID, by the USG generally; by UNDP and, in the longer run, by Cypriot citizens.
7. The team will work very closely with USAID PSC officer Elizabeth Kissinis and will keep her and Nicholas Studzinski fully informed as the work progresses. The team recognizes that USAID, as represented by Nicholas Studzinski, is the CLIENT for this evaluation.
8. As noted in the agreed work plan, the final report will be distributed to Nicholas Studzinski, representing USAID, by March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

These clarifications do much to improve the team's understanding of its task. It will do its best to deliver an accurate, relevant, and useful evaluation report given the resources and time available to it.

Please confirm your agreement with these understandings by expressing same via e-mail to Mr. Peter Davis at Development Associates, copy to me.

1. Persons Interviewed
2. Documents
3. Glossary/Acronyms
4. Questionnaires/Results
5. Questions from TOR not specifically answered in the report.
6. Backup Tables on Environmental and Infrastructure Projects



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## ANNEX 2

### PERSONS INTERVIEWED

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**Stakeholders:**

- USAID/W: Nicholas Studzinski, E&E/ECA, Chief, Division for Southeast Europe
- UNDP/New York: Parviz Fartash, Senior Program Manager for the Baltics, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Moldova, Poland, Romania and Turkey  
Josyane Chapelier, Advisor to the Bureau for Europe and the CIS  
Abdul Hannan, Results-Based Management Unit
- UNOPS/New York: Franco Becchi
- U.S. Embassy/  
Nicosia: Ambassador Michael Klosson  
Ned Nolan, Deputy Chief of Mission  
David W. Renz, Chief, Office of Economic, Commercial and AID Affairs  
Elizabeth Kassinis, USAID Senior BDP Senior Program Advisor  
Kimberley Foukaris, Embassy BDP Program Advisor  
Mat Palmer, Chief, Office of Political Affairs  
Helen Lovejoy, Political Officer  
Colleen H. Lagasse, Bi-communal Coordinator
- UNOPS/PMU: Miran Rechter, Former Program Manager  
Andrew Russell, Program Manager  
Jan Meelker, Deputy Program Manager  
Miriam Ooi, Operations Manager  
Dr. Gerhard Zechner, Veterinary Expert  
Dominique Larsimont, Communications Manager  
Nicholas Jarraud, Environmental Compliance Officer  
Halil Guresun, Communications Associate  
Ece Akcaoglu, Project Officer (NGO)  
Marina Vasilara, Project Officer (NGO)  
Meliha Kaymak, Project Officer (NMP)
- Republic of Cyprus: Ninos Savvides, Director of Coordination, Planning Bureau
- Cyprus Red Cross: Her Excellency, Mrs. Stella Soulioti, Chairperson
- Humanitarian  
Relief Mission: Dr. Behzat Aziz Beyli, President
- Turkish Cypriot  
Authority: Ayfer Said Erkmen, Director, Cultural & Social Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence

Kemal Koprulu, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence

**Other Donors/  
Grant Programs:** Miriam Fuchs, Advisor for Legal Affairs and Project Management  
Delegation of European Community to Cyprus  
Kannan Rayarathinam, Chief Civil Affairs Officer for Cyprus  
United Nations Peacekeeping Force  
Daniel T. Hadjittofi, Executive Director, Fulbright Commission  
Judy Hardinge, Project Coordinator for the Bi-Communal Support Program, Amideast

**Opinion Leaders:**

Political Leaders: Katie Clerides, Vice-President, Democratic Rally Party (DISY)  
Eleni Mavrou, Member of Parliament, Akel Communist Party  
Mustafa Akinci, Party Leader, Peace and Democratic Movement

Government Leaders: Kenan Atakol, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence for Turkish Cypriot Authority  
Michalis, Papapetrou, Former Government Spokesperson and Lawyer, Papapetrou Law Firm  
Lellos Demetriades, Former Nicosia Mayor and Lawyer, Lellos P. Demetriades Law Office  
Taner Erginel, Turkish Cypriot Supreme Court Justice  
Gonul Eronen, Turkish Cypriot Constitutional Court Justice  
Takis Hadjidemetriou, EU Harmonisation Coordinator, Cyprus EU Office

Association Leaders: Shener Elchil, Secretary General, Cyprus Turkish Teachers Trade Union (KTOS)  
Kagan Bahceli, Secretary for Organizational Affairs, Cyprus Turkish Teachers Trade Union (KTOS)  
Ali Erel, President, Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce  
Mustafa Damdelen, Board of Directors, Turkish Cypriot Chamber Of Commerce  
Ahmet Barcin, Director, Cyprus Turkish Middle School Teachers Union (KTOES)  
Erdil Nami, Director, Erna  
Christos Artemiou, President, Pancyprian Committee of Refugees

Business Leaders: Costas Severis, Board of Directors, Bank of Cyprus  
Athos Pitta, Owner, Pitta Dairy Factory

Academics: Peter Loizos, Professor of Social Anthropology, Intercollege  
David Officer, Instructor, Intercollege

Religious Leaders: Bishop of Kykko Nikoforos, Metochi Kykko Monastery  
Yiannis Miliatos, Secretary to Bishop of Kykko Nikoforos

Press: Andreas Paraschos, Editor-in-Chief, Politis Newspaper  
Aristos Michaelides, Editing Director, Politis Newspaper

**Opinion Leaders, Continued:**

Press: Mrs. Taramountan, Editor-in-Chief, Phileleftheros Newspaper

Suyelman Erguclu, Editor-in-Chief, Kibris Newspaper  
Shener Levent, Editor-in-Chief, Afrika Newspaper

**IMPLEMENTING AGENCY**

**Grantees:**

Buffer Zone Survey Agni Petridou, Planning Officer, Nicosia Municipality  
Layik Topcan Mesutoglu, Head of Planning Section, TC  
Nicosia Municipality  
Hulyla Davulcu, Planning Division, Nicosia Municipality  
Gul Oztek, Planning Section TC Nicosia Municipality  
Arab Ahmet Ali Guralp, Project Manager, TC Nicosia Municipality  
New Vision for Nicosia Glafkos Constantinides, Planning Consultant, Nicosia Municipality  
Gulshen Ozen, Consultant, TC Nicosia Municipality  
Pedieos River Michael Ierides, Secretary-General, CYMERA  
Nicosia Sewer - Trunk E Evgenios Nicolaou, Technical Manager, Sewerage Board of Nicosia  
Nevzat Ozel, Wastewater Treatment Plant Manager, TC Nicosia  
Municipality  
Veterinary Health Phedias Loucaides, Director of Veterinary Health, ROC  
Kamil Aktolgali, Chief Veterinary Officer, TC Veterinary Dept.  
Human Health Fatma Duygulu, Director of Nursing, TC Ministry of Health  
Dr. Saray Ozbalikci, Elderly Care Project Manager, TC Ministry of  
Health

**Civil Society**

**Grantees:**

Bulent Kanol, President, NGO Management Support Center (TC)  
Elena Persiani, PMU Consultant, UNDP/UNOPS NGO Training  
and Support Center (GC)  
Meral Akinci, President, KAYAD (TC)  
Aysel Bodi, President, AKOVA (TC)  
Sua Saracoglu, President, Kemal Saracoglu Foundation for  
Children with Leukemia and Fight Against Cancer (TC)  
Ozgur Aldemir, Manager, Kemal Saracoglu Foundation  
Kani Kanol, President, Folk Art Foundation (TC) and HasDer (TC)  
Neda Louka, Project Coordinator, Girl Guides Association of  
Cyprus (GC)  
Christiana Kyrialli, Neuronet Project Coordinator, Cyprus  
Institute of Neurology and Genetics (GC)  
Yiannis Laouris, Director, Cyprus Neuroscience and Technology  
Institute  
Maria Theocharis, Head Mistress, Highgate School (GC)  
Xenia Constantinou, Research Assistant and Youth Promoting  
Peace Coordinator, Cyprus Neuroscience and Technology  
Institute (GC)  
Tina Adamidou, Project Coordinator for Weeping Island, United  
Cypriot Friendship Association (GC)

**Civil Society**

**Grantees, Continued:** Margarita Mouza, Director, Cyprus Rehabilitation and Counseling  
Association (GC)

Mr. Theophanous, Chairman, Cyprus Rehabilitation and  
Counseling Association

Dr. Maria Hadjipavlou, President, Peace Centre of Cyprus (GC)

Dinos Logides, President, Soma Akriton (GC)

Mr. Spyros Spyrou, Director and Chairperson, Center for the  
Study of Childhood and Adolescence (GC)

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## ANNEX 3

### DOCUMENTS

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1. 2003 Annual Report, 1 Oct 2002 – 30 September 2003, Bi-Communal Development Program in Cyprus, CYP/98/001; UNDP/UNOPS Bi-Communal Development Program in Cyprus; and previous Annual Reports
2. Quarterly Report, 1 Oct 2003-31 Dec 2003, Bi-Communal Development Program in Cyprus, UNDP/UNOPS Bi-Communal Development Program in Cyprus; and previous Quarterly Reports since 1998.
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4. ESF Briefing Book, Bi-Communal Development Program in Cyprus 2002
5. Bi-Communal Development Program Performance Indicators, untitled document by UNDP/UNOPS Bi-Communal Development Program in Cyprus Project Management Unit, 20 September 2002, CYP/98/001 (UN Confidential, Not for Distribution)
6. The UNOPS/PMU New Millennium Civil Society Program, Draft Implementation Plan, November 27, 2001; C. Stark Biddle for UNDP/UNOPS Bi-Communal Development Program in Cyprus Project Management Unit
7. Cyprus Bi-communal Development Program Backstopping Mission report 1: Review of Program Progress; Agnes Deshormes, Consultant, for the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), January 2001
8. Cyprus Bi-communal Development Program Backstopping Mission Report 2: Project Appraisal; Agnes Deshormes, Consultant, for the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), January, 2001
9. Cyprus Bi-communal Development Program Backstopping Mission Report 3: Measuring Performance; Agnes Deshormes, Consultant, for the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), January, 2001
10. Mid-Term Review of the Cyprus Bi-communal Development Program, Agnes Deshormes, Consultant for RBEC, United Nations Development Program, May 2000
11. A Contingency Plan for the Bi-communal Development Program, United Nations Office for Project Services, United Nations Development Program; Prepared by Agnes Deshormes, EPSIS, Paris; 2002
12. Cyprus Trip Report and Recommendations: USAID/OTI, Jason Aplon and Thomas Stukel, USAID/OTI, December 16, 2002.

13. Cyprus Bi-Communal Development Program (CYP/98/001), USAID Grant No. ENI-G-00-98-00005-00, with the United Nations Development Program, March 9, 1998
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18. The Annan Plan for Cyprus: A Citizen’s Guide; the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 2003.
19. The Property Regime in the Annan Plan: A Citizen’s Guide; the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 2003
20. The UNDP/UNOPS NGO Program in Cyprus, An Assessment and Proposed Strategy: Final Report; C. Stark Biddle, Pat Evans, July 27, 2001

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## ANNEX 4

### ACRONYMS

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<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
BDP	Bi-Communal Development Program
BSP	Bi-Communal Support Program
CASP	Cyprus-America Scholarship Program
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CRCS	Cyprus Red Cross Society
CS	Civil Society
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
DVC	Digital Video Conferencing
ESF	Economic Support Funds
FFFR	Flexible Framework Fostering Rapprochement
GC	Greek Cypriot
GCC	Greek Cypriot Community
HRM	Humanitarian Relief Mission
IA	Implementing Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMP	Nicosia Master Plan
OL	Opinion Leader
PMU	Project Management Unit
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
ROC	Republic of Cyprus
SC	Steering Committee
SPMO	
TC	Turkish Cypriot
TCC	Turkish Cypriot Community
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, Cyprus
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOPS	United Nations Office of Project Support
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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## ANNEX 5

# QUESTIONNAIRES AND RESULTS

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This annex contain the following documents:

- 5a. Questionnaire for Grant Recipients
- 5b. Questionnaire for Opinion Leaders
- 5c. Grant Recipient Questionnaire Results
- 5d. Opinion Leader Questionnaire Results



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## ANNEX 5A.

# CYPRUS BI-COMMUNAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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February 2004

### Core Questions: Grant Recipients

Fill in questions 1-4 prior to interview. Ask all other questions of all Grant Recipients.

Name:

Position:

Name of Organization:

Date of interview:

1. Please describe the size and structure, nature and history of your organization
2. What is the title of the grant(s) you have received from the Bi-communal Development Program (BDP)?
3. How long has the BDP grant(s) been in operation? When is it scheduled to end?
4. What is the total value of the BDP grant(s)? How much has been spent to date?
5. What in your view is the general purpose of the UNOPS/BDP program in Cyprus?
6. Please describe the grant's/grants':
  - a. Purpose?
  - b. Beneficiaries?
  - c. Activities?
7. During the grant period, did your organization have activities that involved people from both communities?
8. Has your organization engaged in any activities that promoted bi-communal cooperation and understanding?
9. Could you describe the successes you have had? Or the problems? Have the authorities been supportive of these activities?
10. Have your organization's purpose, beneficiaries or activities changed since you have begun working with the BDP? How so?
11. Are there other key partners for your organization in these activities – e.g., other NGO's? Which partners? Where are they located? What are their roles?

12. Describe any problems encountered in implementing the BDP grant? How have these been solved?
13. Could you comment on the grant proposal and approval process you experienced with BDP. How would you improve the process?
14. Has your organization's ability to take on more difficult tasks changed as a result of the grant? How?
15. Has the Project Management Unit (PMU) provided any direct services to you in implementing the grant (e.g., procurement)?
16. When this BDP grant ends, do you plan to continue the activity? And how?
17. What other funding sources does your organization have, including material support from the community?
18. Have you or any other people in your organization received any training in management or proposal writing?
19. Assuming there is a political settlement along the lines of the Annan Plan, how should this new state of affairs change the BDP program, if at all?
20. In your view, in your dealings with the PMU, what have been that organization's:
  - a. Strengths?
  - b. Weaknesses?
  - c. Has the PMU website been efficient and helpful?
21. If there were a referendum now, based on what you know, would you be strongly in favor, in favor but with reservations, or not in favor?

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## ANNEX 5B. CYPRUS BI-COMMUNAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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February 2004

### Core Questions:      Opinion Leaders

Ask these questions of all Opinion Leaders.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Position: \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

1. Are you familiar with the Bi-communal Development Program that is being implemented here by UNOPS? (BDP)
2. How did you learn about the BDP?
3. What can you tell about the purpose of this program?
4. Can you give us your assessment of what this program has accomplished, if anything?
  - 4a. What have been the major strengths of BDP??
  - 4b. What about problems, weaknesses?
5. In your view, has the BDP contributed to a settlement of the political division between Greek and Turkish Cypriots? (IF YES) Please give us examples of what you have in mind.
6. In your view, what groups have benefited the most from this program? (UN, Cypriot Greeks, Cypriot Turks, Local authorities, Everyone, Politicians, NGOs, Greek and Turkish Contractors, Farmers on both Sides...etc)
7. Are there any other initiatives outside of BDP that have had similar objectives and may have contributed to a settlement here?
8. From what you know or have heard, how would you describe the way the BDP is being implemented by UNOPS.
9. If the Annan Plan goes into effect, what are the most immediate problems/issues that need to be addressed if the settlement is to succeed?
10. If the European Union provides major assistance to help implement the Annan Plan, what will be the appropriate role for a future BDP? What kinds of activities would be most suitable for BDP support?

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## ANNEX 5C.

### GRANT RECIPIENT QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

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**Total: 31      TC: 10      GC: 20      Annan Plan: 1**

**TC Results:**

- Q5: When asked about the purpose of the BDP, 8 organizations answered bi-communality while 1 organization answered community development.
- Q7: When asked about whether their activities involved people from the other side, 6 organizations said yes while 3 said no.
- Q8: When asked about whether their activities bi-communal tolerance and understanding, all organizations said yes.
- Q9: When asked about problems or successes, 7 organizations reported successes with the workings of their organizations while 4 said they had problems finding a counterpart in the South, 3 reported political problems and 1 said the process was slow.
- Q10: 6 organizations said their activities and beneficiaries changed since they started receiving funding from the BDP while 4 said it hasn't changed.
- Q11: 5 TC grantees have other NGO partners, while 3 have local authorities as a partner.
- Q12: 3 organizations reported no problems with the BDP while 2 reported political problems during the implementation of their projects. 1 organization said they had delays in receiving the money, while another organization said they had problems with the PMU.
- Q13: 5 organizations said the application process was too long while 3 said the process was too closed.
- Q14: 7 organizations reported that the funding has helped their organization. 3 have not answered.
- Q15: 5 organizations have received direct services (procurement etc) from the PMU while 4 have not.
- Q16: All organizations said they would like to continue with their activities in the future. 6 said they need further funding while the rest have not commented.
- Q17: Other sources of funding are: EU funding, government funding (available for implementing agencies only), Amideast, and other foreign sources.
- Q18: 5 of the 10 organizations have received training on grant writing and management.

Q19: When asked about the future role of the BDP after a settlement, 5 organizations said they would like the BDP to continue while 1 voted for rapprochement and another for social and economic development.

Q20a: When asked about the strengths of the PMU, 4 organizations said the PMU is very helpful, and 2 said it is responsive to the needs of the grantees.

Q20b: Lack of transparency and the fact that it takes too long to get a response from the PMU were seen as the biggest weaknesses (3/10 each). Other weaknesses mentioned were: lack of strategy, too much bureaucracy, and lack of enough staff.

Q21: When asked about the Annan Plan, 8 said they would be in favor while 3 said they would be in favor with reservations.

## **2. GC results:**

Q5: When asked about the purpose of the BDP, 19 organizations answered bi-communality while 1 organization did not answer.

Q7: When asked about whether their activities involved people from the other side, 19 organizations said yes while 1 said no.

Q8: When asked about whether their activities bi-communal tolerance and understanding, 16 organizations said yes while 4 said no.

Q9: When asked about problems or successes, 8 organizations reported successes with the workings of their organizations while 6 reported political problems, 1 said they had problems finding a counterpart in the North and 1 reported a lack of interest.

Q10: Only 3 organizations said their activities and beneficiaries changed since they started receiving funding from the BDP while 12 said it hasn't changed. 1 said UNOPS took over the management of the organization.

Q11: 10 TC grantees have other NGO partners, while 7 have local authorities as a partner.

Q12: 9 organizations reported no problems with the BDP, 8 experienced problems while carrying out their projects, while 2 reported political problems during the implementation of their projects. 1 organization said the budget for the project was not flexible enough.

Q13: 9 organizations made positive comments about the application process while 4 organizations said the application process was too long and 4 said it was too closed.

Q14: 8 organizations reported that the funding has helped their organization. 6 have not answered.

Q15: 6 organizations have received direct services (procurement etc) from the PMU while 13 have not.

- Q16: 4 organizations said they would like to continue with their activities in the future. 4 said they will end their activities. 6 said they need further funding while 3 reported other sources of funding and 1 is self sustaining.
- Q17: Other sources of funding available are: EU funding, government funding and membership fees. 3 organizations reported no other sources of funding.
- Q18: 5 of the 20 organizations have received training on grant writing and management.
- Q19: When asked about the future role of the BDP after a settlement, 6 organizations said they would like the BDP to continue while 4 voted for rapprochement, 4 for education and 3 for NGO and CS empowerment. Other issues were language training, removing the bi-communal aspect, program development and social and economic development.
- Q20a: When asked about the strengths of the PMU, 9 organizations said the PMU is very helpful, 2 said it had money to give and 2 said it is responsive to the needs of the grantees.
- Q20b: Lack of transparency (4 votes) was seen as the biggest weakness of the PMU. The fact that it takes too long to get a response and the lack of adequate number of staff are the second biggest categories (3 each). Other weaknesses mentioned were: bogus NGOs, too much bureaucracy, and inflexibility.
- Q21: When asked about the Annan Plan, 10 said they would be in favor while 4 said they would be in favor with reservations. 1 person said they would vote against the Plan while 2 said they have not made their minds yet.

**Grant Recipients:**

**Total: 31    TC: 10    GC: 20    Annan Plan: 1**

**Table 1: Knowledge about bi-communal purpose**

<b>Bicomm purpose</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>TC</b>	8	1
<b>GC</b>	19	1

**Table 2: Activities involving people from the other side**

<b>Bicomm activities</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>TC</b>	6	3
<b>GC</b>	19	1

**Table 3: Activities teaching tolerance and understanding**

<b>Tolerance and und.</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>TC</b>	10	0
<b>GC</b>	16	4

**Table 4: Activities and Beneficiaries changed since grant received**

<b>Capacity Change</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>TC</b>	6	4
<b>GC</b>	3	12

**Table 5: Received direct services from PMU**

<b>Services from PMU</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>TC</b>	5	4
<b>GC</b>	6	13

**Table 6: Annan Plan**

<b>Annan Plan</b>	<b>In Favor</b>	<b>In favor with reservations</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>TC</b>	8	3	
<b>GC</b>	10	4	1

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## ANNEX 5D.

### OPINION LEADERS QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

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**Total: 23 TC: 10 GC: 12 Other: 1**

**TC results:**

- Q1: No one has not heard of the BDP. 6 of the TC op leaders were participants, while one claimed to be knowledgeable and not participant and 3 had very little knowledge.
- Q2: 6 op leaders were participants while 1 heard about the BDP from the press, one from a friend and one applied to the program but got rejected.
- Q3: Bi-communal purpose is well known. 7 correctly put bi-communality as the purpose of the program while one claimed it to be development and 1 said he/she didn't know.
- Q4: The most visible accomplishment of the program among the TCs has been the infrastructure works (3/10). 2 people said bringing people together was the biggest accomplishment of the BDP while another 2 said the support for NGOs has been the biggest accomplishment. Only one person said very little has been accomplished. 1 person said the Annan Plan booklet was the biggest accomplishment.
- Q4a: 3 people said preserving the heritage is the main strength of the BDP, while 2 people said the fact that BDP had money to offer was the main strength. 1 person said the BDP was balanced and trusted while another said the fact that UN was involved was the biggest strength.
- Q4b: The biggest weaknesses of the BDP according to the TC op leaders were the fact that the authorities were involved in the decision making and "bogus" NGOs might have been funded (2/10 each).
- Q5: When asked whether the BDP had contributed to peace, 4 TCs chose not to answer the question. Out of the 6 that answered, 4 said yes, 1 said no and 1 said I don't know.
- Q6: Local authorities and NGOs were the ones that TCs think benefited from the BDP. (2/10 for each)
- Q7: EU funding (3/10) and the other bi-communal workshops/activities (2/10) were seen as the other major initiatives that had the same purpose as the BDP, while 3 people mentioned bi-communal initiatives (of mainly the unions) that have already been underway, which has not received any foreign funding.
- Q8: When asked what they think about the implementation of the BDP by PMU, only 2 people answered. 1 said he/she didn't know and 1 made a negative comment.



- Q9: Reconciliation (4/10) and history books (3/10) were seen as the main issues that will arise after a settlement. Properties for those to be moved, legal expertise, Civil Society and language teaching and training (2/10) were also seen as important issues.
- Q10: When asked about the future role of the BDP, the responses were again varied. Education, Civil Society, Economic issues and reunification costs were seen as the appropriate things for the BDP to fund. 1 person said the BDP should continue what it is doing but with a larger scale.

**GC Results:**

- Q1: No one has not heard of the BDP. 3 of the GC op leaders were participants, while 8 claimed to be knowledgeable and not participant and 1 had very little knowledge.
- Q2: 3 of the GC opinion leaders heard about the BDP from the press, 3 from a friend, 1 said through work and one applied to the program but got rejected.
- Q3: Bi-communal purpose is well known. 8 correctly put bi-communality as the purpose of the program while one claimed it to be development and 3 said they didn't know.
- Q4: The most visible accomplishment of the program among the GCs has been bringing people together (5/12). 3 people said infrastructure was the biggest accomplishment of the BDP while another 2 said the fact that BDP was funding things governments would not have been the biggest accomplishment. Only one person said very little has been accomplished. NGO empowerment was seen by 1 person as the biggest accomplishment.
- Q4a: 4 people said the BDP was balanced and trusted, while other comments were that BDP had money to offer, CS empowerment and building mutual respect (2 each) were seen as the biggest strengths.
- Q4b: The biggest weaknesses of the BDP according to the GC op leaders were the fact that the authorities were involved in the decision making and "bogus" NGOs might have been funded (4/12 each). 1 person said it was a hard to reach the BDP while one said the accomplishments were not visible.
- Q5: When asked whether the BDP had contributed to peace, 9 said yes and 3 said no.
- Q6: 6 GCs think everyone benefited from the BDP, while 3 think NGOs were the ones that benefited most. 1 person said the local authorities benefited while another said local elites were the ones that benefited.
- Q7: EU funding (5/12) and other foreign funding (3/12) were seen as the other major initiatives with the same purpose. 2 people also mentioned local bi-communal activities already underway that have not received any funding from BDP.

Q8: When asked what they think about the implementation of the BDP by PMU, 3 said they didn't know, 4 made a negative comment while 4 made a positive comment.

Q9: Reconciliation (5/12) was seen by GCs as the main issue that will arise after a settlement. Properties to be built and economic issues (4/12 each) were the other main issues for GCs.

Q10: When asked about the future role of the BDP, the responses were again varied. 9 GCs said reunification costs were the most important costs for the BDP to handle while 2 said CS empowerment. Economic issues and education also received 1 vote each.

**Opinion Leaders:** Total: 23      GC: 12      TC: 10 Other: 1

**TABLE 1: KNOWLEDGEABLE BDP**

	Yes	No
GC	12	0
TC	10	0

**Table 2: Participant on BDP**

	Yes	No
GC	3	9
TC	6	4

**TABLE 3: UNDERSTAND PURPOSE**

	Yes	No
GC	8	4
TC	7	3

**Table 4: Main Strength**

	<b>Heritage</b>	<b>Money</b>	<b>Balanced and trusted</b>
GC	0	2	4
TC	3	2	1

**TABLE 5: MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENT**

	<b>Infrastructure</b>	<b>Contact</b>	<b>Civil Society</b>
GC	3	5	1
TC	3	2	2

**Table 6: Weaknesses**

	<b>Authorities' Involvement</b>	<b>Bogus NGOS</b>
GC	4	4
TC	2	2

**Table 7: BDP Contribution to Peace**

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
GC	9	3
TC	4	2

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## ANNEX 6

# CONSOLIDATED COMMENTS FROM UNDP/UNOPS

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### 1. General comments

We endorse a large number of the report's recommendations, for example:

- Retirement of the use of the term “bi-communal”. Even though bi-communality is still important in some respects, in the future it will likely be more useful to define our expected results and activities in the framework of “institutional capacity building” -- especially as this relates to harmonization with the EU and the implementation of a future peace settlement.
- Increased strategic focus, including planning, implementing, reporting and evaluating on the basis of expected results;
- Future focus on governance, advocacy and NGO/government collaboration;
- Greater transparency in funding decisions where feasible;
- Partnership and coalition building to increase effectiveness;
- Sectoral or thematic based needs assessment as the basis for future work;
- Upgrading of the financial and project data management system. In fact this is already underway under the new integrated UNDP/UNOPS IT platform (ATLAS). The PMU should be able to use this system by September 2004;
- Further develop administrative guidelines to be consistent with allowable expenditures e.g. salaries, administrative costs, etc;
- Develop criteria for grant extensions and budget increases;
- Reporting on NGO Grants by sub-sector and by NGO.

### 2. Factual questions

- Page v, third paragraph – UNDP can establish offices in countries with high income levels, however, the host country must be willing to fully fund the administrative and programme costs of establishing such an office.

**Evaluators' response:** Statement has been corrected on page v and also on page 1.

- Page v, footnote 2 – Please use total grant amounts in the report. In other words, total USAID grant contribution for the BDP during the entire period was \$60 million. Total UNDP contribution to the BDP was \$500,000.

**Evaluators' response:** Statements have been added indicating that total USAID contribution for LOP was \$60,000,000 in the text to which the footnote relates and also on page 1.

- Page vii, paragraph c. - The maximum budget for NGO grants was reduced to \$50,000 from \$100,000.

**Evaluators' response.** A clarifying statement was added here and on page 41.

- Page ix, paragraph d (also on page 12) – The definition of an “expert” as someone who is selected to undertake a task based on specific competencies in his/her field of expertise is not unique to UNOPS but is standard practice for organizations that offer similar services. While UNOPS as an organization promotes staff training, it has the responsibility to clients to recruit qualified personnel who have the necessary skills to achieve the objectives of a project. This is especially important where the duration of projects are for a relatively short duration of one to two years. In the context of UN’s goal of building national capacity, it is often not acceptable to beneficiaries for project funds to be utilized to build capacity of UN staff. However, the PMU has conducted several in-house training conducted by in-house experts and external consulting firms. In addition to this, six Project Officers have participated in a total of 13 training/workshops outside Cyprus. Additionally, during missions of UNDP/UNOPS HQ senior staff, presentations were often made to staff on operational or programme issues specific to UNDP or UNOPS.

**Evaluators' response:** We agree that UNOPS has a responsibility to hire qualified staff for its projects. We are also aware of some of the training provided, since this was noted in several of the BDP quarterly and annual reports, and was also mentioned by some of the PMU staff with whom team members met. Nonetheless, the team's conclusion, based on observations and discussions, is that skill-upgrading training was not a priority for UNOPS but could have improved PMU staff ability to manage, monitor and evaluate grants.)

- Page 5, paragraph D (also Page 17, paragraph c.) – UNOPS has always been represented in the project steering committee (either by its Cyprus programme manager or its New York-based senior portfolio manager) and it has always reviewed projects that exceed \$30,000. In other words, there has been no policy change.

**Evaluators' response:** Language has been changed in both locations to indicate that UNOPS participates in the project steering committee. The team had received conflicting information while in Cyprus and is glad to have this point clarified.

- Page 20, second paragraph - In 1999, approximately \$8.8 million worth of contracts signed and \$2.6 million disbursed. The PMU costs in 1999 were \$592,000. We are not quite sure what basis was used to make this remark.

**Evaluators' response:** The information in this paragraph, and in the chart on page 20, is from budgetary table and charts provided by Miran Rechter.

- Page 26, first paragraph – The PMU did take corrective action. For further details, attached please find the Terms of Reference and Mission Report of Luciano Serra.

**Evaluators' response:** Though we did not have the mission report of Luciano Serra to review, at the time of the team's visit the flow meter remained non-functional, so we stand by our statement that no action has been taken to correct it.

- Page 29, last paragraph (also Page 31, third paragraph) – Here we believe that the evaluators make the common mistake of referring to UNOPS instead of BDP. It might be worthwhile to do a “search and replace” throughout the document to find and correct any other instances.

**Evaluators' response:** Clarification was made in page 29 to reflect the fact that the decision to do multi-year funding was one of the entire steering committee. For references to the PMU on page 31, however, the intent of the evaluators was to give credit for these innovations to the PMU. It is our understanding that the PMU actually writes the grants and is responsible for initiating and negotiating much of the content of agreements - even if a larger body within the BDP has final authority. Our intent was to show that the PMU played an important role in pushing the envelope in this sector.

- Page 40, paragraph 2.a. – A set of indicators was indeed prepared in 2002 and updated in 2004. The 2002 version was shared with the evaluators.

**Evaluators' response:** The team did review the 2002 indicators, but we could find no indication in the files and quarterly reports that we reviewed that these indicators were maintained regularly as a way of monitoring progress. The 2004 indicators update was provided to evaluators only after the final draft of this document was completed, so evaluators did not have the opportunity to review it in depth. That being said, the paragraph in question simply states that in today's environment a more focused set of objectives and indicators is warranted.

### **3. Specific comments**

- Page vii, paragraph c. (and also Page 41) – We were not informed previously of the standard for NGO funding mentioned in this paragraph. We wonder if it is fair to evaluate this aspect of the programme against criteria of which the PMU was not aware.

**Evaluators' response:** This comment was not intended as a criticism against the PMU specifically. Both USAID and the UNDP have long experience in funding indigenous NGOs and could have applied their knowledge to prevent over-funding of individual grantees.

- Page ix, paragraph 2d – A more in-depth investigation of the functions and responsibilities of other staff might have provided a different conclusion. The entire staff and management are *project staff*. The proportion of time spent on the administration of the PMU staff and the office is less than the time spent on project/contract administration. One part-time and two

full-time Project Assistants also directly support the Project Officers. In addition, operations staff is responsible for carrying out certain aspects of procurement, personnel, financial monitoring and logistics of a project/contract. Finally, the management is involved on a daily basis in solving problems related to the development and management of projects/contracts. However, the PMU acknowledges that a more even distribution of workload could be achieved amongst Project Officers and other staff, within the context of emerging priorities for the successor programme to the BDP.

**Evaluators' response:** No comment.

- Pages 7 – 9 (Roles of the PMU) – It might be helpful to understand that the functions of the PMU could be seen as mimicking at times those of a UNDP Country Office, even as it carried out the more standard obligations of UNOPS as executing agency for the project. These multiple roles were not necessarily well-explained or understood and greater clarity on roles and responsibilities should be sought in the future. The two primary functions of a UNDP Country Office (apart from UN coordination, which is not relevant in this situation) are “upstream” development services (for example, policy advice, project development, facilitation, and monitoring and evaluation) and “downstream” operational support services (including contract management and direct procurement of goods and services). All of the PMU activities mentioned in this section (and others that are not mentioned) flow from these two basic functions.

**Evaluators' response:** No comment.

- Page 11, section e. – A more appropriate (less judgmental) title for this section might be “Management decision-making and internal communications”.

**Evaluators' response:** We have taken UNDP/UNOPS suggestion.

- Page 11, section f. - A distinction should be made between the project’s tracking system and its reporting format. The current Financial Monitoring System contains data on individual contracts. With over 300 contracts (completed and on-going), the contracts are grouped in ‘projects’ with a common code.

**Evaluators' response:** Point taken, but without having a better understanding of the distinctions, it is not possible for us to change the wording appropriately. We believe our key point is valid, that the way activities are identified in the annual and quarterly reports does not provide managers with the information they need to monitor progress.

- Pages 25-32 – It should be noted that successful bi-communal initiatives in the infrastructure sector helped to create the necessary trust and confidence to allow the BDP to later move into more sensitive areas.

**Evaluators' response:** This may well be true, but since it did not come to light during our interviews and documentation review in Cyprus we cannot include it as a team finding.

- Pages 34 –35 – We find it unusual that no mention is made of “Gimme 6”, with an investment of roughly \$2.5 million by far the BDP’s largest intervention in this area.

**Evaluators' response:** True, we regret that time did not permit us to evaluate as many of the important activities as we would have liked.

- Page 34, fifth paragraph – The PMU "could have been more aggressive in initiating email dialogue among grantees in order to foster greater collaboration". All project stakeholders were in touch with each other and with the PMU, usually on a daily basis. We agree, however, that the website needs revamping.

**Evaluator's response:** No comment.

- Page 35, final paragraph – We are not aware that Contact Theory was utilized either during the formulation or implementation of the project. Did the evaluators find evidence that the BDP consciously applied this theory?

**Evaluators' response:** While there may not have been a conscious effort to apply contract theory, it was clear to the team that the BDP's goal was to achieve as many contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, in as many walks of life, as possible. The 2002 indicators report, as well as summary evaluative information provided to the team on our arrival in Cyprus, showed that the number of meetings was the key indicator of progress, at least until April 2003.

- Pages 36-37 – We wonder why the NGO component was evaluated for degree of bi-communal contact but not the other components.

**Evaluators' response:** We have changed the language in that section to reflect the fact that PMU staff graded all grants, not just the NGO grants. The evaluators decided to use this evaluation technique for the NGO grants alone for a couple of reasons. First, the IA grants reviewed were for large, multi-year activities, so that the team was able to assess bi-communality based solely on interviews and documentation review. These assessments are incorporated into the narratives. Assessing the NGO grants on this basis was not possible, however, because of the large number and diversity of the grant activities. The "grading" procedure made it possible to do an overall assessment. Secondly, comparison of "grades" provided by the Embassy, the PMU, and team members themselves was intended to demonstrate how monitoring and evaluation can be done to achieve measurable results that can be compared from one year to the next.



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## ANNEX 7

### EVENT TIMELINES

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#### 8a. BDP Project Event Timeline

Year	Month	Event
1998	April	PMU established
1998	August	Initial NGO strategy developed by the Angelica's and Miran Rechter
1998	September	Agreements reached with Red Cross and HRM – the program effectively began
1999	June	GC Steering Committee began approving NGO proposals
1999	June	NGO Technical Resources Center (GC) grant approved
1999		PMU website established, grants announced on lined?
2000	April	Agreement reached with TC side to allow funding of NGO proposals.
2000	May	Mid-term appraisal of BDP, including development of indicators for (1) rapprochement; (2) economic development; and (3) capacity building - Using Flexible Framework for Rapprochement
2000	July	TC agreed to approve NGO proposals – as long as there was no collaboration with GC NGOs.
2000		USAID/US Embassy/UNOPS initiated weekly meetings.
2000	October	USAID/UNDP/UNOPS decided to reduce the proportion of funds going to infrastructure and increase funding to other sectors; as well as to eliminate the total funding ceiling on NGOs.
2000	October	NGO Management Center set up on TC side
2001	January	Backstopping mission by Agnes Deshormes
2001	January	As a result of the mid-term review, PMU reorganized into three project units (Implementing Agencies, NGOs, Information and Communication) as well as Finance/Admin office; and Deputy Program Manager named.
2001	March	Monthly meetings of PMU, US Embassy, USAID initiated.
2001	May	Initial Environmental Review (IER) was introduced to all projects.

2001	May	BDP program extended to end-2004, another \$30 million added.
2001	July	NGO Program Assessment and Strategy Completed (Biddle/Evans)
2001	August	PMU convinced TC authorities to allow TC NGO reps to visit the PMU.
2001	November	New Millenium Civil Society Program Implementation Plan completed
2002	January	PMU recruited 5 professional staff and 2 support staff, an increase of 60%
2002	February	PMU presented a draft communications strategy
2002	March - July	PMU developed a database for impact indicators
2002	March	Steering Committee meetings increased to quarterly. Projects approved during one meeting must be ready for signed contract by the following quarter.
2002		Contingency Plan prepared by Agnes Deshormes.
2002	July - December	PMU put in an integrated reporting and monitoring system linked to accounting and contract data
2002	September	Procedures established for weekly meetings between PMU and Embassy
2002	October	“Partners Retreat” held to correct lack of clarity in the roles of different program stakeholders and to set stage for sector assessments.
2002	December	Contingency Planning Round Table held
2002	late year	Decision made to reduce NGO grants to max of \$50,000
2003	January - March	IA and NGO units merged into a Program Unit, so as not to differentiate between IAs and NGOs.
2003	March	IER procedures finalized to include a PIM for all new projects.
2003	September	Application process formalized for Special Initiatives Projects (and procedures listed on website?)
2003	September	UNOPS wanted all funds earmarked so that funds would be expended by the end of the grant Dec 04.

## ***8b. Timeline of Political Developments***

### **1997 – 2004**

**4 January 1997** An agreement is signed between the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and Russian State Company Rozvorouzenie for the sale of the anti-aircraft – anti-missile defence system S-300. Delivery time is set for 18 months later.

**7 January 1997** US State Department says that the decision of the Cyprus government to order the missiles contributes to instability in the island and the region in general and that it is ‘a step in the wrong direction’.

**8 January 1997** Turkey threatens to retaliate militarily in case the S-300 defence anti-missile system is deployed in the area of the island controlled by the government of ROC.

**9 January 1997** US administration calls on Turkey for restraint. At the same time repeats to the ROC that it has taken a ‘wrong decision’.

**10 January 1997** The British Government informs the government of the ROC of its opposition to the deployment of the missile system.

**12 January 1997** Opinion poll shows that 94% of the Greek Cypriots agree to the deployment of the S-300 missile system. The same poll shows that 88% are in favour of the Common Defence Doctrine agreed between the ROC and Greece.

**13 January 1997** Kerry Cavano, director of the Southern Europe Desk at the State Department arrives in Cyprus. He suggests a moratorium on flights over the island instead of deployment of the missiles. His suggestion is not turned down by President Clerides. The US government expresses its disappointment.

**20 January 1997** Suleyman Demirel, the President of Turkey, and Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader sign a common declaration to the effect that the Greek Cypriot weapons systems threaten stability and security in the region. They decide to take military countermeasures to re-establish Turkish military supremacy.

**April 1997** Diego Cordovez is appointed Special Adviser on the Cyprus Problem to the UN SG.

**4 June 1997** Richard Holbrook takes over as Bill Clinton’s, US President’s, special envoy to the Cyprus problem.

**9 July 1997** Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash negotiate at Troutbeck (US). Denktash insists on recognition of Turkish Republic of Cyprus “TRNC”. Deadlock is reached.

**20 July 1997** New agreement between the “TRNC” and Turkey.

**August 1997** Works start at Troodos summit in order to create the base for the installation of the S-300 defence missile system. The site of the base lies next to UK installations. Consequently the British protest against this Greek Cypriot move.

**25 August 1997** A new round of bi-communal talks fails to produce any results as Rauf Denktash demands the interruption of the ROC’s EU accession negotiations and the recognition of the ‘TRNC’.

**26 August 1997** Turkey introduces searching operations on vessels passing through the Bosphorus for parts of the S-300 missiles bound for Cyprus.

**15 October 1997** Greece's Defence Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos watches the annual manoeuvres code named Nikiforos (Victorious) of the GC National Guard. The Greek Cypriots live short-lived moments of euphoria in expectation of the installation of the S-300 defence system. Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus, Chrysostomos, states that the defence pact between the ROC and Greece should be offensive.

**16 October 1997** The Turkish Air Force intercepts the C-130 Hercules that carries Akis Tsochatzopoulos, Defence Minister, back to Greece.

**8 November 1997** The Turkish Army with new manoeuvres code named 'Resolution '97'. The scenario of the manoeuvres includes destruction of the S-300 missile system on ground.

**December 1997** Turkey signs an agreement with Israel to acquire Israeli-made "Popeye" missiles. These are intended to destroy the GC S-300 missiles.

**9 January 1998** In the run up to the presidential elections (15 February 1998) Clerides announces the opening of the Pafos Airbase on 24 January. Turkey threatens once again to retaliate.

**12 January 1998** The US government intervenes once more. Consequently the inauguration of the Pafos Airbase is postponed until March.

**24 January 1998** The Pafos Airbase becomes partly operational for the GC National Guard. Turkey threatens once more to destroy the base.

**25 January 1998** Turkey says it will refer the matter of the Pafos Airbase to the UN Security Council.

**30 January 1998** Alain Dejame, chairman of the UN Security Council states that he will raise the issue of the airbase at the next meeting of the SC.

**15 February 1998** Glafkos Clerides is re-elected President of the Republic. The US prepares for a new initiative.

**17 February 1998** US Under-Secretary of State for Defence G. Lontal warns the Cypriot Ambassador to the US not to proceed with operating neither the Pafos Airbase nor the S-300 defence missile system. British PM Tony Blair also puts pressure on Clerides to give up the missiles deployment.

**March 1998** The government of the ROC freezes its programme for making the Pafos Airbase fully operational.

**20 March 1998** Theodore Pangalos, the Greek Foreign Minister suggests to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to cancel the deployment of the S-300 missiles in exchange for a NATO-guaranteed moratorium on flights over Cyprus. The deal is not accepted. The US demands unilateral cancellation of the missiles deployment.

**31 March 1998** The ROC starts EU accession negotiations. Turkey retaliates by convening in Ankara the 'Joint Council' to promote union between Turkey and the "TRNC".

**April 1998** Yiannis Kassoulides, Foreign Minister of the ROC announces at a meeting at the Foreign Ministry that President Clerides gave Tony Blair an undertaking not to deploy the S-300 missiles. However, construction on the site continues ...

**2-3 May 1998** Richard Holbrook arrives in Lefkosia (Nicosia) aiming at cancelling the deployment of the S-300 missiles in Southern Cyprus and the restart of bi-communal talks. Denktash insists on recognition. Hence Holbrook fails to initiate a new round of talks.

**31 May 1998** London's "Sunday Times" publishes a report to the effect that the UK is preparing the biggest evacuation operation since the end of the Second World War because of the prospect of war in Cyprus. The report estimates that around 250,000 people will be evacuated. GCs panic reflecting on the effects of such reports on the island's tourism.

**9 June 1998** The GC National Council decides to defer delivery of the S-300 missiles until the end of the year. It is envisaged that this decision will reduce tension.

**16 June 1998** Three F-16s and a C-130 land at the Pafos Airbase.

**17 June 1998** Six Turkish F-16s land at Ercan (formerly Lefkoniko) airport in northern Cyprus. Turkey talks of war in case of permanent stationing of Greek fighter aircraft in southern Cyprus.

**July 1998** Ann Hercus takes post as Deputy Special Representative and Chief of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus.

**2 July 1998** UN Secretary General's Special Adviser Diego Cordovez arrives in Cyprus. Clerides offers to cancel the missiles deployment programme if Denktash returns to the negotiating table. Denktash refuses to negotiate with reference to the S-300 missiles.

**7 July 1998** It is reported in the press that US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright suggests in a letter to President Clerides the purchase of smaller range S-15 missiles while S-300s will be stored outside Cyprus.

**9 July 1998** Yiannis Omirou, the Greek Cypriot Defence Minister watches a trial launching of the S-300 missiles in Astrakhan, in the Caspian Depression, Southern Russia.

**June-July 1998** The US State Department shows interest in promoting Theodore Pangalos' idea of a moratorium of flights over the island and takes the initiative for its implementation independent of NATO. The Turkish side refuses to talk on the basis of an exchange to the non-deployment of the S-300 missiles.

**10 July 1998** Turkish PM Mesut Yilmaz demands the abandonment of the S-300 missiles and threatens to install missiles in the North of the island.

**31 August 1998** Rauf Denktash calls a press conference in Northern Cyprus. He puts forward his proposal for a solution based on confederation.

**21 September 1998** Ismail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister, states in Istanbul that the S-300 missiles have become a 'headache' for the Greek Cypriots.

**7 October 1998** Igor Sergeev the Russian Defence Minister states that Russia is not only ready to deliver the S-300 missile system but also to help install and operate it.

**26 October 1998** Clerides speaks of plans ready to create a naval base.

**10 December 1998** Thomas Miller, Cyprus co-ordinator at the US State Department arrives in the island with a mission to defuse tension and persuade the GC side to cancel deployment of the missiles.

**12 December 1998** At the EU summit meeting in Vienna Jack Chirac, the French President warns that unless the ROC cancels its defence missile programme its EU accession negotiations will be called off.

**13 December 1998** Richard Holbrook takes the initiative to persuade Turkey to start a dialogue on security issues in exchange for non deployment.

**22 December 1998** UN Security Council passes a resolution that calls on both sides in Cyprus to reduce the number of troops and the level of armaments in the island.

**29 December 1998** Clerides meets Costas Simitis, the Greek Premier, in Athens. They announce the deployment of the S-300 defence missile system in Crete.

**February 1999** Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish rebels of the PKK in Turkey, is kicked out of Syria. He takes refuge for a few days in Greece. Greek supporters of his cause fly him to Nairobi, Kenya where he is captured by Turkish intelligence officers and brought back to Turkey to stand trial. The issue provoked a crisis in Greco-Turkish relations. Ankara accused GCs of providing Ocalan with a fake passport.

**22 April 1999** Diego Cordovez resigns from SG's Special Adviser on Cyprus.

**20 June 1999** Letter by Kofi Annan to the UN Security Council. Accepts Diego Cordovez resignation, appoints Ann Hercus, a New Zealander, as resident Special Representative and Chief of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus.

**1 July 1999** Ann Hercus takes office.

**June-July 2000** Several banks collapse in northern Cyprus taking with them the savings of thousands of individuals and companies.

**November 2000** Intercommunal talks held in Geneva. The Turkish Cypriot side declines to attend further sessions.

**November - December 2000** Turkey faces liquidity problems. The Turkish lira is devalued. This has a severe negative impact on the lives of TCs living in northern Cyprus. The TC administration is forced to adopt economic measures prompting a widespread strike and not an insignificant number of public protests.

**January-June 2001** Peace efforts hampered by internal distractions both in the North and the South of the island. The North experiences economic and political difficulties while the South goes through a parliamentary election campaign. The TC side continues to refuse engagement.

**26 May 2001** Elections for the House of Representatives in the ROC. AKEL, nominally 'communist' but actually a moderate left-wing party, emerges as the biggest political grouping. 'New Horizons', a far-right group and the Green Party enter parliament winning one seat each.

**August 2001** At the end of a visit to the island Alvaro de Soto, the UN SG's Special Adviser on Cyprus, announced that the SG had invited both sides to attend talks in New York at the beginning of September to initiate a 'new and re-invigorated phase' of the peace process. The GC side accepted the invitation. On the contrary the TC side made its acceptance of the invitation conditional on the Greek Cypriots agreeing in advance to the notion of a 'new partnership'. Ankara sided with the TC position, attracting widespread criticism from many European governments.

**September 2001** The EU and the UN Security Council reaffirmed their support for the ongoing efforts of the SG and his Special Adviser.

**January - December 2001** Delayed and reduced aid payments from Turkey to "TRNC" exacerbate the predicament of the TC economy. The leadership's inability to deal with it fuels

disenchantment among many TCs. The '41 Organizations' and the 'This Country is Ours' movements openly challenge Denktash's leadership. Demonstrations are staged involving several thousand people each time. "These groups, and many other individual Turkish Cypriots in private discussions, object to the degree of control exercised by Turkey (and particularly the Turkish Forces) over the north, as well as to the corruption perceived to exist in and close to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. With Turkey's full support behind Mr. Denktash and the power of the military presence on the ground, however, there is no realistic prospect of a dramatic change ... disenchantment continues to manifest itself most visibly in the ongoing wave of emigration - including many of the young - and the unfortunate 'brain drain' which results."<sup>2</sup>

**16 January 2002** Face-to-face negotiations between Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash resume for the first time in ten years. June or July 2002 becomes the target date for a settlement. The talks are hosted in the third wing of the PMU's compound. Hence the BDP is unexpectedly associated with the negotiations.

**May 2002** Lack of tangible progress prompts the UN SG to pay his first visit to Cyprus.

**30 June 2002** TC local elections take place. The main opposition and pro-settlement party CTP (Turkish Republican Party) wins two new mayorships Lefkosia (Nicosia) and Kyrenia. Thus CTP now controls all three main towns (third one is Famagusta).

**3 November 2002** Turkish General Elections: Overwhelming victory of the Justice and Development Party. Its leader Tayyip Erdogan assumes the premiership and expresses his desire to contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus issue.

**11 November 2002** Koffi Annan, the UN SG, submits the first version of his peace plan. Its leaking to the press provokes intense political discussions and broad civic involvement in expressing views on the plan and the political future of Cyprus.

**12-13 December 2002** The European Council (Heads of States/Governments) meets in Copenhagen. The ROC is given the green light to join the EU on 1 May 2004. Though no peace agreement is reached, the resolution of the political division of Cyprus is not made a precondition for entry. The two sides agree to renew their efforts to reach a settlement by the end of February 2003. The European Council acknowledges Turkey's progress in adopting the EU political and other criteria for entry and decides to stipulate a tentative date for the start of Turkey's accession negotiations during the European Council of December 2004.

**December 2002** The Turkish sector of Nicosia experiences at the end of the month a mass pro-settlement demonstration (25,000-35,000 people representing 12 to 17 % of the entire TC population). The crowd demands the resignation of Denktash and the acceptance of the UN peace plan.

**16 February 2003** Tassos Papadopoulos supported by the biggest left-wing party AKEL, the socialist EDEK and the small Green Party is elected President of the ROC unexpectedly defeating incumbent Glafkos Clerides in the first round of the presidential election. He is now the Greek Cypriot negotiator.

**26 February 2003** The UN SG pays a second visit to Cyprus and tables his final peace plan. Asks Papadopoulos and Denktash to meet in The Hague on 10 March carrying their reply to his request to put this latest peace plan proposal to referendum in their respective communities without their prior signature on the plan.

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<sup>2</sup> BDP 2001 Annual Report, CYP/98/001, p.2.

**28 February 2003** 40,000 to 70,000 TCs demonstrate in Nicosia in favour of the UN peace plan.

**7 March 2003** 25,000 to 45,000 TCs demonstrate against the plan.

**10 March 2003** The leaders of the two communities and the SG meet in The Hague. Papadopoulos agrees to Koffi Annan's proposal while Denktash declines it leading to the collapse of the talks.

**March 2003** Denktash's allies block the TC "parliament" from reaching quorum to pass a resolution in favour of acceptance of the SG's request for a referendum on his plan.

**16 April 2003** The ROC signs the EU Accession Treaty in Athens along with nine other acceding countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

**23 April 2003** In an unexpected move, the TC authorities allow movement of people between the North and the South. Immediately, hundreds of people peacefully cross the borders in both directions every day.

**30 April 2003** In response, the Government of the ROC announces a series of 'Measures for TCs' aimed at achieving the full participation of the TCs in the public life in the ROC.

**December 2003** Turkey finally agrees to paying a compensation worth of nearly 1,120,000 euros, including the default interest, in accordance with a 1996 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decision to Greek Cypriot woman Titina Loizidou for loss of access to her property in Kyrenia, northern Cyprus, under Turkish control since July 1974. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, however, accepts Ankara's demand that the ECHR ruling asking Turkey to make suggestions to grant Loizidou access to her property be taken by the end of 2005. The compromise reached in Strasbourg only puts a halt to the crisis as Ankara's declaration added to the decision text argues that payment of compensation to Loizidou will not set a precedent for other Greek Cypriot applications suits versus Turkey.

**14 December 2003** Elections for a TC 'parliament' in Northern Cyprus. Passionate debate between the parties in favour and those opposed to a solution on the basis of the Annan plan. The results produce an evenly divided electorate: outgoing majority: UBP (National Unity Party) 18 seats, DP (Democratic Party): 7 seats, outgoing opposition: CTP (Turkish Republican Party) 19 seats, BDH (Peace and Democracy Movement) 6 seats. Mehmet Ali Talat, the CTP leader forms an interesting - with respect to the prospects for a peace settlement - coalition 'government' with DP whose leader is Serdar Denktash, son of Rauf Denktash.

**10 February 2004** Papadopoulos and Denktash meet Kofi Annan in New York and agree to resume talks in Nicosia within the UNPA (United Nations Protected Area) on the basis of the SG's peace plan.

**March 2004** Negotiations on the Annan plan proceed in Cyprus.



## ANNEX 8

### ASSESSMENT OF NGO BI-COMMUNALITY – NGOs SAMPLED BY TEAM

Organization	Project	Type	Extent of bi-communal activity	Team Rating	PMU Project Rating	PMU Org. Rating
Kemal Saracoglu Foundation - TC	Educ. the Public about Prevention and Detection of Cancer (Leukemia)	C	Cooperated with cancer org. in S. to get people diagnosed; held event at Ledra Palace for 13,000 people; will continue activities in future but needs grant	B	B	B
Folk Art Foundation	Folk Art Institute	S	Included folk art pertaining to both sides, has potential for broader bi-communal activity.	B	B	A
“	Jasmine Internet Café	N-NMP	Not much activity noted.	C	C	C
Peace Center	Bi-communal Perceptions and Attitudes	J	Translated work into both languages, held seminars, but no face to face meetings. Materials not disseminated because too political.	B	A	A
Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics	Neuronet	N-i	Unable to create the planned single data base and diagnostic capability for MS in North and South	C	C	C
Cyprus Rehabilitation and Counseling Assn	Training of Teachers in Mainstream Schools	M	About 95 people (1/3 TC) trained in how to identify and teach kids with disabilities. Developed training materials in both languages.	A	B	B
Center for Study of Childhood and Adolescence	Raising Awareness on Issues Affecting Children	C	Still early. TC counterpart in N. will help get TC participants. Materials, seminars on children’s safety/health issues planned.	A	C	B
Assn for Historical Dialogue and Research	Approaches to Teaching and Learning History	C	Still early. Prepared materials, held conference, another conference to be held in June – good participation from teachers on both sides.	A	A	A
PRIO	Public Information Project	S, i	Created Annan Plan book – widespread dissemination on both sides, prepared by people from both sides	A	A	B
Eurotalks	Eating Towards Unity	J	Cyprus branch has bi-communal steering committee, TC cooking in South, GC cooking in North	C	B	A
Cyprus Sociological Ass’n.	Perceptions on the Annan Plan		Used interviews on both sides to get information, had joint conferences, gained info that will help in the peace process	A	A	C
United Cypriot Friendship Assn	Weeping Island	J	Brought together 5 TCs, 15 GCs to produce bi-communal, tri-language poetry book and CD. Had bi-communal groups at book launch, some distribution throughout.	B	A	C
PMU contract	NGO Center	M-C	Mirror of center in North, held bi-communal meetings and events with center in North, but overall not much business – lack of need	C	B	A

			or personnel			
Management Assn	Management Center	M-C	Supported growth of civil society. Has helped/trained 353 non-profit reps from TC, 35 from GC since April '03	A	B	A
Soma Akriton	The Young Green Consumers	M-C-J	All activities are bi-communal. Investigated needs together, youth met several times, and do activities outside the program. They have changed their attitudes. Major campaign in North will begin in May	A	Not Rated*	Not Rated*
Has Der	The Young Green Consumers	M-C-J	See comments under Soma Akriton above.	A	Not Rated*	Not Rated*
Girl Guides	AIDS-Free Cyprus	M-J	Prepared training kits and games in both Greek and Turkish; trained teacher-educators; helped sponsor AIDS-Day event. Training and distribution are now occurring on TC side.	B	B	A
Cyprus Neuroscience & Technology Institute	Technology for Peace	S-C	Created a "portal" where Cyprus peace organizations can post information, news, events, etc, and can place their own websites. Groups on both sides use portal and training sessions held	A	B	B
Highgate School	Traditional Cypriot Folk Tales	S-C	Developed a folk tales book with help from TC contact in the North who distributed. TC and GC children held launch of second book. Seemed more interested in international distribution than local, and no plans for further activity	C	B	B
KAYAD	Socialization of Marginalized People	N-i	Had programs to teach tolerance, mutual respect and understanding, language classes, and to teach forgiveness – indirect impact on bi-communality	B-	B	A
Youth Promoting Peace (through CNTI)	Youth Promoting Peace	C	Builds bridges among youth through seminars, conferences, music festivals – many activities. Did joint planning of activities – hampered by heavy hand of CNTI.	A-	A	A
Women Waging Peace	Indelible Memories	J	Efforts to put together book of oral history from women on both sides failed	C	C	C
CYMEPA	Pedieos River Cleaning	M	Cleaned river bed on GC side. Though TC authorities undertook similar operation on the North, CYMEPA did not perceive the project as a bi-communal activity.	B	C	A

Team Rating Key: A = increasing levels of bi-communality shown during life of project and good prospects for continued activity in the future.

B = some level of bi-communality, but not a great deal of growth, and future prospects dim. C = little or no bi-communality, or project failed.

PMU Project Rating Key: A = High bi-communal content. B = Medium bi-communal content. C = None or project failed.

PMU Organization Key: A = Strong potential for future bi-communal efforts. B = Some potential, but limited. C = Little or no potential.

US Embassy Rating (under Type Column): High bi-communalism (J- joint or C – collaborative); Medium (M – Mirror); Low (In spirit, Island wide, None)

High or A gets 3 points; Medium or B gets 2 points; Low or C gets 1 point. The four scores lend a high score of 12, a low score of 4.

\*For activities not rated by PMU, the team applied average of team's and Embassy ranking.

# ANNEX 9

## PMU PROJECT AND ORGANIZATIONAL RATINGS

ANNEX 10  
PMU PROJECT RATINGS

P Number	Description	IA/ NGO ORGANIZATION NAME	TC	GC	Impact rating	Future potential rating	Start Date	End date	USD Equip	
cancelled	Publication of Hade Magazine	Terminated		GC	C	C	3/15/00	2/28/01	0.00	Closed
Cancelled	The genetic basis for susceptibility to Multiple Sclerosis in Cyprus	NGO		GC	C	C	4/3/00	8/31/01	0.00	Closed
P01-02-001	HANDICRAFT - EMPOWERING WOMEN CRAFT WORKERS	Handicraft Cooperative Society	TC		C	B	11/20/02	10/31/03	63,668.00	
P02-01-003	Project -Water Leak Detection - Pilot Project in Nicosia	TCC Nicosia Municipality	X		B	B	9/1/01	2/28/03	132,717.66	Closed
P02-01-004	Water Supply Pilot Project	TCC Nicosia Municipality	X		B	B	12/15/03	10/31/04	424,336.00	
P02-03-001	Marathasa Dam	Water Development Department		X	A	B	6/20/02	4/30/03	126,483.00	
P02-03-002	Mouflon Research of Cyprus - Direct execution of Contract WSE-PS03-4906	UNDP/UNOPS		X	A	B	8/15/03	10/29/04	53,603.00	
P02-03-002	Mouflon Research of Cyprus ( Direct execution)	UNDP/UNOPS	X		A	B	8/15/03	10/29/04	5,585.00	
P02-03-002	Mouflon Research of Cyprus - GCC	Ministry of Interior / Game Fund		X	A	B	8/15/03	12/15/04	70,765.00	
P02-03-002	Mouflon Research of Cyprus - TCC	Veterinary Department	X		A	B	8/15/03	10/29/04	46,020.00	
P02-04-001	WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR CYPRUS AND ACTIVITY ACTION PLAN	SWECO International	X	X	A	A	1/13/03	7/14/03	144,420.37	
P02-04-002	Waste Management - Training the Trainers	NGO: CYMEPA		X	A	C	12/15/03	9/30/04	8,000.00	
P02-04-002	Waste Management - Training the Trainers	NGO: SID/EREC	X	X	A	C	12/20/03	9/30/04	8,000.00	
P02-04-003	Inventory of Biodegradable Waste Sources in Urban and Rural Areas in Cyprus	NGO: AKTI		X	A	B	12/15/03	9/30/04	46,966.00	
P02-04-003	HRM - Inventory of Biodegradable Waste Sources in Urban and Rural Areas in Cyprus	NGO: ESL via HRM	X		A	B	12/15/03	9/30/04	40,606.00	
P02-06-001	CONTROL OF PINE PROCESSIONARY CATERPIPLAR - OBMO 60102 - 2002 AND OBMO 60103 - 2003	TCC Forestry Department	X		A	B	9/5/02	8/31/03	357,311.44	
P02-06-001	EIA for Processionary Caterpillar				B	B	11/26/00	1/12/01	75,959.40	Closed
P02-06-002	Forestry Project - Reforestation and Silviculture	GCC Forestry Department		X	A	B	10/1/01	10/31/02	153,359.55	Closed
P02-06-002	MANAGGEMENT OF STATE FORESTS	GCC Forestry Department		X	A	C	4/1/03	1/31/04	257,408.00	
P02-07-001	Project Environmental Protection - Initial Assessment of Ambient Air Quality in Cyprus	Environment Department	X	X	B	A	7/10/01	11/30/03	52,472.37	
P02-07-001	Mobile Air Quality Station Repair, Maintenance and Training	Medisell Co. (Private Company)			A	C	9/10/01	9/30/03	123,343.00	
P02-07-001	Preliminary Assessment of Ambient Air in Cyprus	Environment Department	X	X	B	C	12/1/01	11/30/03	773,633.00	
P02-07-001	Environmental Protection - Initial Assessment of Ambient Air Quality in Cyprus	Environment Department	X	X	B	C	3/1/00	5/31/03	20,000.00	
P02-08-001	Rehabilitation of Trunk 'E' TCC - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	EMEK	X		B	B	8/22/01	12/31/02	542,997.46	Closed
P02-08-001	Rehab Trunk E	Cybarco Ltd		X	B	B	2/5/01	5/30/02	727,191.25	Closed
P02-08-001	Rehab Trunk E	Cybarco Ltd		X	B	B	1/22/01	5/10/01	428,370.54	Closed
P02-08-002	Integrated Monitoring and Early Warning System for the Nicosia STP	GCC & TCC Municipalities	X	X	A	A	11/15/00	4/30/04	300,694.00	
P02-08-003	Sewerage Connection of Yenikent-Geunyeli	TCC Municipality	X		A	A	10/1/02	4/30/03	39,000.00	
P02-08-004	Nicosia Sewerage System - Extension in TCC - Contract closed at 27/11/03	TCC Municipality	X		A	A	9/4/00	4/30/01	220,841.41	Closed
P02-08-005	Sewerage Treatment Plan	GCC Municipality		X	A	A	2/24/99	7/27/00	3,007,069.37	Closed
P02-08-005	STP - Pipes GRP	TCC Municipality	X		B	B	3/2/99	7/30/99	318,802.38	Closed
P02-08-005	Sewerage G. & E. Thermosolars Ltd. - CANCELLED -						3/1/99	11/30/99	24,470.00	Closed
P02-08-005	STP - Penstocks						3/1/99	10/30/99	225,643.75	Closed
P02-08-005	STP - Sluice Valves (4 Nos)						3/1/99	10/30/99	6,652.87	Closed
P02-08-005	STP - Generator						3/1/99	10/30/99	20,746.00	Closed
P02-08-005	STP - Automatic Wastewater Sampling & Measuring Equipment (2 Nos)	GCC Municipality		X	B	C	3/1/99	10/30/99	23,580.00	Closed
P02-08-005	STP - Mechanical Screens (2 Nos)						3/1/99	10/30/99	136,200.00	Closed
P02-08-005	MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE NICOSIA SANITARY SEWERAGE - Contract closed at 27/11/03	TCC & GCC Municipality	X	X	A	B	3/19/03	6/12/03	9,497.78	Closed
P02-09-001	Monitoring and Protection of Sea Turtles	TCC Department of Environment	X		B	C	6/1/99	10/30/99	27,671.00	Closed
P02-09-001	Monitoring and Protection of Sea Turtles in the TCC (2000)	TCC Department of Environment	X		B	C	5/21/01	12/20/01	53,448.60	Closed
P02-09-001	Monitoring and Protection of Sea Turtles in the TCC-2002	TCC Department of Environment	X		B	C	5/1/02	11/30/03	65,521.74	
P02-09-001	Monitoring and Protection of Sea Turtles in the TCC (2000)	TCC Department of Environment	X		B	C	6/1/00	10/30/00	37,393.11	Closed
P02-10-001	Monitoring Dust Pollution (Particulate Matter) in Workshops and Factories	ETEK		X	B	B	7/1/02	8/8/03	47,600.00	
P03-02-001	Construction of Underground Passage in the Moat between Barbaro Bastion and Loredano Bastion- Contract closed at 27/11/03	IA -Town Planning Authority (thru HRM)	X		B	A	7/1/02	8/15/03	89,927.50	Closed
P03-02-002	SURVEY OF THE BUFFER ZONE - PHASE II	IA -Town Planning Authority (thru HRM)	X		A	A	7/1/02	11/30/03	121,568.04	
P03-02-002	SURVEY OF THE BUFFER ZONE - PHASE II	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises ltd)		X	A	A	8/1/02	11/30/03	153,518.20	
P03-02-002	Nicosia Master Plan, Buffer Zone Emergency Support of Buildings	IA -Town Planning Authority (thru HRM)	X		A	A	10/1/03	4/30/04	102,727.98	
P03-02-002	Nicosia Master Plan, Buffer Zone Emergency Support of Building	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises ltd)		X	A	A	10/1/03	4/30/04	99,576.00	
P03-02-002	NMP - Buffer Zone Survey GCC	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises ltd)		X	A	A	11/1/00	9/30/01	75,463.36	
P03-02-002	NMP - Buffer Zone Survey TCC	IA -Town Planning Authority (thru HRM)	X		A	A	11/1/00	9/30/01	80,232.52	

P03-02-003	Nicosia Master Plan/TCC	IA - Nicosia * Turkish Municipality (thru HRM)	x		A	A	10/1/98	6/30/99	91,055.32	Closed	
P03-02-003	Arab Ahmet Rehabilitation Project-Dervish Pasha Parking Lot	IA - Nicosia * Turkish Municipality (thru HRM)	x		A	A	1/2/00	6/30/00	78,888.21	Closed	
P03-02-003	NMP-Arab Ahmet (1999-2001) Upgrading Streets	IA - Nicosia * Turkish Municipality (thru HRM)	x		A	A	2/15/01	9/30/01	311,811.82	Closed	
P03-02-003	NICOSIA MASTER PLAN - ARAB AHMET STREET UPGRADE - Contract closed at 27/11/03	IA - Nicosia * Turkish Municipality (thru HRM)	x		A	A	11/1/01	9/30/02	217,405.70	Closed	
P03-02-003	NICOSIA MASTER PLAN, ARAB AHMET REHABILITATION UPGRADE OF STREETS-PHASE 3	IA - Nicosia * Turkish Municipality (thru HRM)	x		A	A	11/1/02	10/31/03	355,000.00		
P03-02-003	Arab Ahmet Rehabilitation/Roccas Bastion Car Park	IA - Nicosia * Turkish Municipality (thru HRM)	x		A	A	2/1/00	11/30/00	76,217.39	Closed	
P03-02-003	RESTAURANT BUILDING	IA - Nicosia * Turkish Municipality (thru HRM)	x		A	A	1/1/02	9/30/02	46,486.86	Closed	
P03-02-003	NMP - Arab Ahmet (Theatre Building) Contract No. WSE-PS-485	IA - Nicosia * Turkish Municipality (thru HRM)	x		A	A	6/20/00	6/30/02	395,420.67	Closed	
P03-02-004	New Vision for the Core of Nicosia - TCC	IA - Town Planning Authority (thru HRM)	X		B	A	11/1/03	10/31/04	136,313.11		
P03-02-004	Nicosia Master Plan, New vision for the Core of Nicosia	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises Ltd)		X	A	A	11/1/03	10/30/04	202,694.00		
P03-02-006	Nicosia Master Plan/Chrysaliniotissa Rehabilitation Project (1998)/GCC	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises Ltd)		X	A	A	1/7/98	3/31/99	400,175.74	Closed	
P03-02-006	NMP-Chrysaliniotissa Rehabilitation Phase I	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises Ltd)		X	A	A	1/1/99	12/31/00	842,782.13	Closed	
P03-02-006	Chrysaliniotissa Rehabilitation Project - Phase 2	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises Ltd)		X	A	A	11/15/99	12/31/00	209,701.01	Closed	
P03-02-006	Project -NMP- Chrysaliniotissa Kindergarten Project	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises Ltd)		X	A	A	12/1/01	1/31/04	349,065.00		
P03-02-006	NMP - Chrysaliniotissa Rehabilitation Project (1999-2001) Phase 3b	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises Ltd)		X	A	A	11/15/00	9/30/01	314,118.89	Closed	
P03-02-006	Chrysaliniotissa Rehabilitation - Phase 3a	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises Ltd)		X	A	A	1/1/00	8/31/01	501,300.11	Closed	
P03-02-007	Nicosia Master Plan/Pedios River Cleaning and Survey project	IA - Nicosia * Turkish Municipality (thru HRM)	X		C	B	2/15/01	11/30/01	353,454.75	Closed	
P03-02-007	Turkish Cypriot Biological Society for the project "Flora and Fauna Inventory, Stagnant Water Sampling and Analysis	Biological Association	X		B	B	6/7/01	7/30/01	42,158.44	Closed	
P03-02-007	NGO - CYMEPA for the project - The Pedios River Cleaning	CYMEPA: Cyprus Marine Environmental Protection Association			GC	C	A	9/3/01	12/31/01	20,438.20	Closed
P03-02-007	FLORA AND FAUNA SURVEY/GCC OBMO 58740 AND 58741	Cyprus Wildlife association		X	A	B	8/1/02	4/30/03	27,325.00		
P03-02-007	THE PEDIEOS RIVER CLEANING IN STROVOLOS	CYMEPA: Cyprus Marine Environmental Protection Association			GC	C	A	9/2/02	12/31/02	22,190.83	Closed
P03-02-010	Improvement Scheme in Ay. Ioannis and Taht-el-Kale Quarters Taht-el-Kale Monastir (2003-2004)	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises Ltd)		X	c	A	7/1/03	4/30/04	196,079.00		
P03-03-001	Preservation of Venetian Walls/GCC	Department of Antiquities		X	A	B	1/9/98	1/31/99	85,846.73	Closed	
P03-03-001	Restoration of Loredano Bastion and its Wings	TCC Department of Antiquities	X		A	B	6/1/99	12/31/99	75,731.76	Closed	
P03-03-001	Preservation of Venetian Walls (GCC) -Closed	Department of Antiquities		X	A	B	1/7/99	2/28/01	581,787.49	Closed	
P03-03-001	Venetian Walls/TCC - Restoration of the Quirini Bastion and its Wings	TCC Department of Antiquities	X		A	B	6/20/01	2/28/02	241,079.25	Closed	
P03-03-001	RESTORATION OF THE ROCCAS BASTION AND ITS WINGS - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	TCC Department of Antiquities	X		A	B	4/2/02	12/31/02	90,367.25	Closed	
P03-03-001	VENETIAN WALLS RESTORATION OF ROCCAS BASTION GCC - Contract closed at 27/11/03	Department of Antiquities		X	A	B	5/13/02	5/31/03	96,158.85	Closed	
P03-03-001	RESTORATION OF THE PODOCATARO BASTION & CARAFFA WINGS	Department of Antiquities		X	A	B	6/15/02	2/15/03	321,775.79	Closed	
P03-03-001	RESTORATION OF FLATRO BASTION & WINGS GCC	Department of Antiquities		X	A	B	3/3/03	11/30/03	212,040.00		
P03-03-001	RESTORATION OF THE FLATRO BASTION & WINGS TCC	TCC Department of Antiquities	X		A	B	3/3/03	12/31/03	138,119.58		
P03-03-001	Restoration of Venetian Walls CRSC	Department of Antiquities		X	A	B	1/1/04	12/30/04	568,574.00		
P03-03-001	Restoration of Venetian Walls/TCC - Moat between Barbaro Bastion and Kyrenia gate	TCC Department of Antiquities	X		A	B	9/1/00	5/31/01	151,961.33	Closed	
P03-03-001	Restoration of Venetian Walls/TCC - Barbaro Bastion	TCC Department of Antiquities	X		A	B	3/10/00	11/20/00	461,620.42	Closed	
P03-03-003	Project Venetian Walls "Engomi Ruins - Fencing"	TCC Department of Antiquities	X		A	B	9/2/01	10/9/01	54,619.03	Closed	
P03-04-001	SEISMIC HAZARD AND RISK ASSESSEMENT PHASE II - HRM	TCC Geological Department	X		A	B	12/1/01	10/31/03	179,258.00		
P03-04-001	SEISMIC HAZARD AND RISK ASSESSEMENT PHASE II	Geological Department		X	A	B	1/12/01	11/30/03	227,854.84		
P03-04-001	chamber of civil engineers	ETEK		X	C	C	1/1/02	12/31/02	43,664.18	Closed	
P03-04-001	SEISMIC HAZARD ASSESSEMENT	Geological Department		X	B	B	1/1/02	7/31/03	216,193.00		
P03-04-001	Seismic Hazard and Risk assessment (Phase II) - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Geological Department		X	B	B	1/5/02	12/20/02	71,869.43	Closed	
P03-04-001	Seismic Hazard Assessment Phase 1 GCC - Contract closed at 28/11/03	Geological Department		X	B	B	9/1/00	10/30/01	298,895.52	Closed	
P03-04-001	Seismic Hazard Assessment Phase 1 TCC	TCC Geological Department	X		B	B	9/1/00	10/30/01	285,182.50	Closed	
P03-05-001	AA - Ancillary Buildings (Contract No. WSE-PS01-4059)J&A PHILIPPOU	J&A Philippou (company - direct execution by BDP)		x	C	C	5/14/01	6/22/01	33,600.00	Closed	
P03-05-001	Apostolos Andreas Project - R and R of ancillaries	Mesan Ltd (company - direct execution by BDP)	x		C	C	10/8/01	6/30/03	868,192.00		
P03-05-001	Apostolos Andreas Project - Landscaping Designs and Supervision Phase 1 and 2 - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Dogan Gurgun (company- direct execution by BDP)	x		B	C	10/26/01	9/30/03	39,896.60	Closed	
P03-05-001	Apostolos Andreas Project - Supervision of the Works for the Ancillary Buildings - Contract closed at	Canbil insaat ltd (company - direct execution by BDP)	x		B	C	11/8/01	5/31/03	68,025.08	Closed	
P03-05-001	LANDSCAPE PHASE 1A APOSTOLOS ANDREAS MONASTERY	Candemir Construction ltd (company - direct execution by BDP)	X		C	C	2/4/02	11/30/02	75,254.00		
P03-05-001	LANDSCAPE PHASE 1A APOSTOLOS ANDREAS MONASTERY	J&A Philippou (company - direct execution by BDP)		x	C	C	5/1/02	12/31/02	61,039.14	Closed	
P03-05-001	APOSTOLOS ANDREAS MONASTERY, LANDSCAPE AND CONSTRUCTION WOKRKS, PHASE IIA	Abohorlu Instaat ltd (company - direct execution by	X		C	C	12/18/02	11/30/03	108,056.18		
P03-05-001	TREE PLANTING AND FENCING AT APOSTOLO ANDREAS MONASTERY	Dogan Gurgun (company- direct execution by BDP)	X		C	C	12/7/00	4/30/01	57,511.46	Closed	
P03-05-001	Memmet Yildirim Architecture & Restoration Office for the Refurbishing of the Apostolos Andreas	Mehmet yildirim (company - direct execution by BDP)	X		C	C	3/20/00	6/14/00	22,630.00	Closed	
P03-05-002	Production of Video-HST and AA						7/1/02	7/8/02	2,299.98	Closed	
P03-05-002	HST - Landscape Phase 1 Contract No. WSE-PS01-4019	Bodeker International consultants			A	C	3/20/01	5/20/01	97,528.23	Closed	
P03-05-002	HST - Landscape Phase 2A Contract No. WSE-PS01-4044	Pantelis Gardens Designs Ltd		X	A	C	4/20/01	10/30/01	151,731.48	Closed	
P03-05-002	HST - Ancillary Buildings (Contract No. WSE-PS01-4054)	ETEK		X	A	C	5/9/01	12/31/03	110,874.00	Closed	
P03-05-002	HST-Studies and Monitoring	Technocontrolli Spa			A	C	8/1/01	3/31/02	57,347.27	Closed	

P03-05-002	HALA SULTAN TEKKE									11/1/01	4/10/02	126,071.61	Closed
P03-05-002	Repair and Renovation of HST Ancillary Buildings	Cybarco Ltd		X	B	B				2/8/02	8/31/03	1,076,165.00	
P03-05-002	LANDSCAPE MAINTENANCE	Magistratos Gardens		X	B	B				6/17/02	6/16/03	40,480.00	
P03-05-002	Hala Sultan Tekke Releve Contract No. WSE-PS-4017	Technocontrolli Spa		INT	C	C				8/9/00	11/20/00	18,350.18	Closed
P03-05-002	Hala Sultan Tekke Landscape Designs - Contract closed at 27/11/03	Bodeker International consultants		INT	C	C				1/12/00	12/31/00	9,634.67	Closed
P03-05-004	Restoration of Pentakomo Spiritual Centres - Contact with President of The Penatokomo Community Council Mr Christakis Filinnoi	Municipality of Pentakomo		X	B	B				12/1/03	10/31/04	630,929.00	
P03-08-001	Rehabilitation on Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque.1/10/03 is the assumed starting date. Per contract starting date is 26/9/03			X	A	B				10/1/03	12/31/03	29,000.00	
P03-11-001	LAPTA VILLAGE HERITAGE CONSERVATION/LAPITHOS VILLAGE	Lapithos TCC Municipality		X	A	B				3/1/03	11/30/03	75,153.11	
P04-02-002	Intercultural Education - Curr Dev	Pedagogical Institute		X	B	A						26,766.00	
P04-02-003	BI-COMMUNAL INTERNET QUIZ GAME FOR STUDENTS	Hypermedia Ltd.		X	A	C				10/1/03	3/7/04	65,844.00	
P04-02-004	What does it mean to think Historically?	What Does it Mean to think Historically Approach To Teaching and Learning History			GC	A	A			12/15/03	6/30/04	20,782.00	
P04-02-005	Rock Concert in Paphos 31/8/03	The Art and Wild Nature Foundation			GC	A	A			11/10/03	11/10/04	43,102.00	
P04-02-005	Artbridges of Cyprus	The Art and Wild Nature Foundation				A	A						
P04-03-003	Uniting Though Traditional Music	Cyprus Music Network & Ethnomusicology Research programme			GC	A	B			1/1/04	10/31/04	64,867.00	
P04-03-005	Cyprus Music Youth	Philokolia Music Foundation		X	A	B				10/1/03	6/1/04	58,824.00	
P04-06-001	MARKET RESEARCH ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CIMME6 CHILDREN'S TV SERIES	AC Nielsen		X	C	C				10/1/03	2/10/04	21,375.00	
P05-01-001	Echinococcosis Eradication(GCC) - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			5/1/99	4/30/00	147,836.51	Closed
P05-01-001	Echinococcosis Eradication(TCC)(Phases 1,2 and 3) - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			6/1/99	4/30/00	156,390.46	Closed
P05-01-001	Project -Eradication of Echinococcosis/Hydattosis in Cyprus (2001-2001) - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			9/1/01	9/30/02	169,533.46	Closed
P05-01-001	ECHINOCOCCOSIS ERADICATION PROJECT - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			10/1/01	10/30/02	84,781.64	Closed
P05-01-001	SLAUGHTERHOUSES(PART OF ECHIN.ERADICATION IN TCC) - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			1/1/02	12/31/02	239,198.36	Closed
P05-01-001	ECHINOCOCCOSIS ERADICATION GCC	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			1/1/03	12/30/03	155,455.00	
P05-01-001	ECHINOCOCCOSIS ERADICATION /TCC	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			1/1/03	3/20/04	418,014.88	
P05-01-001	Echinococcosis Eradication Project in the TCC Year 2 - Phases 1, 2, 3, and 4	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			7/1/00	6/30/01	154,938.81	Closed
P05-01-001	Eradication of Echinococcosis/Hydattosis in Cyprus 2000	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			7/1/00	6/30/01	128,780.98	Closed
P05-01-002	Investigation & Elimination of Sheep and Goat Brucellosis (1999)	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			1/7/99	3/31/00	192,430.59	Closed
P05-01-002	Eradication of Brucellosis- Equipment and Supplies	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			1/7/99	3/31/00	76,800.78	Closed
P05-01-002	Eradication of Brucellosis(TCC)	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			7/1/99	3/31/00	245,782.13	Closed
P05-01-002	BRUCELLOSIS ERADICATION PROJECT PHASE I & 2 - DIRECT EXECUTION	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			4/12/03	5/15/04	364,926.00	
P05-01-002	INVESTIGATION & ELIMINATION OF CATTLE BRUCELLOSIS/GCC - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 10/12/03	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			1/1/02	12/30/02	68,496.10	Closed
P05-01-002	Investigation and Elimination of Brucellosis in cattle /GCC	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			4/12/03	5/15/04	226,296.00	
P05-01-002	BRUCELLOSIS ERADICATION IN THE TCC YEAR 2 - PHASES 1&2	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			4/12/03	5/15/04	90,370.00	
P05-01-002	Brucellosis Project in the TCC Year 2 - Phases 1 and 2 - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			1/15/00	6/30/03	471,627.38	Closed
P05-01-002	Investigation & Elimination of Sheep and Brucellosis Year 2 - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 10/12/03	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			10/1/01	12/30/02	92,303.54	Closed
P05-01-003	Salmonella in Poultry and Poultry Products - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	C	B			1/6/99	12/31/00	310,465.26	Closed
P05-01-004	VIRUS PILOT PROJECT	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture			X	A	A			10/1/02	5/31/04	208,000.00	
P05-01-004	TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR CONTROL OF VIRAL DISEASES (PILOT PROJECT)	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture		X		A	A			5/1/02	5/31/04	160,000.00	
P05-02-001	Plant Protection (GCC)	Ministry of Agriculture & Natural Resources			X	A	B			2/1/00	12/31/00	270,483.95	Closed
P05-02-001	Plant Protection -Field Rat and Medfly Campaigns	TCC Department of Agriculture		X		A	B			3/1/00	12/31/00	126,000.13	Closed
P05-02-003	RAT CONTROL/PLANT PROTECTION	TCC Department of Agriculture		X		A	B			12/15/01	10/31/03	423,230.00	
P05-02-003	Field Rat and Medfly Campaign	Ministry of Agriculture & Natural Resources			X	A	B			12/31/01	10/31/03	286,153.00	
P05-02-004	TC Partnership with AKTI on Promoting Organic Agriculture in Cyprus	Veterinary Department / Ministry of Agriculture		X		A	A			12/1/03	4/28/04	3,200.00	
P05-02-004	Promoting Organic Agriculture in Cyprus	Veterinary Department / Department of Agriculture			X	A	A			12/1/03	2/28/04	9,670.00	
P05-03-001	Recruitment of Medical Director for The Cyprus Institute of Neurology & Genetics									9/1/99	2/29/00	15,055.01	Closed
P05-03-002	CARE FOR THE ELDERLY IN KARPAS AREA PENISULA REGION	IA - Health Authority (thru HRM)		X		A	B			4/1/01	4/30/03	114,506.49	
P05-03-002	Development of the Chronic Diseases Hospital: The Formation of an Interdisciplinary Team for Palliative	IA - Health Authority (thru HRM)		X		C	B			7/1/01	8/19/02	84,969.00	
P05-03-002	CARE FOR THE ELDERLY IN THE KARPAS AREA PENISULA - Contract closed at 27/11/03	IA - Health Authority (thru HRM)		X		A	B			5/1/03	11/15/03	69,471.62	
P05-03-002	Project -Determination of the Risk Groups of Breast and Ovarian Cancer	IA - Health Authority (thru HRM)		X		C	B			2/1/01	4/30/01	19,998.74	Closed
P05-03-003	SELENIUM CONTENT OF CYPRUS SOILS	Cancer Research Foundation			TC	B	C			10/31/03	10/31/04	57,800.00	
P05-03-005	Male Urogenital Cancer and its Relationship to HPV Infection	Mendel Centre for Biomedical Sciences				GC				12/22/03	10/31/04	36,100.00	
P05-03-005	Type and frequency of Human Papilloma Virus Infection in Cyprus	Mendel Centre for Biomedical Sciences				GC	C						
P06-03-001	Communications and Public Relations Services	Action PR		X	n/a	n/a				7/22/02	12/31/03	186,460.58	
P06-04-001	Cyprus MediaNet: Technology for Peacebuilding	Cambridge Foundation for Peace			A	A				1/27/03	9/3/03	220,000.00	
P06-04-001	NICOSIA MASTER PLAN, INFORMATION CENTRE	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises ltd)		X		A	A			10/1/03	5/31/04	50,000.00	
P06-04-002	NICOSIA MASTER PLAN, AMATEUR PHOTOGRAPHY COMPETITION	IA - Nicosia Municipality (Public Enterprises ltd) & NGO - Cyprus Photo graphic society		X		A	A			9/15/03	1/31/04	12,500.00	
P06-04-002	Nicosia Master Plan, Amateur Photography Competition	IA - Nicosia "Turkish" Municipality (thru HRM) + 2 NGOs (Photo study group Cyprus Turkish Photo		X		A	A			10/1/03	1/31/04	12,500.00	

P07-01-001	Introducing Migrant and Resident Birds of Cyprus to the Public	North Cyprus Society for the Protection of Birds and Nature (KIKISKOP)	TC		C	C	7/25/02	6/30/03	23,184.00	
P07-01-001	BIRD DIVERSITY & AGR. INTERNSIFICATION IN CYPRUS	Cyprus Conservation Foundation Environmental Study Centre		GC	A	A	11/25/02	1/30/04	58,176.00	
P07-01-002	STEPS FOR PREVENTION OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY - OBMO 58339 AND 58340	Cyprus Turkish Mental Health Organisation	TC		A	A	7/30/02	12/30/03	71,035.71	
P07-01-002	STEPS FOR PREVENTION OF DRUG ABUSE IN CYPRUS	TOLMI: The Open Therapeutic Community of Addicted People		GC	B	B	9/25/02	12/31/03	51,564.13	
	Pilot Study for Prevention of Abuse	KENTHEA		GC	C	C	9-Jan-99	11-Jan-01	\$89,635.00	Closed
P07-01-003	Freidreich's Ataxia Screening in the Population originating from the Paphos District of Cyprus	Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics (CING)		GC	C	C	4/2/01	10/31/02	79,903.17	Closed
P07-01-004	AIDS-Free Cyprus - Educational Programme on HIV/AIDS/STD	Cyprus Girl Guides Association		GC	B	A	12/11/00	1/31/03	78,936.08	Closed
	Protection from HIV/AIDS and other STDs	Cyprus Girl Guides Association		GC	B	A	07/10/03	22/12/03	\$10,530.00	Closed
P07-01-005	Cyprus Association of Professional Foresters for the project - Conservation of Griffon Vulture in Cyprus - ORMO-38852 - ORMO 58174-1	Cyprus Association of Foresters		GC	C	C	1/15/01	12/30/02	104,757.50	Closed
P07-01-006	Swelling Clays, 'A Continuous Threat to the Built Environment of Cyprus	ETEK		GC	A	B	3/29/01	12/15/02	97,629.21	Closed
P07-01-006	Swelling Clays 'A Continuous Threat to the Built Environment of Cyprus'	Chamber of Mining, Metallurgical and geological Engineers- Swelling Clays	TC		A	B	2/1/02	12/15/02	93,750.00	Closed
P07-01-007	Folk Art Institute	Has der	TC		B	A	1/20/01	6/30/02	106,953.22	Closed
	Jasmine Garden Internet Cafe	Has der	TC		C	B				
P07-01-008	ProAction for the project "Agrotourism: Feasibility Study"	Agrotourism: Feasibility Study	TC		C	C	3/26/01	12/31/01	12,124.00	Closed
P07-01-009	Neurological and Genetic Networking of the two Communities (Neuronet)	Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics (CING)		GC	C	C	2/26/01	12/31/02	81,712.53	Closed
P07-01-010	NGO - Cyprus Neuroscience and Technology Institute for the project - Technology for Peace	NGO		GC	B	B	3/1/01	4/30/04	105,247.02	
P07-01-011	Research on Cypriot Women Education and Employment	NGO	TC		C	C	6/20/01	2/25/04	61,134.00	
P07-01-012	Marine Debris Accumulation Along the Coastline	SID (Society for International Development) EREC (Environmental Research And Education Center)	TC		B	B	6/25/01	7/31/02	12,629.95	Closed
P07-01-013	Environmental Education: Teacher's Manual	Pro Action	TC		C	C	1/15/01	10/31/02	45,710.44	Closed
P07-01-014	STUDY ON THE OLD TOWN OF LIMASSOL	Cyprus Conservation Foundation Environmental Study Centre		GC	B	A	11/15/02	11/14/03	62,544.95	
P07-01-015	Epidemiological Study of the Thyroid Disease in Cyprus	Institute of Scientific Research & Applications		GC	C	C	3/10/01	6/30/02	95,750.56	Closed
P07-01-016	Educational Resources for Children: Traditional Cypriot Folk Tales			GC	B	B	7/1/02	8/31/03	21,161.00	
P07-01-017	Research Studies on House Form and Culture Within the Context of Cypriot Traditional Settlements"	Cyprus Civil Engineers and Architects Association:	TC		B	C	11/10/01	10/30/03	97,258.00	
P07-01-017	Restoration & Maintenance of Traditional Settlements - Contract closed on 27 Nov 03	Chamber of CT Architects		GC	B	C	1/10/00	10/13/03	72,551.82	Closed
P07-01-018	Cyprus 2001, Paralel Trips	Artimage (Panicos Chrisanthou)		GC	A	A	4/2/01	2/15/03	100,000.00	
P07-01-019	"Women Research Library	TAUW Turkish Association of University Women	TC		C	C	6/20/01	2/25/04	57,905.00	
P07-01-020	The Community Centre	Association of Women to Support Living (KAYAD)	TC		A	B	5/1/01	9/30/03	129,528.41	Closed
P07-01-020	CULTURAL AND SPORT ACTIVITIES TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN SOCIETY	AKOVA Community Centre	TC		C	A	10/18/02	9/30/03	52,647.56	Closed
P07-01-020	Rural Community Centre for Educational, Cultural and Sports Activities to Strengthen the Role Of Women in Societv Phase 2	AKOVA Community Centre	TC		B	A	1/1/04	10/30/04	50,000.00	
P07-01-021	Ecologically Important Areas	Society for International Development	TC		C	C	8/25/01	12/15/02	12,470.00	
P07-01-022	A Book on Cypriot Painters	New Cyprus Association		GC	B	A	11/1/01	10/31/03	77,344.00	
P07-01-023	LIVING WELL WITH DIABETES-SUMMER CAMP	Cyprus Turkish Diabetes Association	TC		C	C	7/1/02	9/8/03	16,226.66	Closed
P07-01-024	Arizona State University for the project -From Separation to Collaboration: Keys to Successful Cooperation on Joint Projects in Cyprus and Between Greece and Turkey -	Arizona State University	DX				3/1/00	11/30/02	100,749.27	Closed
P07-01-025	Environmental Education for Educators	Peace Child International	TC	GC	A	C	1/1/00	12/31/00	17,354.17	Closed
P07-01-025	Environmental Education for Teachers and Curriculum Development		TC		C	C	1/29/01	12/31/02	32,564.09	Closed
P07-01-026	Monitoring of Pollution by Garbage on Cyprus Beaches	CYMEPA: Cyprus Marine Environmental Protection Association		GC	B	B	7/1/99	3/31/00	35,838.41	Closed
P07-01-026	Monitoring of Pollution by Garbage on Cyprus Beaches - Contract closed at 27/11/03				B	B	6/15/01	1/31/02	36,250.27	Closed
P07-01-026	Monitoring Pollution by Garbage Monitoring	CYMEPA: Cyprus Marine Environmental Protection Association		GC	B	B	9/25/00	8/30/01	35,375.20	Closed
P07-01-027	Pilot Study for Primary Prevention of Abuse of Illegal Psychactive Substances in Four Villages of the GCC and TCC	KENTHEA		GC	C	C	9/1/99	8/31/00	37,587.29	Closed
P07-01-028	Youth Promoting Peace: Bi-communal Youth Peace Activities	"Youth Promoting Peace:		GC	A	A	5/15/01	12/31/02	45,504.16	Closed
P07-01-028	YOUTH PROMOTING PEACE BI-COMMUNAL YOUTH PEACE ACTIVITIES II ORMO - 60302 AND 60303	"Youth Promoting Peace:		GC	A	A	10/14/02	12/15/03	54,141.29	
P07-01-029	Empowerment of the Deaf-Cypriot Community	Pancyprian Organization for the Deaf		GC	C	C	9/1/99	8/31/00	39,039.89	Closed
P07-01-030	Federal Education	Cyprus Center of Federal Studies and Self Governance		GC	C	B	11/25/00	6/30/02	55,550.11	Closed
P07-01-031	CYPRUS PATIENTS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT - Patients' Right Charter -	"CYPRUS PATIENTS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT		GC	B	B	6/1/00	4/30/01	29,292.77	Closed
P07-01-032	Front Line Care for the Mentally Ill and Their Families	Advocacy Group for the Mentally Ill		GC	C	C	1/1/00	12/31/01	44,942.01	Closed
P07-01-032	Mental Patients and their families - Contract closed at 27/11/03	Advocacy Group for the Mentally Ill		GC	C	C	2/1/00	12/31/00	16,635.74	Closed
P07-01-033	Recycle a Can to Repel Cancer - Contract closed at 27/11/03	Environment and Energy Association	TC		C	B	7/22/02	11/15/03	29,914.44	Closed
P07-01-033	CANS FOR KIDS - Contract closed on 27/11/03	Cyprus Anthropoc Society for Children		GC	C	C	3/1/00	6/30/01	63,416.71	Closed
P07-01-034	"Production of instructional videos for the Deaf and concerned groups/individuals"	Pancyprian Association of Parents of Hearing Impaired Children		GC	C	C	3/15/00	9/30/01	39,076.67	Closed
P07-01-035	Screening for Lead Exposure in Children	Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics (CING)		GC	C	C	3/15/00	2/28/01	60,871.68	Closed
P07-01-036	WEEPING ISLAND	UNITED CYPRIOTS FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION		GC	A	C	8/1/00	1/31/01	23,099.43	Closed

P07-01-037	Assistance for those affected by dyslexia - Contract closed at 27/11/03	North Cyprus Dyslexia Association (NCDA)	TC		B	B	8/12/02	9/30/03	74,317.68	Closed
P07-01-037	Assistance for Dyslexic Children	Cyprus Dyslexia Association		GC	B	B	3/1/00	9/30/01	76,479.66	Closed
P07-01-038	Molecular and histochemical Markers of Neoplasia (Contract No. WSE-PS-470) OBMO-28195	Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics (CING)		GC	C	C	4/3/00	9/30/01	74,219.17	Closed
P07-01-039	Environmental Education Workshop on Freshwater Issues for Educators	ECOGNOSIA		GC	B	B	10/16/00	10/15/01	24,042.29	Closed
P07-01-040	TRAINING OF TEACHERS OF MAINSTREAM SCHOOLS	Cyprus Rehabilitation Councelling Association		GC	B	B	7/4/03	6/29/04	52,942.00	
P07-01-040	Bicommunal Rehabilitation Center	Cyprus Rehabilitation Councelling Association		GC	C	C	12/30/00	12/20/01	70,688.59	Closed
P07-01-041	Inherited Thrombophilia Testing of the Cypriot Population .	Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics (CING)		GC	C	C	1/1/01	12/31/02	104,943.29	Closed
P07-01-042	Mediation Centre Project	TC Mediation Association:	TC		B	A	3/20/01	12/31/02	57,730.80	Closed
P07-01-042	The establishment of a Mediation Center and peace-building in Cyprus through training in Conflict - Management Skills and Mediation OBMO-20588 - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	Mediation of Association		GC	B	A	6/15/00	9/30/01	31,261.61	Closed
P07-01-043	Cardiovascular Disease Prevention Campaign .	Cyprus Heart Foundation		GC	C	C	4/2/00	1/31/01	47,056.86	Closed
P07-01-044	Cyprus Short Course (Summer School)	United World Colleges Cyprus		DX	A	B	1/15/01	7/30/01	30,878.74	Closed
P07-01-045	Olive Trees: Inventory and Assessment	Pro Action		TC	C	C	11/13/00	12/31/01	20,341.36	Closed
P07-01-046	Working Donkey Welfare in Cyprus	Friends of the Cyprus Donkey		GC	B	C	11/13/00	6/30/02	57,945.28	Closed
P07-01-047	Understanding Bi-communal Perceptions and Attitudes	Peace Centre of Cyprus		GC	A	A	6/1/00	8/31/01	66,209.00	
P07-01-048	bi-communal choir for peace in cyprus OBMO 59846 AND 59847	Bi-communal Choir		GC	A	A	9/2/02	9/1/03	20,271.00	
P07-01-048	Bi-communal Choir	Bi-communal Choir		GC	A	A	1/1/00	12/31/00	48,228.69	Closed
P07-01-049	SETTING UP A CONFERENCE & EDUCATIONAL CENTRE AT THE CYPRUS TURKISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION(CTMC) OBMO-59492-11 - Contract closed at 27/11/03	Cyprus Turkish Medical Council	TC		C	C	8/15/02	7/30/03	118,855.51	Closed
P07-01-050	MED SEA CLEAN UP - OBMO 60122 AND 60123	CYMEPA: Cyprus Marine Environmental Protection Association		GC	B	A	9/2/02	1/31/03	17,402.79	Closed
P07-01-051	EDUCATING THE PUBLIC ABOUT PREVENTION AND EARLY DETECTION OF CANCER - OBMO-60191 - Contract closed at 27/11/03	Kemal Saracoglu Foundation	TC		B	B	9/16/02	9/15/03	69,064.58	Closed
P07-01-052	CYPRUS FOLKORE ARCHIVE AND LIBRARY - OBMO 60281 & 60282 & 80729-1	Has Der	TC		B	B	9/16/02	12/12/03	50,189.00	
P07-01-053	IMPLEMENTING SEX AND GENDER EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS/TRAIN THE TRAINERS AND TRAIN THE TEACHERS	Cyprus Family Planning Association		GC	C	B	1/1/02	12/30/03	20,230.54	
P07-01-054	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF HUMAN PAPILLOMA VIRUS INFECTION IN CYPRUS - Contract closed at 27/11/03	The Mendel Centre for Biomedical Sciences		GC	C	C	9/25/02	8/31/03	54,016.84	Closed
P07-01-056	Women Waging Peace-Indelible memories	Women Waging Peace Cyprus Branch		GC	C	C	4/15/01	2/28/02	5,454.48	Closed
P07-01-057	ESTABLISHMENT OF MUSIC LABEL FOR YOUTH	Olive Tree Music		GC	A	A	5/15/03	6/30/04	50,000.00	
P07-01-058	CYPRUS GEOLOGICAL HERITAGE EDUCATION TOLL	Research & Development Institute Intercollege		GC	B	B	5/30/03	5/30/04	62,745.00	
P07-01-059	THE YOUNG GREEN CONSUMERS:THE CITIZEN OF TOMORROW	Soma Akriton		GC			7/7/03	7/9/04	52,941.00	
P07-01-059	The young Green Consumer: The citizen of tomorrow	Has Der Youth Club	TC				9/22/03	8/2/04	49,900.00	
P07-01-061	Lefka Summer School	Lefke Community Centre	TC		C	B	8/15/03	10/15/03	11,961.00	
P07-01-064	Survey and Training on heart and Cardio Vascular Diseases	TC Heart Association	TC		C	C	8/10/03	7/30/04	32,134.00	
P07-01-065	Jasmine Garden Internet Cafe	Folk Art Foundation	TC		C	B	11/1/03	10/30/04	42,270.00	
P07-01-066	Raising Awareness on Consumer Protection and Rights	Cyprus Consumers Association		GC	A	A	9/15/03	8/23/04	35,804.00	
P07-01-067	Gender, Conflict and the Media : Working Towards Egalitarianism and Peace	Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies		GC	B	B	10/1/03	7/30/04	50,000.00	
P07-01-068	E@ting towards Unity : Cypriot Cuisine and Converging Factor	Eurotqtques Cyprus Office		GC	B	A	10/1/03	10/31/04	40,000.00	
P07-01-069	Survey of Human Resource Management Policies and Practices of Organizations in the Turkish Cypriot Community	TC Human Resource Management Association	TC		C	C	9/10/03	7/30/04	8,540.00	
P07-01-072	Women and The Accounting Profession in a United Cyprus	Cyprus Institute of CPA's		GC	B	C	7/15/03	6/15/04	18,314.00	
P07-01-073	Panel discussions - Regional and Key Events	OPEK Association of Social Forum		GC	A	A	12/1/03	3/29/04	43,440.00	
P07-01-075	The Green Corners of my Neighbourhood	CYMEPA: Cyprus Marine Environmental Protection Association		GC			12/1/03	8/31/04	37,000.00	
P07-01-075	The Green Corners of my Neighborhood	SID (Society for International Development) EREC (Environmental Research And Education Center)	TC				12/1/03	8/31/04	37,000.00	
P07-01-076	RAISING AWARENESS ON ISSUES AFFECTING CHILDREN	Centre for the Study of Childhood and Adolescence		GC	C	B	12/1/03	11/30/04	50,000.00	
P07-02-001	Bi-communal Management Centre	Association of Management Studies		GC	B	A	9/1/99	12/31/02	59,632.99	Closed
P07-02-001	The Management Centre	CT Association of Managers	TC		B	A	9/3/01	7/31/02	85,474.27	Closed
P07-02-001	THE MANAGEMENT CENTRE - OBMO 60615 & 60616 - Contract closed at 27/11/03	CT Association of Managers		GC	B	A	8/1/02	10/31/03	190,909.14	Closed
P07-02-001	MANAGEMENT CENTRE - TCC	CT Association of Managers	TC		B	A	11/13/03	8/13/04	112,618.00	
P07-02-001	NGO Technical Support Centre	Association of Management Studies		GC	B	A	1/1/00	12/31/01	66,197.65	Closed
P07-02-002	Gender Mainstreaming Seminar			GC	A	B	2/5/03	2/5/03	1,759.26	Closed
P07-02-002	TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR NGOS			GC	B	A	10/12/02	12/14/02	16,247.10	Closed
P07-02-002	TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR NGOS - Contract closed at 27/11/03			GC	B	A	4/15/03	4/24/03	1,574.07	Closed
P07-02-002	Training NGOs in Public and Media Relations			GC	B	A	5/22/03	5/27/03	1,176.47	Closed
P07-03-001	SURVEY ON NGOS ORGN.CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS/GCC	INTERCOLLEGE		GC	C	C	2/19/02	4/8/02	6,561.60	Closed
P07-03-001	Survey on NGOs Capacity Building Needs	SOAR		GC	C	C	2/26/02	4/9/02	5,352.68	Closed
P07-04-001	Bi-communal Gender Training			GC	A	B	3/22/02	3/27/02	1,682.67	Closed
P07-04-002	DEAF WAY II CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON D.C.	Pancyprian Organisation for the Deaf		GC	A	C	6/27/02	8/1/02	27,511.67	Closed
P07-04-003	STEPS FOR PEACE	STEPS FOR PEACE		GC	A	B	6/24/02	7/7/02	8,450.70	Closed
P07-04-004	STEPS FOR PEACE BI-COMMUNAL CHOIR	The Peace Centre 'Bi-communal Choir'		GC	A	A	5/1/02	5/15/02	27,546.15	Closed

P07-04-005	CIVIL SOCIETY COMMON INITIATIVE	OPEK Association of Social Forum		GC	A	A	12/6/02	12/7/02	2,094.69	
P07-04-007	PREPARATION & DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATIVE MATERIALS ON HIV/AIDS AND ITS PREVENTION	Cyprus Family Planning Association		GC	B	B	12/1/03	12/12/03	5,600.00	
P07-04-007	World Aids Day 2003	HRM	TC		B	B	12/1/03	12/12/03	8,740.00	
P07-04-009	PANEL DISCUSSIONS	OPEK Association of Social Forum		GC	A	A	3/17/03	3/17/03	2,399.81	Closed
P07-04-009	PANEL DISCUSSION - MAY 2003	OPEK Association of Social Forum		GC	A	A	5/30/03	5/30/03	3,890.00	To Close?
P07-04-009	PANEL DISCUSSION JUNE 2003 - Contract closed at 27/11/03	OPEK Association of Social Forum		GC	A	A	6/20/03	6/23/03	2,715.69	Closed
P07-04-009	Public Debate : Cyprus 2004 : Solution - Accession - Contract closed at 27/11/03	OPEK Association of Social Forum		GC	A	A	10/1/03	10/1/03	2,074.36	Closed
P07-04-009	Panel Discussion : Debate on topic Cyprus 2004 : Solution Accession - Contract closed at 27/11/03	OPEK Association of Social Forum		GC	A	A	10/10/03	11/10/03	4,853.23	Closed
P07-04-009	Public debate on the topic Cyprus 2004:solution - accession in Lymia - Contract closed at 03/12/03	OPEK Association of Social Forum		GC	A	A	10/29/03	10/29/03	2,306.12	Closed
P07-04-011	Cypriot Signing of the Olympic Truce Declaration	OPEK Association of Social Forum		GC	B	A	4/6/03	4/6/03	4,849.00	Closed
P07-04-016	PARTICIPATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL THALASSEMIA CONFERENCE	Pancyvripan Thalassaemia Association		GC	B	C	7/10/03	12/1/03	9,155.00	
P07-04-017	ORGANIZATION OF YOUTH ROCK PEACE CONCERT	Art & Wild Nature Foundation		GC	A	A	7/1/03	9/1/03	4,314.00	To Close?
P07-04-024	4th Global Conference on Culture of Violence - OBM 76466-1 - Contract closed at 27/11/03		DX		A	C	9/19/03	9/29/03	3,160.98	Closed
P07-04-025	AIDS-FREE CYPRUS. EDUCATION PROGRAMME ON THE PROTECTION FROM HIV/AIDS AND OTHER STD'S	Girl Guides Association		GC	B	B	10/7/03	12/22/03	10,530.00	
P07-04-026	COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION SEMINAR - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 13/12/03	Youth for reconciliation		GC	A	A	11/9/03	11/23/03	1,990.12	Closed
P07-04-028	Conference on Laparoscopic Surgery	Cypriot Turkish Medical Association	TC		B	C	10/31/03	11/10/03	2,654.00	Closed
P07-04-029	Rockathon - Merging Cultures bi-communal musical event	Shiela & Dave Fenton (Rockathon: unregistered)		X	A	C	11/4/03	11/25/03	10,000.00	
P08-01-001	TRANSLATION OF UN PEACE PLAN-TURKISH - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	WorldLingo			A	C	2/12/03	2/25/03	23,368.43	
P08-01-001	TRANSLATION OF UN PEACE PLAN-GREEK - CONTRACT CLOSED AT 9/12/03	EuroGreek			A	C	2/12/03	2/25/03	18,630.46	
P08-01-003	PUBLIC INFORMATION PROJECT	International Peace Research Institute (PRIO)			A	B	6/5/03	11/30/03	63,805.49	
P08-01-006	BI-COMMUNAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE ANNAN PLAN	Cyprus Sociological Association		X	A	C	10/17/03	1/31/04	36,244.00	
P08-01-007	WORKSHOP ON THE ANNAN PLAN AND RECONCILIATION IN CYPRUS	St. Anthony's College			A	C	10/3/03	10/4/03	5,000.00	
P08-03-001	PMU Direct Execution						8/27/03	1/31/04	50,000.00	
P09-01-001	Bi-Communal Development Programme						4/1/98	12/31/98	0.00	Closed
P09-01-001	Cyprus Red Cross Society			X	A		1/1/99	12/31/99	426,000.00	Closed
P09-01-001	Assistance to CRCS Activities (1998): Office of the Vice-President						1/5/99	12/31/98	0.00	Closed
P09-01-001	Operational Cost for the year 2002 - Contract closed at 27/11/03						1/1/02	12/31/02	331,156.42	Closed
P09-01-001	CRCS FOR SUPPORT TO ACTIVITIES IN 2003						1/1/03	12/31/03	471,839.66	
P09-01-001	Cyprus Red Cross Society (2001) - Contract closed at 27/11/03						1/1/01	12/31/01	414,404.22	Closed
P09-01-001	Cyprus Red Cross Society (WSE-PS-409)						1/1/00	12/31/00	451,134.00	
P09-01-002	Support to HRM's activities (1999)						1/1/99	12/31/99	116,336.02	Closed
P09-01-002	Support to the HRM activities (2001) - Contract closed at 27/11/03						1/1/01	12/31/01	102,365.28	Closed
P09-01-002	Operational Expenses for 2002						1/1/02	12/31/02	126,319.63	Closed
P09-01-002	HUMANITARIAN RELIEF MISSION FOR SUPORT TO ACTIVITIES FOR 2003						1/1/03	12/31/03	80,306.91	
P09-01-002	Humanitarian Relief Mission (2000)						1/1/00	12/31/00	94,444.22	Closed
P10-03-007	COMMUNICATIONS SKILLS TRAINING - Contract closed at 27/11/03	ACUMEN			C	C	9/12/02	9/13/02	4,076.27	Closed
P10-10-001	Support to HRM activities (1998)			X	A		9/1/98	12/31/98	50,380.00	Closed